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Abstract 
 
Resource allocation is an important context in which children and adolescents learn 
about moral issues of equality, equity and fair exchange. Recent research has 
examined resource allocation in an intergroup context in an attempt to understand 
how group processes exert an influence upon the propensity to share fairly. This 
thesis extends existing knowledge by providing an in-depth examination of a key 
element of the intergroup world; namely, social norms. Specifically, how the ability 
to coordinate multiple social norms when allocating resources in a challenging 
intergroup context develops between middle childhood and adolescence. Chapter 
One provides an overview of literature regarding resource allocation in an intergroup 
context, as well as relevant theory. In Chapter Two when ingroup and outgroup 
norms of competition and cooperation were manipulated, participants coordinated 
multiple norms at the peer level when allocating resources. In Chapter Three, 
adolescents and young adults coordinated peer group and generic societal norms, 
whereas children relied predominantly on ingroup norms to guide their allocation. 
Chapter Four demonstrated age-related differences between children and young 
adults in understanding of group processes when evaluating ingroup members who 
deviated from a resource allocation norm. In Chapter Five children coordinated 
generic norms at the classroom level with ingroup norms in their allocation 
decisions. Finally, Chapter Six examined the influence of peer norms in a situation 
of intergroup inequality. Adolescents coordinated their understanding of relative 
advantage and group processes, whilst children allocated equally. Overall these 
studies demonstrate the development of resource allocation strategies that 
simultaneously coordinate peer level norms, generic societal norms, and contextual 
6 
 
information. In Chapter Seven, the findings are discussed in the context of theory 
and potential explanatory mechanisms are explored. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction & Literature Review 
 
Resource allocation involves fundamental moral considerations including the fair 
treatment of others, and has subsequently long been a central component of research 
concerning the development of morality (Damon, 1977). Resource allocation has 
been studied from diverse perspectives including psychology, neuroscience, and 
moral philosophy (Rawls, 1971). Fair resource allocation is an important context in 
which children begin to appreciate moral concepts that are applied more broadly 
throughout the developmental lifespan. Meritocracy, need, equality and the rights of 
others are important ideas that emerge through the lens of resource allocation. 
Historically, developmental research has predominantly examined resource 
allocation as an interpersonal process (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & 
Tomasello, 2011). However, a burgeoning line of research from developmental 
intergroup theoretical perspectives has begun to explore how group processes play a 
central role in guiding the development of fair resource allocation (Rutland & Killen, 
2017). The present work adopts this perspective to examine how a specific element 
of group processes influences the development of fair resource allocation and social 
reasoning; namely, social norms.  
Across five empirical chapters this thesis explores how social norms 
influence children, adolescents’ and adults’ allocation of communal resources in 
complex intergroup contexts, as well as their social reasoning regarding these 
decisions. In order to do so, we first explore what is already known about children 
and adolescents’ resource allocation decisions in both interpersonal and intergroup 
settings. This is followed by an examination of the theoretical perspectives that this 
Chapter One: Introduction 
16 
 
work draws upon. Finally, the central aims and common methodology of the studies 
that follow are outlined. 
Understanding the development of fair resource allocation is a central aim of 
moral philosophy and developmental psychology. Biased allocation of resources has 
broad consequences at a societal level, particularly when resources are unfairly 
distributed based on intergroup characteristics. Examining the developmental roots 
of this behavior, and pinpointing the factors that can influence biased behavior along 
with the ages at which these factors are important is essential in order to develop 
educational practices that promote egalitarian resource allocation. The present work 
seeks to extend the field by providing the first systematic examination of how peer 
group and generic societal norms directly influence the allocation of resources, how 
such norms are considered when evaluating group members who deviate from said 
norms, and finally how norms can be used to challenge unfair resource allocation. 
1.1. A Concern For Fairness  
A core focus of developmental moral psychology is to establish what is 
considered fair by whom and when. Much of the existing work on resource 
allocation that explores these boundaries of fairness comes from either an 
interpersonal perspective (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; Wittig, 
Jensen, & Tomasello, 2013) , or examines resource allocation in infancy and young 
childhood (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Less is known 
about how fair resource allocation emerges in an intergroup setting and extends from 
middle childhood into adolescence. Interpersonal work in infancy has, however, 
been extremely important in elucidating how children think resources ought to be 
allocated when the identity of the individuals involved is not central to the procedure 
of the study (i.e. their group memberships are not made salient). 
Chapter One: Introduction 
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Researchers have traditionally used decision-making games in order to 
examine resource allocation behavior. These games were first developed to explore 
bargaining behaviour and early studies utilising them revealed the importance of one 
resource allocation style. Specifically, participants consistently demonstrate a 
tendency to allocate resources equally in order for individuals to receive a roughly 
fair share. In Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze's (1982) Ultimatum Game (UG) 
participants are asked to distribute a set of resources (e.g. money) between 
themselves and an anonymous other in a one-shot dyadic exchange where the 
‘receiver’ must accept the individual’s offer in order for either player to receive their 
share. This requires participants to take the perspective of their sharing partner in 
order to make an offer that they believe will be accepted.  
In Güth and colleague’s original sample participants generally offered 
between 40 and 50% of their allotted resources, and only two participants were 
willing to accept a 10% share of the resources. The fact that conflict arose when 
participants were offered this small share, but not for a 40% share suggests that 
participants were more concerned with achieving relative equality than they were 
with maximising their own resources (i.e. they weren’t looking to “beat” the decision 
maker). In other words, it matters how much someone else is going to receive in an 
exchange situation, and decision makers are not singularly focused on their own 
gains and losses. In particular, it matters if someone else is going to benefit above an 
equal share of resources. As a result of this, adults are willing to forgo an offer they 
might otherwise find attractive if someone else is set to do better than they are.  
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) further probed this concern for equal 
allocation using their Dictator Game (DG), which forced participants to respond to 
unfair allocations. Kahneman argued that participants in the UG might have chosen 
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equal allocations due to concerns for reciprocity from their sharing partner in future 
iterations. The DG was designed such that participants’ believed their sharing partner 
could not retaliate or reciprocate their chosen allocation style. Participants were 
asked to distribute $20 between themselves and an anonymous ‘receiver’ who would 
have no choice but to accept their offer. Individuals could choose between two 
allocations; either taking $18 for themselves whilst giving their partner $2, or an 
equal split of $10 for each player. The rational economic choice, with no risk that the 
receiver could retaliate, would be to maximise and select the $18 share.  
However, the results of this study replicated and emphasised the equality 
concern shown by Guth et al., as 76% of participants selected the equal allocation 
strategy. This is particularly remarkable given that participants were not provided 
with any information regarding their partner (i.e. their group or personal affiliations), 
and were aware of the one-shot nature of the decision. With retaliation not possible 
and consequences for maximisation non-existent, an equal allocation strategy can 
only be accounted for by a concern for equal allocation and fairness. This fair 
allocation of resources has been consistently replicated in adult samples (see Roth, 
1995 for a review). Similar dyadic exchange studies have been conducted with child 
samples and reveal a similar picture of the ontogeny of interpersonal resource 
allocation in childhood. 
1.2. Development of Equality Concern  
Using similar resource allocation games within developmental samples, 
results appear largely consistent with the idea that children too allocate resources 
equally in interpersonal settings. Benenson, Pascoe, and Radmore (2007) asked 
participants between 4 and 9-years-old to distribute resources in the DG with an 
anonymous partner. From 4 years old, participants allocated up to 30% of their 
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resources to a partner, approaching the values seen in comparable adult work 
(Henrich et al., 2005; Kahneman et al., 1986). 9-year-old children allocated a greater 
share of the resources to their partner. In situations of interpersonal dyadic exchange 
where group identity information is not made salient, children prefer to allocate 
resources equally between individuals. These findings speak to a fundamental 
preference for fairness not just amongst adults, but so too in childhood. 
A number of recent studies using various adaptations of the DG with 
developmental samples have revealed similar results to Benenson and colleagues 
(Blake, Corbit, Callaghan, & Warneken, 2016; Blake & Rand, 2010; Cowell et al., 
2017; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Smith, Blake, & 
Harris, 2013). Broadly, these studies suggest that with age (i.e. between young and 
middle childhood), children make more equitable offers to their sharing partners. 
However, they rarely offer more than half of the resources to their partner. 
Interestingly, these findings vary across cultures. For example, expectations for 
generosity had a larger impact on the allocation decisions of children in India than 
they did on children in the US (Blake et al., 2016). Such variation across cultures 
speaks to the importance that normative information may hold for children when 
allocating resources. 
When allocating resources in value-neutral interpersonal contexts where they 
are not aware of the group membership of sharing partners, children, adolescents and 
adults alike do not capitalize upon opportunities to maximise their share of 
resources. Instead they show a consistent desire to allocate resources equally. 
However, we know that in reality resource allocation decisions rarely occur in the 
dyadic interpersonal vacuum in which they are most often studied. Instead, we have 
access to important information about our sharing partners regarding their group 
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memberships. Which groups individuals affiliate with and are members of, what 
values these groups might hold (particularly in reference to allocation of resources) 
and how likely groups may be to reciprocate an equal share of resources are 
important factors in deciding upon a resource allocation strategy. Importantly, 
children have been shown to utilise salient intergroup information to guide their 
resource allocation decisions. 
1.3. Intergroup Resource Allocation  
A number of studies have moved beyond the use of interpersonal decision-
making games by examining how children and adolescents allocate resources in 
situations where group membership is made salient. Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach 
(2008) asked participants aged between 3 and 8-years-old to choose a preferred 
strategy for allocating resources between themselves and a partner. In the ‘sharing’ 
condition, participants could select an equal split where both participants received 
one resource, or an unequal allocation where they would receive two resources at the 
cost of their partner receiving none. In order to sustain equality between parties in 
this condition, children had to accept a cost to the self. Crucially, Fehr et al. 
manipulated the group membership of the sharing partner. Participants were told that 
their partner was either a member of their own school (i.e. an ingroup member) or 
another school (i.e. an outgroup member).  
Results demonstrated a developmental trend in the concern for equality in 
line with the interpersonal decision-making game literature. With age, participants 
moved closer to equality in their decision-making. Less than 10% of 4-year-olds 
were willing to accept a cost to the self in order to share, with the majority of 
participants taking two resources for themselves and leaving their partner with 
nothing. By 5 to 6 years, 22% selected the equal option and accepted the cost of 
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losing out on an extra resource to ensure their partner received one. By comparison, 
45% of 7-year-old participants opted for the even split at a cost to the self. With age, 
a relatively greater proportion of children are willing to accept a cost in order to 
achieve equality. This finding fits with research using interpersonal allocation games 
(Blake et al., 2016; Blake & Rand, 2010; Cowell et al., 2017; Gummerum et al., 
2010; Smith et al., 2013). 
Most importantly, the propensity to choose the sharing option varied as a 
function of the partner’s group identity. Across the age groups, children were 15 - 
20% more likely to select the egalitarian option and share the resources equally if 
their partner was an ingroup member. Ingroup membership motivated greater equal 
allocation tendencies. Whether this is due to awareness of group conventions or a 
concern for reciprocity is unclear from these results, but this is indicative of an 
influence of group membership from middle childhood. Interestingly, it was not only 
in-group membership that influenced allocation decisions. By 8 years only 12% of 
participants were willing to share with an outgroup member. Young children are not 
only concerned with equality for ingroup members but also acutely aware of 
conventions that dictate ensuring distinction from the outgroup via the medium of 
resource allocation. 
Similarly, Moore (2009) asked 4 to 6-year-old participants to distribute 
resources between themselves and an individual who was ostensibly a friend, a non-
friend or a stranger. Again, this provides a test of whether group membership or 
concerns for equal allocation provide a more pressing influence in middle childhood. 
Participants could either give their partner one sticker and accept a short wait for 
their own sticker, or take two stickers for themselves up front and enforce the wait 
on their partner. Consistent with the findings of Fehr et al., children were more likely 
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to choose the equal option and accept a cost to the self when their partner was a 
friend than they were when the receiver was a non-friend. Interestingly, participants 
did not discriminate against strangers by enforcing a wait upon them, suggesting that 
children prefer the egalitarian option until they encounter a conflict between their 
moral concerns and the outgroup membership of the recipient.  
Both Fehr et al. and Moore utilised pre-existing groups (i.e. school 
membership, peer group friendships) in order to examine the relative influence of 
group membership versus moral concern. Gummerum, Takezawa, & Keller (2009) 
extended this work by manipulating group membership, thus minimising the 
potential confound of pre-existing group culture and the varying strength of ingroup 
identification amongst participants. Group membership was manipulated using a 
minimal group paradigm. Participants were inducted into groups ostensibly based 
upon their response in a dot estimation task. Participants aged between 7 and 11-
years-old played the DG with the recipient’s identity varying by group (ingroup 
versus outgroup). Counter to Fehr et al. and Moore’s findings, 7-year-olds’ 
allocations did not differ depending on whether the recipient was an ingroup or 
outgroup member. In middle childhood, participants were still concerned with equal 
allocation. By comparison, 11-year-olds gave €1 less on average to outgroup 
members compared with ingroup and control recipients. This study demonstrated 
that children willingly share with a partner whose group membership is not made 
salient. However, they also favour their ingroup by altering their allocations 
according to group membership. Whilst concerned about equality, children also 
understand the importance of group membership and how this plays a role in 
allocation decisions. 
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When asked to allocate resources in a situation where group membership is 
not made salient, children, adolescents and adults allocate resources equally between 
individuals  (Benenson et al., 2007; Hamann et al., 2011; Roth, 1995; Warneken et 
al., 2011) . However, when they are asked to allocate resources with friends (Moore, 
2009), existing group members (Fehr et al., 2008) or minimal group members 
(Gummerum et al., 2009), children favour their ingroup peers. Less is known 
regarding the development of this intergroup resource allocation behavior into 
adolescence. Similarly, it is not entirely clear what is guiding this ingroup biased 
resource allocation. The present thesis explores one possible explanatory factor by 
experimentally manipulating group norms. Before discussing the aims and shared 
methodology of the thesis it is important to outline the theoretical approaches from 
which the present work draws.   
1.4. Developmental Intergroup Perspective 
The present work adopts a developmental intergroup perspective that aims to 
incorporate ideas from developmental theories concerned with social identity and 
moral development. These theories play a key role in guiding the hypotheses of the 
empirical chapters and contextualising the findings in the final chapter. 
1.4.1. Social Domain Theory. Classic thinking regarding moral development 
draws predominantly from the work of Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral 
development (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Kohlberg, in the tradition of 
Piaget, argued that children’s moral thinking developed in stages. Initially, children’s 
conventional moral thought was seen as being bound by rules and punishment. 
Kohlberg argued that children’s moral decisions were driven by adult-endorsed rules 
and concern for the consequences of not following such rules. In Kohlberg’s theory, 
this conventional focus on rules develops with age to a post-conventional stage that 
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focuses on rights, justice and more abstract moral ideas. This domain-general 
approach argues that children use a central cognitive resource to move from basic to 
more complex multi-faceted moral thinking. However, evidence suggests that 
Kohlberg underestimated the abilities of young children when it comes to moral 
thought (Conroy & Burton, 1980; Locke, 1979). 
Social Domain Theory (SDT; Turiel, 1983) is a domain-specific model 
developed in contrast to domain-general theories of moral development (Kohlberg et 
al., 1983; Piaget, 1952). Kohlberg’s theory of moral development argued that 
children move through stages of moral ability in conjunction with emergent 
cognitive abilities, ultimately analysing moral dilemmas using a global, justice-
related perspective. A domain-general account of the development of fair resource 
allocation might predict consistent equality-based allocation in older children who 
have developed the post-conventional abilities necessary to assess how their actions 
reflect global principles of fairness and equality. Instead, older children and 
adolescents are particularly sensitive to the context within which a decision takes 
place and vary their attitudes towards equal allocation accordingly (Killen, Rutland, 
Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; 
Rutland & Killen, 2016). 
Social Domain Theory provides a domain-specific account of the emergence 
of social and moral reasoning that can help account for contextual variation in 
resource allocation. SDT proposes that rather than moving through stages of moral 
reasoning, children use multiple domains of knowledge simultaneously when 
reasoning about moral issues. Turiel proposed that children reason from three 
perspectives: moral, social-conventional and psychological.  
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Moral domain reasoning concerns the inherent rightness or wrongness of a 
given behaviour. Children develop this knowledge through experience of events that 
affect the rights or welfare of themselves and others. For example, young children 
regularly experience how the unfair distribution of toys or food can impinge upon 
the rights of parties involved in the allocation situation. Turiel’s definition of the 
moral domain meets with Kohlberg’s post-conventional stage with a focus on justice 
and rights. However, Turiel argued that children are capable of this type of reasoning 
from a younger age than Kohlberg assumed. Moral decisions must take into 
consideration justice and the rights of those involved. Moral rules, in Turiel’s theory, 
are universal and are applied across contexts. They are also impartial and applied 
without taking individual identity differences into account. Finally, these rules are 
not dependent on consensus. Moral rules are accepted regardless of whether a 
minority of individuals disagree (i.e. it doesn’t matter if one person wants to 
monopolise resources, everyone should still receive a fair share).  
Reasoning in the social-conventional domain involves considerations related 
to the on-going functioning of groups. Children develop an understanding of such 
conventions based on their experience of social structures. For example, one might 
experience the benefits to an ingroup that stem from a biased resource allocation 
strategy. Transgressions in the social-conventional domain are considered wrong 
because they involve deviation from an agreed upon social norm. By comparison to 
moral domain rules, social conventions are context-specific (i.e. not universally 
applied across contexts) and can be decided upon by consensus within groups.   
Finally, thought in the psychological domain involves issues of autonomy 
and individual choice. Children learn about the psychological domain through 
experience of trying to understand the thinking of others. For example, children 
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come to understand that the allocation of a personal windfall of resources falls under 
the jurisdiction of the individual. For the most part, issues of autonomy and personal 
choice are less likely to arise in the morally relevant context of intergroup resource 
allocation.  
Intergroup resource allocation scenarios often involve competition between 
these domains. The present thesis presents participants with situations where they 
must consider whether to adhere to societal principles of fairness (moral domain), or 
allocate a greater share of resources to their ingroup in line with conventions 
regarding favouring one’s ingroup (social-conventional domain). We know that 
children are concerned with both of these domain relevant factors when allocating 
resources. In some cases young children behave in an egalitarian manner (Benenson 
et al., 2007) whilst in others they favour ingroup members (Fehr et al., 2008). In 
order to frame the studies presented in this work we adopt a developmental 
intergroup perspective that draws upon the tenets of SDT; namely, the Social 
Reasoning Development approach (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2017; 
Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). 
1.4.2. Social Reasoning Development Approach. The social reasoning 
development approach (SRD; Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 2010) proposes 
that the concurrent emergence of concerns related to morality (moral domain) and 
group dynamics (social-conventional domain) are of equal importance in children’s 
moral decision-making. Authors of the approach have recently argued that children 
and adolescents simultaneously consider both the moral and group concerns involved 
in resource allocation decisions. The allocation of resources involves more than 
moral concepts (i.e. equality, merit, need, and equity). Instead group processes are an 
important part of deciding who gets what and why. The SRD approach makes two 
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crucial points that are of particular importance to the present thesis. First: group 
processes (e.g. group norms) are relevant when considering the fair allocation of 
resources. Second: there are age related changes in fair resource allocation within 
intergroup contexts. 
1.5. Group Processes and Fair Resource Allocation 
Interpersonal friendships influence children’s moral decision-making 
regarding resource allocation (Moore, 2009). Less however is known about how 
group processes, including group status, group identification and group norms 
influence this process when group membership is a salient variable in the resource 
allocation decision. Children place important weight upon group membership from 
middle childhood (Killen & Rutland, 2011; McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, 2015; 
Nesdale & Dalton, 2011), and a strong ingroup preference emerges around this age 
(Nesdale, 2017). Some children display outgroup negativity, but the most consistent 
finding is that children treat ingroup members preferentially in both attitude and 
behaviour (Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). This is observed in 
resource allocation where children demonstrate ingroup bias by allocating resources 
in favour of ingroup members (Fehr et al., 2008). Less is known regarding the group-
level factors that may help to explain this pattern of ingroup serving allocation 
behavior. 
The SRD approach emphasizes the importance of group processes in moral 
decision-making. Group norms are one important factor that help to guide the 
behaviour of group members and delineate group boundaries. Norms are the 
expectations that regulate behavior both at the group and societal level. Norms are 
highly influential in guiding children’s intergroup evaluations and attitudes. 
Exclusionary ingroup norms lead to more negative outgroup attitudes and intentions 
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(Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, Kiesner, & Griffiths, 2008; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & 
Griffiths, 2005), but the latter can be tempered by an inclusive ingroup norm 
(McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). The 
SRD approach argues that norms are an important factor not just in the formation of 
intergroup attitudes, but so too in moral decision-making and fair resource 
allocation.  
Moral cognition emerges alongside understanding of these group processes in 
childhood. When group memberships are not made salient, children share equally 
with one another, seeing these moral decisions as both generalisable (applicable 
across situations) and impartial (not dependent upon situational factors). Fairness is 
one such constant that should not be influenced by the partner with whom one is 
sharing. However, we have seen that children do not always treat resource allocation 
norms as generalisable or impartial as they allocate resources preferentially to 
ingroup members. Conventions regarding group distinction and ingroup preference 
are simultaneously at play. 
It is not simply the case that children selfishly allocate resources. We know 
that children, adolescents and adults all choose to allocate resources equally and 
favour those who do the same (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1986; 
Mulvey et al., 2014; Wittig et al., 2013). Rather children show a preference for 
ingroup members in contexts that present a conflict between morality and group 
processes. Intergroup settings present the strongest challenge between these 
competing domain concerns, particularly when group-favouring norms are 
prescribed. Whilst selfish allocation is rejected as unfair due to its contrast with 
moral expectations for fairness (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011), allocating 
preferentially to ingroup members is seen as more legitimate under certain 
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circumstances. Such behavior is justified in terms of group functioning in the social-
conventional domain (Mulvey et al., 2014). Ensuring that the ingroup continues to 
function and encouraging distinction from other groups in terms of access to 
resources are used as justifications for ingroup biased allocation. 
Some recent work has explored how norms can exert an influence on the 
resource allocation of young children in an interpersonal context. McAuliffe, Raihani 
and Dunham (2017) manipulated injunctive and descriptive norms of selfishness and 
generosity in a sample of 4 – 9-year-old children. Injunctive norms were endorsed by 
the experimenter (“I think you should give…”), whilst descriptive norms outlined 
the behaviour of same-age individuals (“most kids give…”). Participants who were 
prescribed a norm for generosity gave more to another child in an adapted dictator 
game. However, younger children were more likely to take a greater share of 
resources for themselves when given a selfish norm. In turn, older children were 
more influenced by the generosity norm.  
This study emphasises the importance of normative information for children 
in resource allocation decisions. However, the present thesis goes beyond this in 
several key ways. First and most importantly, the empirical studies in this thesis 
examine these normative processes in an intergroup context. McAuliffe et al. 
manipulated norms; the origin of the norm was either a figure of authority, or a 
generic group of ‘kids’. Manipulations in the present thesis make the source of the 
norm explicit and relevant to the participant by inducting them into groups who hold 
the norms. Second, this thesis provides a novel extension to such work by examining 
the shift from early equality concern in childhood into a more advanced 
understanding of morality in adolescence. Third, the norms manipulated in the 
present thesis are related to concepts of cooperation and competition rather than 
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generous or selfish sharing. Cooperation is important from an early age and provides 
a more subtle proxy for normative expectations than an explicit instruction from an 
experimenter (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
The SRD approach synthesises work from social identity and social domain 
theories to argue that, from childhood, when deciding how to allocate resources, 
reasoning includes concerns about morality and group processes simultaneously. 
Group norms are a central focus of this theoretical approach, and burgeoning 
evidence points to their importance in resource allocation. There has yet to be a 
systematic investigation of resource allocation decisions where social norms are 
experimentally manipulated on multiple levels in a complex intergroup context, in 
order to examine their influence from childhood into adolescence. Research from the 
SRD perspective has made important points regarding the development of 
understanding of fair resource allocation across these age groups. 
1.6. Age Related Changes in Fair Resource Allocation 
Recent research has focused on how the relative influence of group processes 
and moral concerns changes as a function of age. Work in this area has demonstrated 
a developmental shift from young childhood, through middle childhood and into 
adolescence where the importance of group membership and promoting group 
functioning through resource allocation becomes increasingly salient. 
Cooley and Killen (2015) asked pre-school (3.5 to 6-years-old) participants 
to evaluate ingroup members who deviated from peer group norms of either equal or 
unequal allocation of resources. Participants were members of intra-school 
classrooms that acted as groups in this study. Participants were informed that their 
classroom either liked to give five blocks to both groups (i.e. an equality norm), or 
eight blocks to their own group and two to the other group (i.e. an ingroup biased 
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norm). They then read vignettes regarding deviant class group members who wished 
to allocate resources in the opposite manner to their ingroup.  
Ingroup members who deviated from an equal allocation norm were 
evaluated negatively. Participants justified their negative evaluation of an unequal 
deviant by referencing the importance of fairness. Crucially, these children 
differentiated their own perspective from that of the ingroup. 5 and 6-year-olds in 
this study expected that their group would not positively evaluate a deviant member, 
even if this individual argued in favour of equal allocation. The act of deviating from 
group resource allocation normative expectations and the consequences this would 
have for group functioning was expected to hold more weight than the individual’s 
moral action.  
This study emphasizes two points made by the SRD approach. First, there are 
age-related differences in the importance of morality and group processes. Pre-
school children place greater weight on equal allocation than group functioning. 
Second, with age children apply greater nuance to their understanding of group 
processes. By 5 years they distinguish between what their group might think, and 
their own personal viewpoint. Specifically, they understand the consequences of 
failing to adhere to a group norm even if this is counter to principles of equality. 
Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey and Hitti (2013) extended this work 
through the developmental lifespan by examining age-related shifts between 
children’s (9 years old) and adolescents’ (13 years old) evaluations of deviancy from 
an equal or unequal resource allocation norm. Again, participants read vignettes 
where a deviant advocated allocating resources counter to an equal norm (50:50 
split) or an unequal norm (80:20 split) that was prescribed by a school ingroup. The 
monetary resources were to be used to fund a group activity, and so monopolising 
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resources for the ingroup would actively disadvantage and exclude the outgroup. 
Results revealed a developmental shift in coordination of moral and group concerns. 
With age participants took their ingroup norm into consideration when evaluating 
deviancy. Adolescent participants argued that their ingroup would be more likely to 
positively evaluate a deviant who favoured the ingroup (against an equal allocation 
norm) with their resource allocation than a deviant who allocated resources equally 
with the outgroup (against an unequal allocation norm).  
Adolescent participants reasoned about this behavior with reference to the 
benefits to group functioning that this unequal deviant would afford them; “they (the 
ingroup) would like how she wants her group to get more money”. With age, 
individuals understand that there are contexts in which unequal allocation is 
relatively more justifiable in terms of maintaining group functioning. By 
comparison, children focused almost exclusively upon the moral duty to share 
resources equally; “he is just being greedy, which is not fair”. In increasingly 
complex intergroup scenarios where moral and group functioning concerns are 
simultaneously made salient, children reconcile this issue by focusing upon moral 
norms for equal allocation, whilst adolescents understand that adherence to group 
expectations and access to resources are important elements of navigating the social 
world.  
Whilst this emergent understanding of group processes has been well-
documented from a third-person evaluative perspective (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey 
et al., 2014), less is known regarding how children and adolescents will themselves 
allocate resources from a first-person perspective in a similarly complex intergroup 
context where group norms are manipulated. Further, this work has most often used 
descriptive norms. For example, Killen and colleagues informed participants that 
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their group had previously allocated resources in a particular way (Killen et al., 
2013). Research in the attitudes literature has also used prescriptive norms (McGuire 
et al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale et al., 2008; Nesdale & Lawson, 
2011). Direct prescriptions are often used to inform children how their peers and 
adults expect them to behave in a given situation, and for children such prescriptions 
(or injunctive norms) have been shown to be important in interpersonal resource 
allocation (McAuliffe et al., 2017). The present work advances the literature by not 
only placing participants in first person allocation scenarios, but by manipulating 
descriptive and prescriptive ingroup norms. 
Work drawing from the SRD approach has made it clear that group processes 
play an important role in tandem with moral concerns in the context of resource 
allocation decision-making. Work in this area has highlighted developmental shifts 
between childhood, middle childhood and adolescence. The ability to coordinate 
group processes with moral concerns emerges across this period, with adolescents 
best placed to understand that in intergroup contexts a group may prefer someone 
who allocates in favour of the group. So far however, it is not clear how children and 
adolescents will actually allocate resources in these situations, and the role of group 
norms in these decisions.  
1.7. Ingroup Norms 
Children and adolescents are guided by ingroup prescriptive norms when 
forming intergroup attitudes (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale, Griffith, Durkin, & 
Maass, 2005; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005) and with age come to understand from a 
third-party perspective how equal allocation norms can influence intragroup 
dynamics (Killen et al., 2013). The present thesis, for the first time, manipulates 
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norms at multiple levels and asks children, adolescents and adults to distribute 
resources from a first-person perspective in a complex intergroup context.  
Norms here are defined as rules (prescriptive) or expectations (descriptive) 
that are agreed upon as a result of discussion or unspoken consensus. Norms can 
provide guidance with regard to how one ought to behave in a given situation (i.e. 
context-specific social conventions), or generalise across scenarios (i.e. generic 
moral norms). Ingroup norms influence the formation of prejudicial and 
discriminatory attitudes (Nesdale, Griffith, Durkin, & Maass, 2005; Nesdale, Maass, 
et al., 2005), can increase intentions to display outgroup negativity (Nesdale et al., 
2008), as well as encourage more positive behaviours like prosocial giving (Blake, 
Piovesan, Montinari, Warneken, & Gino, 2015).  
Ingroup norms exist across the domains outlined by Social Domain Theory. 
For example, equal allocation of communal resources between individuals is a moral 
domain norm. Children support such norms and challenge those who deviate from 
them (Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014). Moral domain norms are 
impartial and generalisable; they are applied across situations without consideration 
of the identities of the individuals involved. In the present work we are particularly 
interested in moral domain norms related to the allocation of resources. Children 
generally choose to allocate resources equally in interpersonal situations, which 
implies the existence of moral domain norms for equal allocation. However, there 
are also situations in which groups expect their members to preferentially favour the 
ingroup when allocating.  
Social conventional domain norms, by comparison, are more often decided 
upon within groups and are both specific and non-generalizable. For example, group 
members may advocate wearing a specific group uniform when they are together in 
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order to distinguish ingroup members from outgroup members. Social-conventional 
ingroup norms like this are not applicable to those outside of the group and tend not 
to generalize across situations. For example, expectations regarding dress are 
specific to situations where group members are together.  
There may also be instances when social-conventions dictate resource 
allocation decisions. When choosing who to include in a group, there are situations 
where socially excluding an individual is seen as more legitimate due to conventions 
regarding group membership and the qualities of ingroup members (Killen & 
Stangor, 2001). Similarly, there are situations in which favouring the ingroup is more 
acceptable due to the context in which resource allocation takes place. So far, less is 
known about how children reconcile moral domain norms of equality with 
conventional contexts in which ingroup biased resource allocation is more 
justifiable.  
Preliminary examinations of the importance of ingroup norms in a first-
person allocation scenario have revealed developmental trends in line with the SRD 
approach. McGuire and Manstead (2014) inducted participants aged between 7 and 
14-years-old into simulated groups based on school membership. Participants were 
prescribed ingroup norms of competition or cooperation and asked to allocate 
resources with an outgroup partner in an adapted dictator game. Children who were 
prescribed a competitive ingroup norm demonstrated significantly more ingroup bias 
than adolescents did in the same condition. There was no difference between the age 
groups when the ingroup advocated a cooperative ingroup norm. Children are highly 
influenced by the norm of their ingroup when allocating resources. Adolescents on 
the other hand demonstrated a reflective understanding of the competitive context, 
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the ingroup norm and broader societal expectations for acceptable levels of ingroup 
bias.  
The present thesis attempts to extend this work by examining the influence of 
ingroup norms in more complex scenarios where multiple normative factors must be 
taken into consideration. Resource allocation scenarios are often more complex than 
conceptualisations seen in the interpersonal dyadic literature (Benenson et al., 2007; 
Blake et al., 2016; Blake & Rand, 2010; McAuliffe et al., 2017), involving the 
balancing of group, moral and contextual information. Importantly, to navigate 
intergroup scenarios children must take into consideration more than just their 
ingroup’s norms.  
1.8. Outgroup Norms 
Ingroup normative information is vastly important in guiding the behaviour 
of group members (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale et al., 2008; Nesdale, Griffith, et 
al., 2005; Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015). However, the expected 
behaviour of outgroup members also plays a role in these scenarios. Less is known 
regarding how children and adolescents coordinate ingroup and outgroup 
information. Research examining prosocial behaviour has made intergroup 
normative contexts salient in which both the ingroup and outgroup hold ingroup 
biased norms. In these contexts outgroup prosociality decreases and intergroup bias 
increases among children from approximately 7-years-old (Abrams, Rutland, & 
Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & Cameron, 2015; Spielman, 
2000; Zhu, Guan, & Li, 2015).  
Yet ingroup and outgroup norms are not always mutually biased in 
intergroup contexts. Outgroup members who claim to favour their own group 
members may facilitate bias from ingroup members, but this in turn may depend on 
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whether the ingroup norm is competitive or cooperative. Therefore, for the first time, 
in this thesis we manipulated both ingroup and outgroup norms of competition and 
cooperation simultaneously in the context of an intergroup resource allocation task. 
Among 6 to 9-year-old children with the necessary social perspective taking 
ability to attend to multiple group perceptions (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 
2009), a negative outgroup threat significantly increases intergroup bias when the 
ingroup holds a negative exclusion norm rather than a positive inclusion norm 
(Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005). We expected to observe similar 
interactive effects of ingroup and outgroup norm in the context of resource allocation 
decision-making when the outgroup held a competitive or group-biased norm. 
However, not all outgroup influences are negative or threatening. Taking this into 
account, we also examined the influence of an outgroup who advocates cooperative 
behaviour. Specifically, we were interested in whether cooperative outgroup 
normative information would lead to more egalitarian resource allocation from 
ingroup children and adolescents. 
1.9. Generic Norms 
Norms exist within groups as moral imperatives and context-specific social-
conventions. However there are also broader societal-level generic norms that guide 
behavior across group boundaries in order to maintain established expectations for 
societal functioning. It is important to consider these higher-level generic norms 
since research has shown that with age children and adolescents give priority to 
societal level norms over local-level peer group norms (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, 
Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013). A particularly important generic normative expectation is 
the moral imperative to be fair. Children, adolescents and adults alike consider 
fairness to be of importance at the impartial and generalizable generic level and take 
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it into account when evaluating the behavior of normative and deviant ingroup 
members (Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014).  
There are however situations in which generic expectations do not require 
individuals to adhere to generalizable moral absolutes. For example, in a school 
sports class, participants are expected to attempt to learn together through the 
medium of sport. By comparison, an intergroup school competition allows 
individuals to more acceptably favour their own team (within the bounds of the 
competition). We know that such generic normative expectations are important for 
establishing intergroup boundaries, making inclusion decisions and evaluating group 
members (Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015). Less is known about 
how generic level norms influence first-person resource allocation. The present 
thesis seeks to examine this by directly manipulating generic level norms of 
competition and cooperation. 
1.10. Cooperation & Competition  
In Chapters Two through Five, group and generic level norms of competition 
and cooperation are manipulated. Cooperative and competitive norms underlie many 
intergroup situations involving the allocation of resources. Cooperation and 
competition surrounding resources can occur at an individual level (“I want more!” 
or "I will give you some") or at the group level (“Our group gets more!” or "We will 
share some with them"). While children are both motivated to engage in competitive 
and cooperative activities (Crystal, Watanabe, & Chen, 2000; Zhu et al., 2015), and 
pay attention to norms from a young age (Schmidt, Rakoczy, Mietzsch, & 
Tomasello, 2016), few studies have examined the influence of cooperative and 
competitive group norms on the allocation of resources. In fact, little is known about 
how children balance the influence of both cooperative and competitive norms in 
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intergroup resource allocation contexts, or how this understanding develops from 
childhood through adolescence and into early adulthood. 
A longstanding line of research has demonstrated that from infancy, humans 
show a strong desire to cooperate with others (Killen & de Waal, 2000; Smetana & 
Turiel, 2003; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). This generic moral norm for cooperation is 
reflected in cooperation seen amongst children (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & 
Tomasello, 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Yet, societal moral expectations 
about cooperation are not the only influence children consider when allocating 
resources, especially in intergroup contexts when social categories (e.g., gender, 
ethnicity) and social comparisons are salient. 
In early and middle childhood, competitive contexts reduce a preference for a 
fair distribution of resources (Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 2012) as well as prosocial 
resource allocation in interpersonal contexts (Pappert, Williams, & Moore, 2017). 
Research has also shown that from approximately 7 years old, a competitive 
intergroup context decreases outgroup prosociality and increases intergroup bias 
(Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & Cameron, 
2015; Spielman, 2000; Zhu et al., 2015). However, previous developmental research 
has not directly manipulated competitive and cooperative group norms; nor has it 
examined age-related changes from childhood to adulthood in the understanding of 
such norms.  
In the first four chapters of the present thesis ingroup norms of cooperation 
and competition are manipulated in a morally relevant resource allocation task. 
Norms of cooperation and competition are relevant for several reasons. Intergroup 
situations are often inherently competitive, particularly when groups must compete 
for access to limited resources. At the same time, such decisions fall under the 
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jurisdiction of cooperative generic expectations that are linked with moral domain 
issues of equality. Little is known about how children respond to cooperative and 
competitive ingroup norms, and how they balance the influence of such norms with 
moral and group factors. 
1.11. Central Aims  
The present thesis seeks to build upon and synthesise extant work from the 
fields of decision-making, group processes and moral development to provide an in-
depth and systematic examination of the influence of group and generic level norms 
on children and adolescents’ resource allocation decisions. The thesis uses 
theoretical insights from the social reasoning development approach to examine 
complex intergroup scenarios where moral and group factors are simultaneously 
salient, requiring participants to coordinate these factors. Further, we are interested 
in age related changes in the relative importance of these variables across various 
complex intergroup contexts. There were three central aims, as follows. 
1. To examine how norms directly influence resource allocation. The SRD 
approach has emphasised the importance of social-conventional group 
constructs in tangent with moral domain concerns in the resource allocation 
decision-making process. So far, there has not been a systematic 
investigation of the types of norms that are influential for children and 
adolescents’ resource allocation decisions. The present work aims to 
provide this examination by manipulating ingroup norms, outgroup norms, 
and generic norms in order to establish their relative influence on resource 
allocation decisions. 
2. To examine the developmental shift in coordination of group and moral 
factors in complex first-person resource allocation scenarios. Specifically, 
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we are interested in examining how the relative influence of norms (social-
conventional domain factor) versus equality concern (moral domain factor) 
changes across the developmental lifespan and varies by context. Much 
work has established that children, adolescents and adults alike care about 
fairness and equal allocation in value-neutral settings. Less is known about 
how these concerns change developmentally as a function of the complexity 
of the situation and the group identities of the recipients of resources. 
3. To analyse social reasoning data to complement behavioral resource 
allocation data. Observing how children and adolescents allocate resources 
as a function of group norms in an intergroup setting is an essential first 
step. However, any work drawing from a SDT/SRD approach must 
necessarily consider how children and adolescents reason about their 
decision-making. Here, social reasoning data was collected and analysed in 
an attempt to provide a richer picture of the “why?” of resource allocation. 
Specifically, we were interested in the ways in which reasoning style would 
vary dependent upon the participant’s age and their chosen resource 
allocation strategy.  
1.12. Chapter Overview  
Chapter Two: Outgroup Norms. Children and adolescents are guided by 
ingroup norms when forming intergroup attitudes and when allocating resources. 
They also evaluate positively those who cooperate and allocate resources equally in 
line with an equal allocation ingroup norm. Similarly, outgroup information has been 
shown to influence the formation of attitudes and evaluations of outgroup members. 
There has not been a systematic examination of whether similar outgroup normative 
information influences the allocation of resources. Chapter Two manipulates ingroup 
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and outgroup norms of cooperation and competition in order to examine whether 
children and adolescents coordinate these norms when making resource allocation 
decisions. 
Chapter Three: Generic Norms & Resources. Norms are prescribed at the 
group level and are important in guiding intergroup behavior. However, generic 
norms also influence behaviour at a broader societal level. Children and adolescents 
face a challenge when they must consider not only what their group expects of them, 
but also what the generic normative context suggests to be behaviourally appropriate. 
Chapter Three extends previous work by examining resource allocation in the 
context of cooperative and competitive norms at both the ingroup and generic level 
from middle childhood, through adolescence, into young adulthood. This study 
attempts to pinpoint the age at which the ability to coordinate group and generic 
normative processes emerges. Here we manipulated ingroup norms of cooperation 
and competition, as well as inducting participants into cooperative or competitive 
generic normative contexts in order to examine whether there are age-related 
differences in the ability to coordinate these multiple competing variables between 
middle childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood.  
Chapter Four: Generic Norms & Deviants. Resource allocation is an 
important component of moral decision-making. It is also a useful standard for 
evaluating ingroup members and deciding who ought to be included in the group. In 
Chapter Four we were interested in children’s, adolescents’ and adults’ evaluations 
of a group member who deviated from an ingroup norm. Specifically, we wanted to 
examine whether deviant evaluations were dependent upon ingroup norms, the age 
of the participant, and their own allocation decisions. Participants’ evaluations of 
normative and deviant ingroup members were assessed, along with perceptions of 
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their ingroup’s evaluations of these individuals. Developing an understanding of how 
intragroup behaviour will be evaluated by other ingroup members is an essential 
ability in order to ensure one’s continued membership of chosen social groups, and 
to establish boundaries between groups. Again, this becomes increasingly 
challenging when ingroup and generic norms of competition and cooperation are 
manipulated. Given this, we expected to observe age-related differences in 
understanding of individual and group perspectives. 
Chapter Five: Growth & Performance Norms. In Chapter Three, we 
examined the influence of cooperative and competitive generic normative contexts 
on resource allocation decisions. The generic cooperation norm in Chapter Three 
implied that groups ought to work together in order to help a charity cause. Chapter 
Five extended this work by asking whether cooperative generic contexts always 
imply the same behavioral expectations (i.e. are always morally relevant) and 
whether children and adolescents understand these differences. This study once 
again manipulated ingroup norms of competition and cooperation. However, there 
were three generic contexts; competitive, performance-focus (ostensibly cooperative, 
but with an outcome variable that group performance could be measured upon), and 
learning-focus (cooperative with no outcome variable to measure group performance 
against). We were interested in whether children and adolescents would demonstrate 
ingroup bias when their performance could be measured, even in an ostensibly 
cooperative context. We expected that the measurable outcome of a cooperative 
event would influence participants’ resource allocation decisions.  
Chapter Six: Challenging Inequalities. Finally, Chapter Six builds upon the 
preceding four studies in an attempt to apply our understanding of the influence of 
norms to a situation where there is a pre-existing resource inequality between 
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groups. It is important to recognise that in many situations resources are unequally 
distributed based on intergroup characteristics. Chapter Six examined whether 
children and adolescents would rectify an inequality in a complex intergroup 
scenario where an ingroup norm of equality or equity was manipulated. This study 
also extended existing work on inequalities by moving from a third-party perspective 
to a first-person resource allocation situation where the participants’ ingroup were 
personally advantaged or disadvantaged by a pre-existing inequality. We again 
expected to observe age-related differences in resource allocation as a function of the 
prescribed ingroup norm and the relative advantage held by the ingroup. 
1.13. Common Methodology 
In each of these empirical chapters, participants were inducted into simulated 
groups based upon school membership. School groups serve as a particularly 
important ingroup for children and adolescents and they are strongly motivated to 
maintain membership of these groups (Goodenow, 1993). Manipulating group norms 
within a school context has previously been shown to be successful in the attitudes 
literature (McGuire & Manstead, 2014; Nesdale, Griffith, et al., 2005; Nesdale, 
Maass, et al., 2005). In the present thesis, participants were inducted into groups 
based on school membership and asked to imagine they would be taking part in a 
forthcoming inter-school arts event. This method has been previously shown to 
induce strong ingroup preference (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale, Griffith, et al., 
2005; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003). Ingroup norms were manipulated 
in each study by informing participants that their group had a ‘secret message’ for 
new group members to listen to. This message included the pertinent normative 
information. Following the normative manipulation, participants allocated resources 
and provided reasoning justifications for their decision. 
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1.14. Central Hypotheses  
Following on from the central aims of the thesis, there are three central 
hypotheses (more specific hypotheses are outlined in the relevant chapters that 
follow).  
1. Peer group norms were predicted to provide a key influence for all 
participants. For example, a competitive ingroup norm was expected to result 
in more ingroup biased resource allocation. Likewise, a cooperative ingroup 
norm was expected to lead to more equal resource allocation.  
2. Age-related differences were expected in the ability to coordinate ingroup 
norms and other normative information (e.g. outgroup norms, generic 
norms). Older participants (adolescents, adults) were expected to show an 
interactive influence of multiple norms when allocating resources. With age 
participants were expected to become more competent in coordinating the 
influence of the ingroup norm with other relevant norms. Children, by 
comparison, were expected to base their resource allocation decisions 
primarily upon the ingroup norm. Whilst children can and do consider 
influences beyond the ingroup norm, previous research has not examined 
such norms simultaneously in a challenging and complex intergroup 
competition scenario that requires the consideration of multiple norms as well 
as the context of allocation. Under these conditions, we expected children to 
rely more heavily upon the group norm when making decisions. 
3. Finally, we expected resource allocation reasoning to differ as a function of 
age group and the participants’ chosen resource allocation strategy. For 
example, participants who chose to allocate a greater share of resources to 
their ingroup were predicted to refer more frequently to group functioning 
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and social-conventional justifications for doing so. With age, we also 
expected adolescents to engage in more sophisticated reasoning justifications. 
For example, within the moral domain we expected to observe a shift in focus 
from fairness to broader conceptions of rights, justice and fair competition.  
1.15. Summary 
From childhood individuals allocate resources equally and choose to 
cooperate with others in interpersonal situations. These findings have been well 
documented in dyadic resource allocation games. However, most resource allocation 
decisions do not take place in a vacuum where the distributor of resources knows 
nothing about the identity of the receiver or the context of their decision. Recent 
work has demonstrated that social conventions and group functioning factors play 
important roles in decisions about who gets what in a resource allocation task. These 
group factors must be taken into consideration alongside moral concerns (i.e. 
fairness and morally relevant cooperation) in order to coordinate a response that is 
contextually appropriate. The influence of social norms on attitude formation, 
prejudice and discrimination has long been established. Less is known about how 
these same normative processes guide resource allocation in childhood, adolescence, 
and young adulthood.  
The present thesis provides the first systematic investigation of how ingroup, 
outgroup and generic norms can guide resource allocation strategies in complex 
intergroup situations, along with how participants reason about allocation under 
these conditions. In Chapter Two, participants were prescribed ingroup and outgroup 
norms of competition and cooperation and asked to allocate tokens for an arts 
competition. In Chapter Three, participants were again prescribed an ingroup norm 
of competition or cooperation, as well as being inducted into a generic normative 
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context that was either competitive or cooperative. Participants then allocated money 
between the two groups for an arts event. In Chapter Four, participants evaluated 
normative and deviant ingroup members following the same group and norm 
procedure of chapter three. In Chapter Five, the generic normative context was 
adapted to focus on classroom-level generic norms of competition, cooperation with 
a performance-focus, and cooperation with a growth-focus. Participants were asked 
to allocate boxes of art supplies for use in an arts event. Finally, in Chapter Six, we 
examined how ingroup norms can influence challenges to resource inequalities. 
Participants were prescribed an ingroup norm of equity or equality, and asked to 
allocate boxes of art supplies between advantaged or disadvantaged groups.  
This thesis provides an examination of one of the most important constructs 
of intergroup thinking. Without social norms there are no standards against which 
behaviour can be measured. If we wish to challenge resource inequality where it 
exists, establish consensus with regard to what is fair, just or right with regards to the 
world’s communal resources and work towards a fairer society for individuals 
regardless of their group membership, then understanding how competitive and 
unfair allocation may emerge in childhood through intergroup processes is an 
essential first step. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Ingroup and outgroup norm simultaneously influence intergroup resource allocation 
and reasoning among children and adolescents 
 
A version of the study described in this chapter has been accepted for publication: 
McGuire, L., Manstead, A., & Rutland, A. (2017). Group norms, intergroup resource 
allocation and social reasoning among children and adolescents, Developmental 
Psychology. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Allocation of resources is one way children show evidence of cooperative 
behavior involving basic moral considerations about fairness, equality and concern 
for others (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Piaget, 1952; Turiel, 1983). A longstanding line 
of research has demonstrated that from infancy, humans show a strong desire to 
cooperate with others (Killen & de Waal, 2000; Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Tomasello 
& Vaish, 2013), reflecting a generic moral norm in human cultures.  
Research on resource allocation suggests that children from the age of five 
typically favour cooperation, defend the entitlements of their peers (Schmidt, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013) and show a persistent concern for fair exchange 
throughout childhood (Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; Shaw 
& Olson, 2012). Resource allocation is an example of a morally relevant context for 
cooperation, as there can be tangible consequences if one group or individual 
receives less than another (Killen, 2016). Thus, a group norm of cooperation is often 
salient during resource allocation reflecting the generic societal moral norm 
(Hamann et al., 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Yet peer ingroup and 
Chapter Two: Outgroup Norms 
49 
 
outgroup social norms are not always cooperative and peer groups do sometimes 
advocate for competition within competitive intergroup resource allocation scenarios 
from 7 years onwards (Dejesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014; Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 
2012).   
In the first study of this thesis we examined the influence of peer ingroup 
norms and outgroup norms of competition and cooperation in an intergroup context 
on the development of children’s and adolescents' allocation of resources between 
their own group and another group. Ingroup and outgroup norms do not always 
advocate the same behavioural stance in intergroup contexts. An outgroup holding a 
competitive norm may facilitate ingroup bias but this will depend on whether the 
ingroup norm is competitive or cooperative. Similarly, it is not yet known whether 
an outgroup holding a cooperative norm may temper the ingroup biased behavioural 
response to a competitive ingroup norm. Therefore, for the first time, in this chapter 
we manipulated both ingroup and outgroup norms of competition and cooperation in 
the context of an intergroup resource allocation task. It is important to establish 
children’s understanding of norms at the intergroup level before moving on to 
examine their understanding of multiple contextual norms. 
In the present study we go beyond previous research by examining whether 
the effect of an ingroup norm on the development of intergroup resource allocation 
between 8 and 16 years is interactively influenced by an outgroup norm of 
competition or cooperation. Developmental research has found that a negative 
outgroup threat significantly increases intergroup bias when the ingroup holds a 
negative exclusion norm compared with a positive inclusion norm (Nesdale, Maass, 
Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005). This suggests that from middle childhood, children apply 
an interactive understanding of ingroup and outgroup norms to the formation of 
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prejudicial attitudes and bias. Likewise, we expected to observe an interactive 
understanding of ingroup and outgroup norms in relation to resource allocation, 
which itself is often a demonstration of ingroup bias. Specifically, we expected to 
find that a negative outgroup norm of competition would result in significantly 
greater ingroup biased resource allocation when the ingroup also held a competitive 
rather than a cooperative norm. 
Of course, outgroups do not always pose a threatening or competitive 
influence; instead, outgroup norms can be actively cooperative. Other work in the 
attitudes literature from a developmental intergroup perspective has shown that 
outgroup norms have a significant positive effect on reducing ingroup bias. This 
research has indicated that among children from 7 years, positive outgroup norms of 
friendship significantly reduce intergroup biases through direct or extended 
intergroup contact (Cameron, Rutland, & Hossain, 2011; Feddes, Noack, & Rutland, 
2009; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008). We therefore anticipated that a 
positive outgroup norm of cooperation would result in significantly less ingroup 
biased resource allocation when the ingroup also held a cooperative, rather than a 
competitive, norm. It is this coordinated understanding of contextual intergroup 
processes that provides the first block upon which understanding of more complex 
societal norms and contextual moral decision-making is built. 
The present study also, for the first time, examined the influence of group 
norms of cooperation and competition on children’s and adolescents' social 
reasoning when justifying their intergroup resource allocation decisions. Social 
domain theory (SDT) contends that children simultaneously consider the moral, 
social-conventional, and psychological domains when thinking about social relations 
(Turiel, 1983). Research on developmental intergroup processes (Hitti & Killen, 
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2015), drawing from the SRD model (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 
2017; Rutland et al., 2010), has focused on moral domain reasoning about fairness, 
whilst expanding the notion of social-conventional reasoning to include a focus on 
group identity, group dynamics and group norms. We used this model to analyse the 
social reasoning used by children and adolescents to justify their intergroup resource 
allocations.  
There is reason to expect that social reasoning justifications will be 
influenced by the ingroup norm but not the outgroup norm. Individuals within an 
intergroup context must justify their resource allocation decisions to their ingroup in 
order to retain ingroup membership and avoid social exclusion (Rutland et al., 2015). 
This is not the case with the outgroup norm since individuals do not have to maintain 
social identification with the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and are less 
concerned about social exclusion from an outgroup (Killen & Rutland, 2011). Given 
this, we did not expect to see social reasoning changing as a function of outgroup 
norm. 
When there was an ingroup cooperative norm, we expected that participants 
would use significantly more moral reasoning (i.e., it should be fair and each group 
should have equal rights) to justify an equal allocation of resources since this form of 
reasoning is likely to be welcomed by a cooperative ingroup. In contrast we did not 
anticipate an effect of a competitive ingroup norm on the use of social-conventional 
reasoning. Given the age of our sample, they should possess the social acumen and 
concern about self-presentation required to avoid overly justifying intergroup bias 
with explicit reference to ingroup superiority (Nesdale, 2013; Rutland, 2013; 
Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). 
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We expected the effect of a cooperative ingroup norm on participants' moral 
reasoning when justifying equal resource allocation decisions to be more pronounced 
among adolescents compared to children. Recent developmental research has shown 
that from approximately 11 years of age individuals develop a better understanding 
of group dynamics and how deviance from the group norm results in social exclusion 
from the group (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, 
Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Rutland et al., 2015). Further, by adolescence 
individuals are increasingly sensitive to others’ emotions and being socially excluded 
by peers (Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010; Somerville, 2013). These 
developmental shifts in knowledge of group processes mean that adolescents are 
more likely than children to adapt their reasoning to fit with the ingroup norm of 
cooperation and thus avoid social exclusion.  
2.1.1 Aims 
1. To explore the relative influence of ingroup and outgroup norms on resource 
allocation between the ingroup and outgroup in a complex competitive 
intergroup context. Children and adolescents alike understand ingroup and 
outgroup norms and are guided by them when forming attitudes and 
developing intergroup friendships. We aimed to examine whether these 
norms were equally important when deciding how to allocate resources 
between groups.  
2. To examine participants’ social reasoning justifications for their resource 
allocation behaviour. Specifically, we were interested in whether children’s 
and adolescents’ justifications for their allocation strategies differed, and 
whether ingroup norm exerted an influence on this.  
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2.1.2 Hypotheses 
H1. We expected to find an interaction between ingroup norm and outgroup 
norm on resource allocation, independent of age. Specifically, we predicted that a 
negative outgroup norm of competition would result in significantly more ingroup 
biased resource allocation when the ingroup held a competitive rather than a 
cooperative norm. Inversely, we anticipated that a positive outgroup norm of 
cooperation would result in significantly less ingroup biased resource allocation 
when the ingroup also held a cooperative, rather than a competitive, norm.  
H2. We expected, when there was an ingroup cooperative norm, that 
participants would use significantly more moral domain reasoning to justify an equal 
allocation of resources, and that this would be particularly true of adolescents 
compared with children. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1 Participants  
Participants (n = 229) were recruited from the London metropolitan area. 
Participants included 131 (64 Female, 67 Male) children aged from 8 to 11 years (M 
= 9.50, SD = .74) and 98 (55 Female, 43 Male) adolescents aged between 13 and 16 
years (M = 14.64, SD = .79). Power analysis for an ANOVA with 8 groups was 
conducted in G*Power to determine a sufficient sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a 
power of 0.95, and a medium effect size (f  = .025) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Based on these assumptions, the desired sample size was 210 
participants. Participants lived in an ethnically diverse metropolitan area consisting 
of 29.4% White British, 28.5% Black British, 12.3% dual heritage, 9.3% Southeast 
Asian British, and 9.7% other ethnic groups. The ethnic makeup of our sample 
reflected this, with 24.1% White British, 26.9% Black British, 16.5% Southeast 
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Asian British, 11.4% Dual Heritage, 7.6% other ethnic groups, with 13.6% of 
participants opting to withhold ethnic information. The ethnic mix of these schools 
reflected the population of the metropolitan area in which testing took place. 
Participants attended schools serving lower to middle socioeconomic (SES) status 
areas. Parental consent and child assent were obtained for all participants. 
2.2.2. Design  
This study utilised a 2 (age group; adolescents, children) x 2 (ingroup norm; 
competition, cooperation) x 2 (outgroup norm; competition, cooperation) between-
subjects design. 
2.3. Procedure 
2.3.1. Group Induction. Ingroup membership was manipulated using a well-
tested simulated group procedure (McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, 2015; Nesdale, 
Durkin, Maass, Kiesner, & Griffiths, 2008). Participants were asked to imagine they 
would be taking part in an inter-school drawing competition and that they were 
members of the ‘excellent’ drawing team. The status of the ingroup was ostensibly 
based on the judgement of a local artist, whom participants were led to believe had 
assessed their artwork. They were placed in a high status group to reflect the fact that 
most intergroup bias is enacted by high status ingroups upon low status outgroups 
(Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011).  
Participants were shown counterbalanced pictures of two children from their 
own team, marked as the “Excellent Team" (with a blank space for the participant to 
fill as the third member of the group) and three members of their opposing team, 
marked as the “Good Team”. All pictures were matched for participant age and 
gender. Participants were told that the outgroup had been judged to be ‘good’ 
drawers, albeit not as good as their own team. This drawing competition 
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methodology has been reliably shown to induce strong feelings of ingroup 
preference, and ingroup norms manipulated in this context exert an effect on 
attitudes and behaviour (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale et 
al., 2008).  
 2.3.2. Ingroup Norm. Group norms were manipulated in line with previous 
studies on children's intergroup attitudes (Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & 
Lawson, 2011) and resource allocation (McGuire & Manstead, 2014). Children were 
randomly allocated to the ingroup and outgroup norm conditions. Participants were 
presented with either a competitive or cooperative ingroup norm via a ‘secret 
message’ from an ingroup member.  
 Participants read the following message: “Hello, we’re really happy you’re 
going to be on our team for this drawing competition. We just have one rule if you’re 
going to be on our team, and that is; 
 (Competitive) …if you want to be part of the team, you should try and make our 
team win, don’t share with other teams, and don’t support the other team in the 
competition. We want to win the competition. 
 (Cooperative) …if you want to be part of our team you have to act kindly toward all 
other members of other teams, share with them and support them in the competition. 
We want everyone to have fun and be included. 
…I hope you like being a member of the excellent drawing team, good luck!” 
 The ingroup norm manipulation was followed by a normative manipulation 
check question to probe understanding of the ingroup norm: “Does your team want 
to share with other teams?” (Yes/No).  
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2.3.3. Outgroup Norm. The outgroup norm was manipulated by informing 
participants that their team had overheard an outgroup member discussing how they 
were going to behave in the competition.  
Participants read the following in the cooperative outgroup norm condition: 
“We want everyone in the competition to have a good time and work together. It 
would be unfair if one team had more than anyone else. Let’s try our best, but it 
doesn’t matter if we don’t win!”  
In the competitive outgroup norm condition they read: “We want to win the 
competition, we’re not bothered about the other team! We want to get the most out of 
all the teams. The most important thing to us is winning!”  
This was followed by a second normative manipulation check question; 
“Does the other team care about winning the competition?” (Yes/No). 
2.4. Measures 
Participants were asked to imagine that they had 10 tokens, with a monetary 
value of £10 that could be exchanged for art materials that the group could use in the 
drawing competition (resource allocation). Participants were asked to divide these 
between the two groups. 
To assess social reasoning, participants were asked 'Why?' they choose their 
allocation (resource allocation reasoning) in an open-ended response format. All 
measures were completed individually on a laptop or tablet computer using 
Qualtrics.   
2.5. Data Preparation  
Responses to the open ended social reasoning question were coded using 
categories adapted from Social Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983). The coding system 
assigned responses to three conceptual categories based on previous research (Killen 
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et al., 2013) and theoretical formulations: (1) morality (references to justice, fairness 
or equality, e.g. "because it’s the fair thing to do"); (2) group functioning (references 
to group norms, group loyalty or winning the competition, e.g. “our team can use it 
to buy more resources”; or (3) personal choice (references to personal autonomy or 
personal rights, e.g. "It’s my decision what to do with the tokens"). Responses that 
did not make sense or fit into one of these three conceptual categories were coded as 
“other” and not included as part of the central analyses (n = 53, 23%). Analysis of 
agreement between two coders (one of whom was blind to the hypotheses of the 
study) across 25% of the responses revealed strong inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ 
= .80).  
Participants’ chosen allocation strategy was included as a variable in 
reasoning analyses for those who provided a reasoning justification. Participants who 
allocated equally (5 tokens to the ingroup, and 5 to the outgroup) were coded as 
“equality” strategists (n = 101), whilst those who allocated 6 or more tokens to their 
ingroup were coded as “ingroup servers" (n = 89).  
Participants were considered to have not fully understood the normative 
manipulation if they answered either manipulation check question counter to the 
group norm manipulation. For example, a participant was excluded if they said their 
team wanted to share resources when they were told their team held a competitive 
norm. Similarly, a participant was excluded if they said the outgroup cared about 
winning when they were informed that the outgroup held a cooperative norm. 87 
participants met the criteria for exclusion; this group comprised 58 children and 29 
adolescents (see Appendix A for a complete breakdown of exclusion by condition). 
Initial analyses were conducted with the full sample, revealing no significant results. 
Following this, participants who answered the norm manipulation check question 
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incorrectly were omitted from the final analyses. Participants who did not complete 
the resource allocation measure were not included in the final analysis (n = 10). The 
final analyses reported here included a total sample of 219 participants (children, n = 
126; adolescents, n = 93).  
2.6. Data Analytic Plan  
The number of resources allocated to the ingroup (how many tokens the 
participant allocated to their own group) was subjected to a 2 (Age: children, 
adolescents) x 2 (Ingroup norm: competitive, cooperative) x 2 (Outgroup norm: 
competitive, cooperative) univariate ANOVA. Our sample size did not allow for us 
to reliably test for gender effects in interaction with age or norm conditions. 
However, given that gender has not previously been shown to exert an effect on 
adherence to group norms (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale 
& Lawson, 2011) we did not expect differences in resource allocation or reasoning 
based on gender.  
As predicted, there were no significant main effects or interactions involving 
age group, and therefore it was excluded from further analysis. Where appropriate, 
follow up simple main effects tests were conducted for significant interactions using 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons applied. 
One sample t-tests were used to assess ingroup bias in resource allocation by 
comparing participants; allocations to the midpoint of the scale (criterion value = 5 
tokens).  
Resource allocation reasoning data was analysed using a multinomial logistic 
regression model. We modelled the interaction effect of Age Group (Adolescents, 
Children), Allocation Strategy (Equality, Ingroup Serving) and Ingroup Norm 
(Competitive, Cooperative) on reasoning style across two conceptual categories 
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(moral, social-conventional). Fewer than 5% of participants (n = 6) used the personal 
choice category, so these responses were omitted from the analyses, along with 
participants who used the “other” category (n = 53).  
2.7. Results 
2.7.1. Resource Allocation 
(H1) Ingroup and outgroup norms will determine resource allocation 
decisions, independent of age. 
As predicted, there was a significant interaction between Ingroup norm and 
Outgroup norm on resources allocated to the ingroup, F(1, 215) = 4.56, p = .03, η2  = 
.02 (see figure 2.1). In line with H1, participants took both ingroup norm and 
outgroup norm into consideration when deciding how to allocate resources between 
the two groups. 
  Specifically, when both the outgroup norm and ingroup norm were 
competitive (M = 6.89, SD = 2.21), participants allocated significantly more 
resources to the ingroup than when the outgroup norm was also competitive but the 
ingroup norm cooperative (M = 6.11, SD = 1.85, p = .048). In this case, a cooperative 
ingroup norm tempered ingroup bias when the outgroup advocated explicit 
competition. 
However, when both the outgroup norm and ingroup norm were competitive 
(M = 6.89, SD = 2.21) we did not observe a difference in ingroup allocations 
compared with a situation where the outgroup norm was cooperative but the ingroup 
norm was competitive (M = 6.13, SD = 2.01; p = .06). Here, a cooperative outgroup 
did not exert a tempering effect on ingroup bias, and was less influential than a 
cooperative ingroup norm. 
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 Contrary to the specifics of H1, we did not observe significantly less ingroup 
biased allocation when both the outgroup norm and ingroup norm were cooperative 
(M = 6.60, SD = 2.46) compared to when the outgroup was also cooperative but the 
ingroup competitive (M = 6.13, SD = 2.01, p = .27). When the two groups were 
mutually cooperative, participants in fact demonstrated significantly more ingroup 
bias than when the ingroup advocated competition. 
In addition, participants in the competitive ingroup norm and competitive 
outgroup norm condition (M = 6.89, SD = 2.21) did not allocate significantly more 
resources to the ingroup compared to those in the cooperative ingroup norm and 
cooperative outgroup norm condition (M = 6.60, SD = 2.46; p = .53). Whilst a 
mutually competitive situation leads to more ingroup bias than a situation where the 
ingroup holds a cooperative norm, participants did not temper their ingroup bias in 
response to a mutually cooperative intergroup situation. Potential explanations for 
this finding are examined in the discussion. 
One sample t-tests indicated that for all four crossed ingroup norm/outgroup 
norm conditions significant ingroup bias was observed at the p < .001 level 
compared with a criterion level of 5 tokens (see table 2.1.). 
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Table 2.1.  
 
One-sample T-tests of ingroup biased resource allocation (criterion value = 5 tokens) as a function of ingroup norm and outgroup norm 
condition 
Ingroup Norm 
Condition 
 
Outgroup Norm 
Condition 
 
Mean 
Tokens 
Allocated 
To 
Ingroup 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
t 
 
DF 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
Cohen's D 
 
Competitive 
 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
6.89 
 
2.21 
 
6.40 
 
55 
 
< .001 
 
0.86 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
6.13 
 
2.01 
 
4.10 
 
52 
 
< .001 
 
0.56 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
6.11 
 
1.85 
 
4.74 
 
61 
 
< .001 
 
0.60 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
6.60 
 
2.46 
 
4.51 
 
47 
 
< .001 
 
0.65 
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Figure 2.1. Tokens allocated to the ingroup as a function of ingroup norm and 
outgroup norm condition with standard error bars. 
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2.7.2. Resource Allocation Reasoning  
(H2) Participants’ resource allocation reasoning will depend upon their 
allocation strategy. 
Addition of the predictors (age group, ingroup norm, strategy) to the model 
led to a significant improvement in model fit compared with the null model, LR χ2(6, 
N = 170) = 72.04, Nagelkerke R2 = .51, p < .001. The effect of strategy was 
significant, χ2(2, N = 170) = 69.03, p < .001. Moral reasoning justifications were 
more likely to be used than group functioning justifications by equality strategists 
compared with ingroup servers, β = -4.08, χ2(1) = 34.60, p < .001, Exp(B) = .02, 95% 
CI [.004, .07]. Allocating resources equally between the two groups was more likely 
to be justified with reference to the importance of fairness. Inversely, participants 
justified allocating a greater share of the tokens to their ingroup with reference to the 
importance of their group winning the competition. 
Similarly, the effect of age was significant, χ2(2, N = 170) = 6.15, p = .05. 
Moral reasoning justifications were more likely to be used than group functioning 
justifications by adolescent participants compared with children, β = -1.36, χ2(1) = 
5.36, p = .02, Exp(B) = .26, 95% CI [.08, .81]. There was no significant effect of 
ingroup norm (p = .13). Addition of the significant interaction term between strategy 
and age did not significantly improve the fit of the model (Nagelkerke R2 = .49). 
Given that moral domain reasoning was the predominant category used 
across age groups, we next examined whether the specific styles of moral reasoning 
used by adolescents and children differed. Moral responses were further sub-coded 
into three categories that repeatedly occurred within this category: (1) fairness 
(references to generic fairness, e.g. "because it’s the fair thing to do"); (2) equality 
(references to the need to distribute the resources using an equality principle, e.g. " 
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because everybody should have their tokens split equally"); and (3) fair competition 
(references to the need to ensure both teams have equal opportunities in the 
competition, e.g. "so both teams have an equal chance of winning"). We modelled 
the interaction effect of Age Group (Adolescents, Children), Allocation Strategy 
(Equality, Ingroup Serving) and Ingroup Norm (Competitive, Cooperative) on 
reasoning style across these three conceptual categories, as well as group 
functioning. Personal choice reasoning was again omitted due to a small cell size. 
Addition of the interaction term between age group, strategy and ingroup 
norm to the model led to a significant improvement in model fit compared with the 
null model, LR χ2(21, N = 170) = 102.30, Nagelkerke R2 = .55, p < .001. Given some 
small cell sizes (n < 5), we used Fisher’s exact tests and follow up z tests with 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons to examine differences in Resource 
Allocation reasoning as a function of Age, Ingroup Norm and Strategy. There were 
significant differences in reasoning style as a function of age amongst equality 
strategists when the ingroup norm was competitive (Fisher’s exact = 10.62, p = 
.003). Adolescents who allocated equally justified their behavior differently to 
children, specifically when this strategy challenged an ingroup norm of competition. 
The reported means represent percentage proportions of reasoning within the age 
group. All differences reported were significant at the p < .05 level. 
Children who allocated equally in the competitive ingroup norm condition 
were more likely to make reference to Fairness (M = .39) and Equality (M = .32) than 
Fair Competition (M = .29). Children who referenced Fairness argued simply that 
their allocation strategy was “fair and not biased”. Those who referenced Equality 
justified their strategy with reference to the importance of equality as an allocation 
strategy: “because we all need the same amount”. By comparison, adolescents who 
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allocated equally in the competitive ingroup norm condition were more likely to 
make reference to Fair Competition (M = .90) than Fairness (M = .10). For example, 
one adolescent participant argued in favour of an equal allocation:  
 “because I still want it to be fair so our team and the other team have a 
chance of winning”. With age, participants used more advanced moral domain 
justifications for their equal allocation decisions.  
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Table 2.2.  
 
Frequencies and proportions of children’s (8 – 11 years) reasoning as a function of 
ingroup norm and allocation strategy 
   
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
 
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Equality 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Competitive 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Equality 
 
 
 
 
12 (.39) 
 
10 (.32) 
 
9 (.29) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
 
 
2 (.10) 
 
6 (.29) 
 
3 (.14) 
 
10 (.48) 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
 
 
 
Equality 
 
11 (.48) 
 
7 (.30) 
 
3 (.13) 
 
2 (.09) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
2 (.11) 
 
2 (.11) 
 
4 (.21) 
 
11 (.58) 
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Table 2.3.  
 
Frequencies and proportions of adolescents’ (13 – 16 years) reasoning as a function 
of ingroup norm and allocation strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
 
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Equality 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Competitive 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Equality 
 
 
1 (.10) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
9 (.90) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
 
 
0 (.00) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
3 (.25) 
 
9 (.75) 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
 
 
 
Equality 
 
7 (.32) 
 
5 (.23) 
 
8 (.36) 
 
2 (.09) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
0 (.00) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
5 (1.00) 
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2.8. Discussion 
This study manipulated both ingroup and outgroup norms of competition and 
cooperation in the context of an intergroup resource allocation task in order to 
examine how children and adolescents coordinate group information when allocating 
resources between groups. In line with the Social Reasoning Developmental (SRD) 
approach both peer ingroup and outgroup norms influenced children and 
adolescents’ intergroup resource allocations. As expected, an outgroup norm of 
competition lead to significantly more ingroup bias when the ingroup also held a 
competitive rather than a cooperative norm. However, counter to our prediction 
(H1), a positive outgroup norm of cooperation did not result in significantly less 
ingroup bias when the ingroup also held a cooperative rather than a competitive 
norm. Adolescents who allocated equally counter to an ingroup norm of competition 
used more varied moral domain reasoning to justify this challenge to normative 
behavior than children who used the same allocation strategy in this condition.  
The valence of the outgroup and ingroup norms influenced the impact of the 
norm upon resource allocation decisions. A negative outgroup norm combined with a 
negative ingroup norm significantly increased bias, while a positive outgroup norm 
together with a positive ingroup norm did not significantly decrease bias. While 
negative outgroup and ingroup norms seem to increase bias, it appears harder to 
reduce ingroup bias with joint positive outgroup and ingroup norms. This may be 
explained by the 'negativity bias' in how adults process their experience (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and how children make sense of the social-
emotional world (Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Either our children and 
adolescents paid more attention to the negative compared to positive group norms or, 
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alternatively, a mutually cooperative situation between the groups was simply not 
believable during an intergroup competition.  
We did not observe a reduction in ingroup biased resource allocation when 
the outgroup advocated for cooperation, even when the ingroup norm was 
competitive; compared to a situation where both group norms were competitive. 
Children respond to negative outgroup information when forming attitudes about 
outgroups (Nesdale et al., 2005) and yet less is known about the effects of exposure 
to a positive cooperation outgroup norm in relation to a competitive ingroup norm. It 
is likely that an outgroup cooperation norm, while serving as a reminder of the 
importance of generic societal cooperation, did not lead to a reduction in ingroup 
bias due to concerns for challenging the ingroup norm and the potential social 
exclusion consequences of doing so. This finding in itself is not surprising given the 
power of ingroup norms for children and adolescents (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale 
et al., 2008), and the importance of ensuring access to resources. It would be 
interesting to explore whether there are situations in which concerns for loyalty to an 
ingroup norm are set aside in favour of supporting a positive, cooperative outgroup. 
Future work exploring the more positive potential influence of outgroup information 
will be an important line of enquiry.  
When both the ingroup and outgroup advocated cooperative group norms, 
participants did not decrease their displays of ingroup bias. In fact, this group 
allocated as much to their ingroup as participants in the mutually competitive 
condition. It is possible that children and adolescents simply do not find a mutually 
cooperative intergroup scenario convincing when they are asked to imagine they are 
taking part in an intergroup competition. The intergroup competition carries with it 
generic connotations of what is expected of participants. First and foremost, 
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participants may expect their fellow group members to compete in attempts to 
advance the relative position of the ingroup. Interestingly, a potential generic 
competitive norm wasn’t the only salient generic influence since our participants 
were all in a school context. In this context a generic moral norm for cooperation 
was likely salient. Chapter Three extends this work by directly manipulating 
competitive and cooperative generic normative contexts to observe their interactive 
influence with ingroup norms throughout the developmental lifespan. 
2.9. Overview 
In summary, to our knowledge this is the first study demonstrating that 
intergroup resource allocation amongst children and adolescents is influenced by 
both ingroup and outgroup norms. This is compatible with developmental research 
on intergroup attitudes (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale et al., 2005), which has shown 
that children's consideration of multiple norms influences their intergroup attitudes. 
This study showed that from 8-years-old, participants displayed the most ingroup 
biased resource allocation when both the ingroup and outgroup peer norms promoted 
competition. Moreover, we found that with age participants varied their moral 
reasoning depending on the prevalent peer group norm. 
This study has established that from middle childhood in first-person 
resource allocation tasks, multiple normative sources are considered simultaneously. 
Specifically, outgroup competition norms are taken into consideration alongside 
ingroup norms of competition leading to more ingroup biased allocation. Further 
work is required to establish whether children and adolescents are equally capable of 
considering generic normative contextual information when allocating resources. 
Allocation decisions do not take place in the dyadic vacuum of decision-making 
games; instead, the context in which resources are being allocated and what these 
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resources will be used for are important factors to consider. There are some 
situations in which ingroup bias, like that seen in the present work, is less acceptable. 
Chapter Three extends this first study by examining whether there are age-related 
differences between children and adolescents’ understanding of cooperative and 
competitive generic norms.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
Children show ingroup bias when allocating resources in a cooperative generic 
context 
 
A version of the study described in this chapter has been accepted for publication: 
McGuire, L., Rizzo, M.T., Killen, M, & Rutland, A.. (2018). Children show ingroup 
bias when allocating resources in a cooperative context. Developmental Psychology. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In Chapter Two, children and adolescents took ingroup and outgroup norms 
of cooperation and competition into consideration when asked to allocate resources 
between groups in a complex intergroup context. Specifically, we observed increased 
ingroup bias in a situation where both groups held competitive ingroup norms. 
Likewise, a cooperative ingroup norm tempered the effect of a competitive outgroup 
in reducing ingroup bias. From 8-years-old, children take multiple norms at the 
group level into consideration when deciding how to allocate resources. Intergroup 
dynamics play an important role in how children and adolescents allocate resources. 
However, resource allocation decisions involve more than just considerations of who 
gets what based on their group identity.  
Contextual information plays an important role in decision-making and yet 
less is known regarding whether children take into account the context within which 
resource allocation decisions take place. These contexts in turn vary in the moral pull 
they exert over the decision-making process. In Chapter Three, we explored this by 
manipulating the generic normative context of the resource allocation decision. We 
were first interested in whether an ingroup norm for cooperation or competition was 
superseded by a cooperative or competitive generic normative context. Second, we 
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focused on whether the relative influence of the generic context changed as a 
function of the participants’ age. In the present study we extended the age range to 
include young adults. This older sample was included in an attempt to examine 
whether there were further age-related differences in normative understanding 
between adolescents and young adults. 
The present study aimed to extend previous research in several novel ways by 
exploring how cooperative and competitive group norms interact with an intergroup 
resource allocation context. This was achieved by manipulating social norms at 
different levels. First, we manipulated ingroup norms as in Chapter Two. For the 
first time, we also manipulated generic norms. These norms are defined here as 
conventions shared by individuals at a societal level that guide behaviour between 
groups. We know that cooperation and competition are both generic norms which 
can be shared between groups, since research has shown that societies value 
cooperative behavior (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), although they can also favour 
competition in certain contexts (Leibbrandt, Gneezy, & List, 2013). Developmental 
research suggests that a generic norm of competition is often salient in schools, 
especially between middle to late childhood when individuals seek acceptance from 
peer groups by excluding others in an intergroup competitive context (Abrams et al., 
2003; Branco, Palmieri, & Pinto, 2012; Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 
2015).  
In Chapter Three, participants were inducted into simulated groups based on 
school membership and asked to imagine they would be taking part in an intergroup 
arts competition. As per Chapter Two, participants were prescribed an ingroup norm 
of competition or cooperation by a member of their ingroup. Extending beyond 
Chapter Two, this study also included a novel generic norm manipulation. 
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Participants were told that the art competition would be followed by a second event 
that was either competitive or cooperative. Participants were then asked to allocate 
resources between the ingroup and outgroup that could be used in the arts 
competition.  
Research has shown developmental differences between children and 
adolescents in the coordination of generic and peer norms when judging individuals 
who allocate resources equally or unequally from a third-party perspective (Killen, 
Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Rutland & Killen, 2016). Less is known 
regarding how these processes influence first-party resource allocation, and how they 
may develop later beyond adolescence. Therefore, we extended the sample of our 
current investigation to examine young adults as well as children and adolescents. In 
line with previous research examining the coordination of norms, as well as the 
tenets of the SRD approach, the greatest differences were still expected to emerge 
between childhood and adolescence.  
We expected that for children, ingroup norms would prove a salient influence 
on their resource allocation decisions. For example, even in a cooperative generic 
context, children were expected to demonstrate significant ingroup bias when 
prescribed an ingroup norm of competition, compared with when their group 
supported a cooperative ingroup norm. This prediction is based upon the increased 
complexity of the multiple norms manipulated in this study. In conjunction with this, 
ingroup competition norms are known to reduce children's outgroup prosociality and 
increase intergroup bias (Abrams et al., 2015). In contrast, adolescents and young 
adults are better able to coordinate the influence of multiple norms. Given this, we 
expected adolescents and adults to balance the relative importance of the ingroup 
norm and the generic norm, and to therefore use equality as a strategy in a generic 
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cooperative context, even when the ingroup advocates competition. The use of 
equality in this context meets with broader generic behavioural expectations, but also 
meets with group expectations regarding not explicitly favouring an outgroup.  
Reasoning justifications are a crucial component of the present thesis, 
affording insight not only into how participants allocate, but why they do so. As per 
the findings of Chapter Two, we expected reasoning style to be contingent upon peer 
group norms, as well as participant age and resource allocation strategy. Specifically, 
in the case of participants who allocated equally, we expected a focus on moral 
reasoning as seen in Chapter Two. We expected to observe age effects when 
participants challenged an ingroup competition norm by allocating equally between 
groups. In this case, younger participants were expected to emphasise the moral 
importance of equal allocation in challenge to the ingroup norm of competition. By 
comparison, older participants were expected to once again move beyond a simple 
fairness focus (i.e. “it’s fair) and turn instead to discuss ideas of fair competition and 
equality (i.e. “it’s fair because…). 
In contrast, participants who allocated more to their ingroup were expected to 
justify this behavior exclusively in terms of group functioning, with a focus on 
loyalty to the group and achieving success in the intergroup competition. Participants 
who demonstrate ingroup bias in their resource allocation cannot argue that their 
allocation strategy is fair or meets with standards for equal allocation. Instead, they 
must seek to justify their behavior as a strategy to advance the relative position of the 
ingroup within the context of the competition. 
3.1.1. Aims 
1. To examine the relative influence of ingroup norms across varying generic 
normative contexts of competition and cooperation on the development of 
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resource allocation between middle childhood and adolescence. 
Specifically, to examine age differences in the simultaneous consideration 
of generic norms alongside ingroup norms. 
2. To examine participants’ social reasoning justifications for their allocation 
decisions. Specifically, we were interested in whether reasoning would 
differ as a function of resource allocation strategy and ingroup norm.
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3.1.2. Hypotheses 
H1. Resource allocation decisions were expected to vary as a function of 
ingroup norm, generic norm, and age. Specifically, we expected that children would 
focus primarily upon ingroup normative information. That is, when the ingroup norm 
was competitive they would demonstrate ingroup bias by allocating a relatively 
larger share of resources to their ingroup than the outgroup, even when the generic 
context was cooperative. By comparison, adolescents and young adults, having the 
requisite ability to coordinate multiple complex norms, were expected to temper their 
ingroup bias when a competitive ingroup norm was coupled with a cooperative 
generic norm. When both the generic norm and ingroup norm were cooperative we 
expected all participants, independent of age, to use an equality strategy and allocate 
resources equally between the ingroup and outgroup. 
H2. We expected participants’ social reasoning justifications to vary as a 
function of age, ingroup norm and allocation strategy. Specifically, we expected that 
participants who allocated equally, counter to an ingroup norm of competition, 
would make greater reference to moral domain reasoning to justify their challenge to 
an ingroup norm they perceived to be unfair. This moral domain reasoning was 
expected to differ as a function of age, with older participants referencing concepts 
of fair competition and equality, where children were expected to focus on fairness. 
In contrast, participants who allocated equally when the ingroup norm was 
cooperative were expected to make reference to fairness and group functioning. 
These participants were expected to justify their allocation as being in line with the 
group norm and with reference to issues of ingroup loyalty or cohesion. 
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3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
Participants (n = 263) were recruited from the London metropolitan area. 
Participants included 103 (47 Female, 56 Male) 8- to 11-year-olds (Mage = 8.66, SD 
= 0.50), 90 (50 Female, 40 Male) 13- to 15-year-olds (Mage = 13.83, SD = 0.71), and 
70 (61 Female, 9 Male) Adults (Mage
 = 20.89, SD = 2.83). Power analysis for an 
ANOVA with 12 groups was conducted in G*Power to determine a sufficient 
sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.95, and a medium effect size (f  = 
.025) (Faul et al., 2007). Based on these assumptions, the desired sample size was 
251 participants. The sample consisted of approximately 50% White British, 17% 
Southeast Asian British, 15% Black British, and 12% other ethnic groups (including 
Dual Heritage British, Chinese British, and Eastern European participants), with 6% 
of participants opting to withhold ethnic information. The ethnic mix of these 
schools reflected the population of the metropolitan area in which testing took place. 
The children and adolescents attended schools serving lower to middle 
socioeconomic (SES) populations, ethnically representative of the sampling 
population. The adult participants attended a university in the same area and 
participated as part of an undergraduate module. Parental consent and child assent 
were obtained for all participants under 18. 
3.2.2. Design 
This study utilised a 3 (Age group; adolescents, adults, children) x 2 (Ingroup 
norm; competition, cooperation) x 2 (Generic norm; competition, cooperation) 
between-subjects design. 
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3.3. Procedure 
3.3.1. Group Induction. To establish group membership, participants were 
told that they would be taking part in an inter-institution art competition between 
their own and a local rival institution. For children and adolescents, this institution 
was their school. For young adults who were university students, their university was 
chosen as the institution in question. Rather than the photographs used in Chapter 
Two, participants were shown an illustration of four same-gender individuals 
representing their own team for the competition (ingroup), and a separate illustration 
of their rival team (outgroup). The age of the individuals in these illustrations was 
deliberately ambiguous to ensure they could be used for participants of all ages (see 
Appendix B). Illustrations were used to reduce the possibility that the different age 
photographs used between groups were exerting an effect on ingroup affiliation. 
Participants picked a team name, colour, and logo in order to further instill feelings 
of ingroup membership.  
3.3.2. Ingroup Norm. The ingroup norm for the intergroup arts competition 
was established using the “secret message” manipulation. Participants read:  
“Hello we’re really happy you’re going to be on our team for this drawing 
competition. We just have one rule if you’re going to be on our team and that is, you 
should try and make our team win…  
(Competitive ingroup norm) …and never help the other teams in the competition 
(Cooperative ingroup norm) …but also help the other teams in the competition.  
Good luck!” 
These norms were designed to ensure they were believable in the context of 
the local competition, particularly given the strong expectation that individuals 
should support the ingroup during any competition (Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, & 
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Henrich, 2013; Bowles, 2006). Hence the norms focused on trying to make your 
team win in both norm conditions. 
Participants answered a manipulation check question to ensure that they had 
paid attention to and understood their ingroup norm: “Based on what you just read, 
does your team want to help other teams in the competition?” (Yes/No).  
3.3.3. Generic Norm. The generic normative context was established by 
telling participants that the winning group from the inter-institution art competition 
would either participate in the ‘United Kingdom National Art Competition’ 
(competitive generic normative context) or the ‘United Kingdom Charity Art Event’ 
(cooperative generic normative context).  
In the competitive generic context, participants were told their aim would be 
to display the best art in order to beat the other teams in the competition: “The 
winning school will go on to represent London in the UNITED KINGDOM 
NATIONAL ART COMPETITION, which is the highest level of art competition in the 
country that schools can take part in. This will be a big day where winning schools 
from all over the United Kingdom compete to display the best art.” 
In the cooperative generic context, the aim was to work together with the 
other teams in order to raise as much money as possible for an animal shelter: “The 
winning school will go on to represent London in the UNITED KINGDOM 
CHARITY ART EVENT, where paintings and drawings will be sold to raise money 
so homeless animals are given somewhere to live. This will be a big day where 
schools from all over the United Kingdom work together and help raise money for 
animals in need”   
3.3.4. Resources. Participants were told that the student councils of their 
institution and the rival institution had collectively raised £100 to distribute between 
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the ingroup and the outgroup. This money was to be used to purchase special 
materials, which could help them produce better art. They were told that each group 
already had access to basic art supplies (e.g. pens, paper, paints). The £100 raised by 
the school councils was to be used to purchase extra, special, supplies. Participants 
were informed that the members of their group had voted to either give £50 to each 
group (in the cooperative ingroup norm condition), or £80 to their ingroup and £20 
to the outgroup (in the competitive ingroup norm condition). The outgroup was 
always said to have voted in favour of the opposite strategy to the ingroup. 
3.4. Measures 
Participants completed all measures individually on a laptop or desktop 
computer via the online survey software Qualtrics. Resource allocation was 
measured by asking participants to distribute £100 between their own team (ingroup) 
and the other team (outgroup). This was accompanied by a reminder that the money 
could be used to purchase special materials for use in the art competition. 
Participants indicated how much money they would give to each team using a slider 
from £0 to £100 with increments of £1. Resource allocation reasoning was measured 
using an open-ended question (“Why did you split the money the way you did?”).  
3.5. Data Preparation  
Responses to the open ended social reasoning question were coded using 
categories adapted from SDT (Turiel, 1983). We incorporated the extended moral 
domain categories developed from Chapter Two into the present study. The coding 
system assigned responses to five conceptual categories based on previous research 
(Killen et al., 2013) and theoretical formulations; (1) Fairness, generic references to 
fairness (e.g., “I split it that way because it’s the fair thing to do”), (2) Equality, 
references to distributing resources equally between individuals/groups (e.g. “it’s 
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important that both groups get the same amount of money”), (3) Fair Competition, 
references to ensuring the maintenance of fair competition between groups (e.g. “we 
shouldn’t have an advantage, otherwise we won’t be able to tell who has won 
fairly”), (4) Group Functioning, references to group norms, group loyalty, winning 
the competition (e.g., “Because that’s how the team wanted to do it”), or (5) 
Personal Choice, references to personal autonomy (e.g., “It’s my choice how to 
share the money”). Two coders conducted the coding, one of whom was blind to the 
hypotheses of the study. Analysis of agreement between two coders across 25% of 
the responses revealed strong inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ = .95).  
Participants’ chosen allocation strategy was included as a variable in 
reasoning analyses for those who provided a reasoning justification. Participants who 
allocated equal amounts of money to both groups (n = 127) were coded as Equality 
Strategists. Participants who allocated more money to the ingroup (n = 83) were 
coded as Ingroup Serving Strategists. Participants who allocated more to the 
outgroup were excluded from the reasoning analysis due to a small cell size (n = 4).  
Participants were considered to have not fully understood the normative 
manipulation if they answered the ingroup norm manipulation check question 
counter to the group norm manipulation. For example, a participant would be 
excluded if they said that their team wanted to help other teams in the competition 
when they had been told their team held a competitive ingroup norm.  This excluded 
group comprised 39 children, 26 adolescents and 10 adults (see Appendix A for a 
complete breakdown of exclusion by condition). Analyses were conducted with the 
full sample, revealing no significant results. Following this, participants who 
answered the norm manipulation check question incorrectly were omitted from the 
final analyses. Participants who did not complete the resource allocation measure 
Chapter Three: Generic Norms 
83 
 
were not included in the final analysis (n = 33). The final analyses reported here 
included a total sample of 230 participants (children, n = 80; adolescents, n = 87; 
adults, n = 63).  
3.6. Data Analytic Plan  
Resources allocated to the ingroup (how much money they allocated to their 
own group out of a total £100) were subjected to a 3 (Age: children, adolescents, 
adults) x 2 (Ingroup norm: competitive, cooperative) x 2 (Generic norm: 
competitive, cooperative) univariate ANOVA. Initial analyses did not reveal 
differences between adolescent and adult participants; therefore these categories 
were collapsed for the purposes of the central analyses (Age: children, older). In 
order to test for age group differences, the effect of age was tested using a planned 
contrast that compared children’s resource allocation against adolescents and adults 
(weights +2, -1, -1), as well as interactions between this planned age contrast, 
ingroup norm and generic norm.   
Our sample size did not allow for us to reliably test for gender effects in 
interaction with age or norm conditions. However, given that gender has not 
previously been shown to exert an effect on adherence to group norms (McGuire et 
al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) we did not expect 
differences in resource allocation or reasoning based on gender.  
Where appropriate, follow up simple main effects tests were conducted with 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons applied. One sample t-tests were 
used to assess ingroup bias in resource allocation by comparing participant’s 
allocations to the midpoint of the scale (criterion value = £50).  
Resource allocation reasoning data was analysed using a multinomial 
logistic regression model. We modelled the effects of Age Group (Children, Older), 
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Allocation Strategy (Equality, Ingroup Serving), and Ingroup Norm (Competitive, 
Cooperative) on reasoning style across four conceptual categories (Fairness, 
Equality, Fair competition, Group functioning). Fewer than 5% of participants (n = 
5) used the personal choice category, and so these responses were omitted from the 
analyses, along with participants who used the “other” category (n = 69).  
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Resource Allocation 
(H1) Participants’ resource allocation decisions differ as a function of age, 
ingroup norm, and generic norm. 
As predicted, analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction between 
Age, Ingroup norm and Generic norm, F(2, 228) = 5.86, p = .016, η2 = .03 (see 
Figure 3.1). How participants chose to allocate resources depended not only upon 
their age group, but also what ingroup norm they were prescribed and which generic 
normative context they were allocating resources within.  
Amongst children, there were significant differences in resource allocation as 
a function of ingroup norm when the generic norm was cooperative. When the 
ingroup norm was competitive, children (M = 70.52, SD = 22.50) allocated a 
significantly greater share of the resources to their ingroup than when the ingroup 
norm was cooperative (M = 52.90, SD = 9.28; p = .002). When their peers advocated 
competing with the outgroup, children allocated a significantly greater share of 
resources in favour of their ingroup. When the generic context of the decision was 
cooperative (i.e. a United Kingdom Charity Art Event), children allocated a 
significantly greater share of resources in favor of their ingroup when the group 
supported a competitive norm, than when the group supported a cooperative norm. In 
the competitive ingroup norm condition, this allocation differed significantly from 
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the criterion value of 50 (mid-point of the allocation scale), t (20) = 4.18, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .91. However, in the cooperative ingroup norm condition this allocation 
did not differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t (19) = 1.40, p = .18, 
Cohen’s d = .31.  
However, for children in the competitive generic norm condition, there was 
no significant difference between allocations in the competitive ingroup norm 
condition (M = 53.25, SD = 31.72) and cooperative ingroup norm condition (M = 
63.21, SD = 19.98; p = .08). However, when the ingroup norm was cooperative, 
children in this condition demonstrated significant ingroup bias compared with the 
midpoint of the scale, t (18) = 2.88, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .66. For those in the 
competitive generic condition, this allocation did not differ significantly from the 
criterion value of 50; t (19) = -.46, p = .65, Cohen’s d = .10. 
For older participants, there were no significant differences in resource 
allocation in the competitive generic norm condition as a function of ingroup norm. 
Older participants’ allocations in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (M = 
60.92, SD = 15.42) did not differ significantly from those in the competitive ingroup 
norm condition (M = 57.04, SD = 17.44; p = .32). In both conditions, participants 
demonstrated significant ingroup bias compared with the midpoint of the scale; 
cooperative (t (37) = 4.37, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .71), competitive (t (45) = 2.74, p = 
.009, Cohen’s d = .40).  
Likewise, in the cooperative generic norm condition, older participants’ 
allocations did not differ between the cooperative ingroup norm condition (M = 
55.48, SD = 10.36) and the competitive ingroup norm condition (M = 55.57, SD = 
11.68; p = .98). Again, in both conditions older participants demonstrated significant 
ingroup bias compared with the midpoint of the scale; cooperative (t (30) = 2.95, p = 
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.006, Cohen’s d = .53), competitive, (t (34) = 2.82, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .48).  
  
 
Figure 3.1. Money allocated to ingroup as a function of age, ingroup norm and 
generic norm with standard error bars
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3.7.2. Resource Allocation Reasoning 
(H2) Participants’ resource allocation reasoning differs as a function of their 
age, allocation strategy, and ingroup norm. 
Addition of the predictors (age group, ingroup norm, strategy) to the model 
led to a significant improvement in model fit compared with the null model, LR 
χ2(12, N = 189) = 69.44, Nagelkerke R2 = .34, p < .001. We observed a main effect 
of Strategy on resource allocation reasoning, χ2(3, N = 189) = 53.19, p < .001. 
Specifically, equality strategist participants were more likely to justify their 
allocation strategy with reference to fairness than group functioning, β = -
2.69, χ2(1) = 37.53, p < .001, Exp(B) = .07, 95% CI [.29, .16]. Participants who 
allocated resources equally between the groups made reference to the importance of 
fairness as a moral construct. 
Similarly, there was a significant main effect of Age Group on resource 
allocation reasoning, χ2(3, N = 189) = 8.51, p = .04. Children made greater reference 
to strict fairness than fair competition, β = -.53, χ2(1) = 6.39, p = .01, Exp(B) = 3.40, 
95% CI [1.32, 8.77]. Children relied predominantly upon simple references to 
fairness, rather than focusing upon the more complex idea of a fair competition. 
Addition of the interaction term between strategy, age group and ingroup 
norm significantly improved the fit of the model, LR χ2(21, N = 189) = 81.97, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .39, p < .001. The preceding main effects of strategy and age group 
were qualified by this interaction term. Given some small cell sizes, we used Fisher’s 
exact tests and follow up z tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
to examine differences in Resource Allocation reasoning as a function of Age, 
Ingroup Norm and Strategy. All comparisons reported were significant at the p < .05 
level, and reported means are proportional percentages of reasoning.  
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First, reasoning amongst older participants differed significantly as a function 
of strategy in the competitive ingroup norm condition, Fisher’s exact = 14.97, p = 
.001. Older participants who allocated resources equally between the two groups 
when the ingroup norm was competitive made significantly greater reference to 
fairness (M = .55) than equality (M = .05), fair competition (M = .28) or group 
functioning (M = .13). These participants challenged the competitive ingroup norm 
with reference to generic expectations for fairness; “it’s unfair for us to have more 
money”. When challenging ingroup norms of competition through equal allocation, 
older participants relied upon broad arguments related to the central importance of 
fairness. 
By contrast, older participants who allocated a greater share of resources to 
their ingroup when the ingroup norm was competitive made greater reference to 
group functioning (M = .50) than fairness (M = .10), equality (M = .05) or fair 
competition (M = .35). These participants justified favouring their ingroup with 
reference to advancing the position of the group in order to win the competition, “so 
that our team gets more money to buy special materials”. For older participants who 
favoured their ingroup in a competitive ingroup situation, the need to benefit one’s 
ingroup was highly important.  
Similarly, there were significant differences in reasoning style as a function 
of strategy amongst older participants in the cooperative ingroup norm condition, 
Fisher’s exact = 28.45, p < .001. Older participants who allocated equally when the 
ingroup advocated cooperation made equal reference to fairness (M = .41) and fair 
competition (M = .31), both of which differed significantly from references to 
equality (M = .05) and group functioning (M = .23). Participants who justified an 
equal allocation with reference to fair competition discussed the importance of 
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ensuring that the most talented team would win the competition, irrespective of 
access to resources; “So that we can see which team has the best potential – it’s not 
fair if we won’t be able to see that.” When older participants’ moral behaviour is 
coherent with normative expectations, and they do not have to challenge a norm they 
perceive to be unfair, they use more nuanced forms of moral domain reasoning.  
In contrast, older participants who allocated resources in favour of their 
ingroup counter to a cooperative ingroup norm made greater reference to group 
functioning (M = .86) than fairness (M = .11) or equality (M = .04). There were no 
references to fair competition amongst these participants. Interestingly, some of 
these older participants considered an allocation that favoured their ingroup to still 
meet basic requirements for fairness when allocating with an outgroup. For example, 
one participant justified allocating £60 to their ingroup and £40 to the outgroup by 
saying; “It is fair because it not only helps the other team, but it gives our team an 
advantage”.  
There were also significant differences in children’s reasoning as a function 
of strategy in the competitive ingroup norm condition, Fisher’s exact = 9.48, p = .01. 
Amongst children who adopted an equality strategy in the competitive ingroup norm 
condition, there was greater reference to fairness (M = .63) than equality (M = .13), 
fair competition (M = .19) or group functioning (M = .06). Like their older 
counterparts, these children justified a counter-normative equal allocation with 
reference to the importance of generic expectations for fairness. These participants 
challenged a norm they perceived to be unfair by both allocating resources equally 
and justifying this with reference to the moral obligation to be fair. 
Again, as expected, younger participants who allocated in favour of their 
ingroup made greater reference to group functioning (M = .57) as a justification for 
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their allocation than fairness (M = .36) or fair competition (M = .07). There were no 
references to equality amongst these participants. These participants justified their 
ingroup serving allocation predominantly with reference to winning the art event. 
For these participants, benefitting the ingroup in order to succeed in the competition 
outstripped any concern for fairness. 
There was no significant difference in reasoning style as a function of 
strategy amongst children in the cooperative ingroup norm condition, Fisher’s exact 
= 4.89, p = .15. Equality strategists in this condition referenced fairness (M = .65), 
equality (M = .09), fair competition (M = .09) and group functioning (M = .17). Use 
of these categories did not differ significantly from one another. Similarly, ingroup 
serving participants in the cooperative ingroup norm condition made reference to 
fairness (M = .33), fair competition (M = .11) and group functioning (M = .56). 
However, use of these categories did not differ significantly from one another.  
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Table 3.1.  
 
Frequencies and proportions of children’s (8 – 11 years) reasoning as a function of 
ingroup norm and allocation strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingroup Norm 
 
 
 
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Equality 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Competitive 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Equality 
 
 
10 (.63) 
 
2 (.13) 
 
3 (.19) 
 
1 (.06) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
 
 
5 (.36) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
1 (.07) 
 
8 (.57) 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
 
 
 
Equality 
 
15 (.65) 
 
2 (.09) 
 
2 (.09) 
 
4 (.17) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
3 (.33) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
1 (.11) 
 
5 (.56) 
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Table 3.2. 
 
Frequencies and proportions of older participants’(13+ years) reasoning as a 
function of ingroup norm and allocation strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingroup Norm 
 
 
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Equality 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Competitive 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Equality 
 
 
22 (.55) 
 
2 (.05) 
 
11 (.28) 
 
5 (.13) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
2 (.10) 
 
1 (.05) 
 
7 (.35) 
 
10 (.50) 
 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
 
 
 
Equality 
 
16 (.41) 
 
2 (.05) 
 
12 (.31) 
 
9 (.23) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Serving 
 
3 (.11) 
 
1 (.04) 
 
0 (.00) 
 
24 (.86) 
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3.8. Discussion 
This study found, for the first time, that children between 8 and 11-years-old 
showed significantly more ingroup bias when allocating resources in a cooperative 
generic context (e.g., a charity art event) when their group supported a competitive 
ingroup norm, compared with when their group supported a cooperative ingroup 
norm. This finding indicates that whilst children give priority to a competitive 
ingroup norm in a cooperative generic norm context, a cooperative ingroup norm can 
serve to temper displays of ingroup bias. The ability to simultaneously consider 
conflicting ingroup and generic norms of competition and cooperation emerged in 
adolescence, with older participants recognizing that it is inappropriate to display 
excessive ingroup bias in a cooperative generic context even when the ingroup norm 
is competitive.  
In this study children placed greater emphasis on allocating resources in line 
with a competitive ingroup norm than adhering to a cooperative generic context. 
From a normative perspective it would be expected that children would be very 
aware of generic norms and expectations, given that adults usually communicate 
generic norms. Children often defer to adult authority over peer authority (Laupa, 
1994).  In this context, though, children were more persuaded to behave in line with 
their local peer norm of competition than the broader generic societal-level 
expectation for cooperation.  
This finding extends this work by highlighting the salience of peer groups 
and group identities in resource allocation decision-making for children from 8-
years-old. This is a period when children interact and identify with increasing 
numbers of social groups within and outside of school (Brown, 2004), developing 
their knowledge and understanding of ingroup norms and dynamics within groups 
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(Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Killen et al., 2013). Based on the present results, 
children’s ability to simultaneously coordinate different levels of groups (i.e. one’s 
own ingroup and the larger societal norm) may not fully manifest until early 
adolescence. The majority of children’s allocation experiences are through dyadic 
and triadic group sharing (i.e., peer groups in schools). They rarely need to consider 
broader generic contexts that involve multiple groups at different levels (e.g. clubs 
from different schools in different cities), unlike adolescents who are active 
members of both local peer groups as well as being aware of larger societal groups 
(e.g., city or state wide bodies).  
In the cooperative generic context, children demonstrated explicit ingroup 
bias when prescribed an ingroup norm of competition. One possibility is that 
children give priority to peer-level norms, and place less emphasis on broader 
generic norms. However, in the competitive generic context they demonstrated 
significant ingroup bias when prescribed an ingroup cooperation norm. It is possible 
that children interpreted the ostensibly cooperative generic norm condition 
differently from adolescent and adult participants. In this condition, participants 
were told they would be taking part in a charity event to raise money for an animal 
shelter. This condition was designed to imply that cooperating with the outgroup 
would benefit a prosocial charity goal. However, children in this condition may have 
instead interpreted the goal of the event to be ‘winning’ by raising the most money 
for the charity, rather than working with the outgroup. The relation between 
cooperative action and the outcome of cooperation is explored in greater detail in 
Chapter Five.   
When both the peer-level norm was competitive and the generic context was 
competitive, children did not demonstrate significant ingroup bias. Instead, they used 
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an equal allocation strategy. There are two possible explanations for this. First, we 
know that participants were concerned with ideas of “fair competition” in this study. 
Whilst references to fair competition were more prominent amongst older 
participants, there were some children who spoke about ensuring that the 
competition took place on a level playing field. It is possible that a strong promotion 
of competition at two levels enforced these ideas. Second, children have been shown 
to be concerned with self-presentation and to reduce their explicit outgroup prejudice 
when made accountable to adult authority figures (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale & 
Dalton, 2011). It is possible that when placed in such a highly competitive intergroup 
scenario, participants were more aware of the social reputational consequences of 
demonstrating explicit ingroup bias.  
We often expect the “oughts” that guide society to reflect generic norms 
surrounding positive affirmations of cooperation, yet this is not always the case. The 
current work emulated this by inducting half the participants into a generic 
competitive context. In this case, we might have expected participants to allocate 
more to their ingroup, particularly in combination with a competitive ingroup norm. 
However, the evidence suggests that whilst a cooperative generic context guided 
individuals towards a desire for greater equality, a competitive generic context did 
not always have the opposite effect for children. It is possible that for children a 
competitive generic context implies that whilst competing is acceptable, this does 
not extend to actively disadvantaging the outgroup. It is likely that a desire for equal 
allocation of resources (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 
2016; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012) extends to ideas surrounding a “fair 
competition”. Some participants' reasoning referenced the futility of a competition 
where one team begins on an uneven footing. It would be interesting for future 
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research to explore the developmental bounds of what is considered a fair 
competition, and how this informs generic behavioral expectations within 
competitive intergroup contexts. 
Whilst not as severe as the bias shown by children in the competitive ingroup 
norm condition, older participants did demonstrate significant ingroup bias across 
the norm conditions. This bias was greatest when the generic condition was 
competitive and the ingroup norm was cooperative. For adolescents and adults in this 
condition, broader generic behavioral expectations took precedence over a peer level 
endorsement of cooperation. Under generic competitive conditions, participants were 
informed that they would be taking part in a high level intergroup competition. In 
this situation, demonstrations of ingroup bias are more justifiable, as the outgroup 
are also likely to compete. Older participants also demonstrated significant ingroup 
bias when the ingroup norm and generic norm were cohesively competitive. In this 
condition, the individual understands that their group wishes to behave competitively 
and that the context of the allocation decision affords greater opportunity to favour 
one’s ingroup in order to succeed in the competition. Therefore, ingroup bias 
simultaneously meets demands for loyalty to group norms and meets with contextual 
expectations for competition.    
This study also found that participants’ reasoning varied as a function of their 
chosen allocation strategy, the ingroup norm and their age. Older participants who 
allocated resources equally varied their justifications for their allocations according 
to the ingroup norm. Participants who shared resources equally used significantly 
more moral reasoning to explain their allocation decision in the context of a 
competitive ingroup norm (e.g., they should be fair). In contrast, group functioning 
reasoning was used in the cooperative ingroup norm condition with justifications 
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referencing the importance of loyalty to group norms of cooperation. This 
demonstrates that social reasoning about intergroup resource allocation is related to 
supporting or rejecting the ingroup norm. 
Reasoning justifications among children also reflected an interactive 
understanding of ingroup norms. The strongest fairness justifications were observed 
amongst participants who risked social exclusion from their group by allocating 
equally in spite of a competitive ingroup norm. For these participants, competitive 
ingroup normative expectations were not enough motivation for them to adopt an 
unfair allocation strategy. Instead, they sought to challenge unfair competitive 
ingroup norms by making direct reference to the importance of fairness. Inversely, 
participants who allocated in favor of their ingroup made greater reference to group 
functioning. These participants justified their allocation strategy in line with 
maximising the ingroup’s access to resources in order to ‘win’ the intergroup 
competition. This reflective social reasoning based within the group norm category 
demonstrates that children are capable of using domains in a flexible manner to both 
stress moral imperatives, and situate their decision within the context of group 
loyalty.   
3.9. Overview 
This study is amongst the first to demonstrate that group norms of 
competition and cooperation influence both intergroup allocation behaviour and 
reasoning justifications. Specifically, with age participants learn to reflect on both 
ingroup and generic norms when allocating resources. This chapter emphasises the 
early importance of normative information in childhood and the emerging influence 
of contextual information in adolescence when deciding how to allocate resources. 
The following chapter turns to examine a parallel group dynamic process. As has 
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been previously established, resource allocation is an important context in which 
moral domain issues are learnt. As we are beginning to see however, experiences of 
resource allocation are also highly relevant contexts in which individuals learn about 
group dynamic processes. The next chapter explores resource allocation as a context 
in which children come to understand intragroup processes and how they apply this 
to the evaluation of deviant and normative ingroup members. From an early age 
children understand the importance of adhering to group norms of competition and 
cooperation. In the present chapter they were shown to be less adept at coordinating 
this with contextual generic information. Less is known about the parallel process of 
evaluating group members based upon their resource allocation decisions when 
normative information is manipulated. 
By late adolescence and adulthood individuals identify with a wide range of 
groups. How group loyalty and the evaluation of those who challenge group norms 
manifests when multiple group identities exist requires close examination. An 
important next step is to explore how children, adolescents and adults extend their 
own understanding of groups and normative processes to the evaluation of deviant 
and normative ingroup members. When do individuals recognise that competing at 
the local level may be counterproductive to group cohesion and functioning when 
the ingroup expectation is one of cooperation? When individuals get it wrong 
conflict inevitably ensues. Thus, understanding how the ability to balance multiple 
group expectations develops from childhood onwards will contribute to creating 
more constructive and positive intergroup relationships from an early age.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Deviating from the group: The role of competitive and cooperative contexts  
 
A version of the study described in this chapter has been accepted for publication: 
McGuire, L., Rizzo, M.T., Killen, M., & Rutland, A. (2018). The role of competitive 
and cooperative contexts in the development of deviant evaluations. Child 
Development. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Competitive and cooperative norms are fundamental motivators of intergroup 
behavior. As we have established in Chapters Two and Three, this includes resource 
allocation between groups. Ingroup norms of cooperation serve to temper ingroup 
bias when allocating resources with an outgroup. However, an ingroup competition 
norm can lead to greater ingroup bias, especially for children. With age, generic 
contexts come to interactively influence these decisions alongside ingroup norms. 
Beyond resource allocation, competition and cooperation are also important in 
delineating boundaries between groups. Should peers in my group cooperate with 
others from different groups or should they compete with others? Such questions lay 
the grounds for decisions about who should be included or excluded in an intergroup 
setting. Peer group members who turn away from group norms face the risk of social 
exclusion by fellow ingroup members. Chapter Four provides the first examination 
of how competitive and cooperative group norms influence the development of peer 
group member evaluations in an intergroup resource allocation context between 
childhood, adolescence and young adulthood.  
Research shows that children, adolescents and adults alike typically expect 
individuals to work together and positively evaluate equality as a strategy for the 
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distribution of resources (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Güth et al., 1982; Kahneman et al., 
1986; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). We also know that children 
favourably evaluate others who allocate resources equally, even if this aligns with an 
outgroup norm (Killen et al., 2013). However, adherence to ingroup norms has also 
been shown to be of great importance. The well-established “Black Sheep effect” 
demonstrates that outgroup members who adhere to ingroup norms are preferentially 
evaluated over ingroup members who deviate from the norm, including norms of 
competition (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; 
Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Pinto, 2014). Less is known 
regarding whether the desire to cooperate (and in turn allocate equally) means that 
deviant ingroup peers who want to cooperate with an outgroup, counter to an 
ingroup competition norm, are favourably evaluated. Understanding how individuals 
of different ages evaluate those who deviate from cooperative norms will provide 
crucial insight into the relative importance of such norms within resource allocation. 
The present study examines individual favourability of normative ingroup 
targets who adhere to normative expectations and deviants who eschew cooperative 
or competitive norms in a morally relevant resource allocation context. We also 
examined participants’ perceived group evaluations of these targets. Understanding 
what your group thinks, as well as how this might differ from your own perception is 
an important step towards navigating complex intragroup situations. As they come to 
develop more advanced perspective taking abilities (Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010) 
children become capable of separating their own perspective from that of the group 
(Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, 
& Hitti, 2013). However, less is known about these processes in competitive 
situations where morally relevant cooperation considerations must be coordinated 
Chapter Four: Deviant Evaluation 
 101 
with generic contextual issues and group processes. When intergroup competition is 
made salient and participants are asked to evaluate ingroup members, it is not yet 
clear whether children are capable of separating their own perspective from the 
perspective of their ingroup. Such judgments are essential for guiding the formation 
of group boundaries.  
Evaluating deviant ingroup members is a complicated task requiring the 
coordination of group and moral concerns (Hitti et al., 2014; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, 
Abrams, & Killen, 2014). From 9-years-old, individuals’ evaluations of ingroup 
members reflect the fact that they favour a generic moral norm for equal allocation 
over an unequal allocation ingroup norm that favours their ingroup. Children 
positively evaluate and include ingroup members who support equal allocation 
norms (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014). With age, adolescents understand 
that group specific allocation norms become relatively more important than generic 
moral norms. This leads to the rejection of deviant ingroup members who support 
equal allocation norms (despite this being consistent with a societal moral norm) if 
this norm runs counter to an unequal allocation norm at the group level (Killen et al., 
2013).  
These age-related differences reflect the increasing understanding of group 
dynamics predicted by the SRD model (Rutland et al., 2010; Rutland & Killen, 
2017). Similar age effects in understanding of cooperative and competitive norms 
with age were expected in the present chapter. Cooperative norms are often related 
to the equal allocation of resources, whilst under competitive normative conditions it 
is more acceptable to allocate resources to benefit one’s ingroup. We expect to 
observe a shift from childhood, through adolescence and into adulthood where 
experience of such norms at the group and generic level will be reflected in a more 
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advanced understanding of how groups may evaluate deviant and normative ingroup 
members. 
From 9-years-old, children prefer a deviant who favours equal allocation 
even when their group supports an unequal allocation norm (Killen et al., 2013). 
Given this, children were expected to positively evaluate a deviant who sought to 
cooperate with an outgroup through the medium of resource allocation against 
competitive ingroup norm expectations. Coherently, children were predicted to 
negatively evaluate a deviant who advocated competition when the ingroup norm 
was cooperative. Not only this, children were expected to believe that their group 
would share their own positive evaluation of a cooperative deviant when the ingroup 
norm was competitive. As they are less capable of coordinating group functioning 
and moral factors in complex multi-faceted situations (Rutland & Killen, 2017), and 
have less experience of group membership (Abrams et al., 2009), children were 
expected to focus on the moral nature of cooperation, rather than taking into 
consideration their ingroup’s normative preference for competition.  
Following a developmental shift in the ability to coordinate social norms 
from childhood to adolescence (Killen et al., 2013; Rutland & Killen, 2017), and 
increased understanding of competitive contexts (Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, 
& Cameron, 2015; Zhu, Guan, & Li, 2015) adolescent participants were expected to 
argue that their group would positively evaluate a competitive deviant, due both to 
the ingroup serving benefits of this behavior and coherence with the intergroup 
competitive context. 13 year olds favour deviants who support norms of unequal 
allocation that benefit their ingroup, and therefore it was expected that this would 
extend to the support of deviants who advocate competitive behaviour that benefits 
the ingroup counter to a cooperative ingroup norm. 
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A crucial novel component of the present chapter is the extended age range 
compared to previous research that has examined evaluations of deviant ingroup 
peers in intergroup contexts. Cooperation and equal allocation are important in 
adulthood (Kahneman et al., 1986). Similarly, intergroup competition acts as a 
powerful influence on resource allocation into adulthood (Sidanius, Haley, Molina, 
& Pratto, 2007). Adults use cooperative and competitive strategies across different 
scenarios, varying based on individual differences (Ward, 1995). Despite the 
ongoing importance of these two motivations into adulthood, less is known 
regarding how adults evaluate intragroup deviation from norms of cooperation and 
competition.  
Cooperation and competition are inherently intergroup experiences. Adults 
generally gain an advanced understanding of group processes through exposure to 
intergroup situations, and harshly evaluate ingroup members who deviate from 
ingroup norms (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988). Adults particularly 
dislike those who desert their group in a competitive situation (Travaglino et al., 
2014). However, deviancy is often more subtle than complete desertion. As in the 
present chapter, an ingroup member may deviate by agreeing with an outgroup 
norm. Further, cooperative and competitive contexts present a unique case where 
deviancy can either be morally relevant (i.e. cooperative), or serve to advance the 
position of the ingroup (i.e. competitive) – both of which are important motivations. 
Given their ongoing desire to cooperate, it is likely that adults will personally 
positively evaluate a cooperative deviant. However, they also understand the 
consequences that follow from ingroup deviation. Given this, the most negative 
perceived group evaluations of cooperative (against a competitive ingroup norm) 
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deviancy were expected in young adult participants, despite their personally positive 
evaluation of this target.  
Justifying these evaluative decisions, particularly personal agreement with 
deviancy, involves the coordination of moral and group dynamic information. We 
expected to see participants using different social reasoning domains to justify their 
evaluations of a deviant target depending on how much they agreed with the 
behavior of the deviant, along with what normative condition they were in. For 
example, a participant who agreed with deviant behavior in the competitive 
condition may be more likely to use moral domain justifications (i.e. references to 
the unfair nature of ingroup serving allocation) to justify a favourable evaluation of 
deviancy. By comparison, participants who agreed with the deviant in the 
cooperative condition may be more likely to rely upon social-conventional 
justifications (i.e. references to the ingroup benefits of an unequal allocation 
strategy) to justify their evaluation.  
Following the group induction and norm prescription used in Chapter Three, 
participants were introduced to a deviant ingroup member and a normative ingroup 
member, before being asked to evaluate these individuals from their own, and the 
group’s perspective.  
4.1.2. Aims 
1. First, we sought to examine age effects in the evaluation of ingroup 
members who either adhered to, or deviated from, the competitive or 
cooperative normative expectations of the group. We measured this 
from both the individual’s perspective, and the perceived group 
evaluation. 
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2. Second, we examined whether there was a link between individual 
and group evaluations and whether this differed with age. 
3. Third, we sought to further explore not only how participants 
evaluated deviants, but how they used social reasoning across 
reasoning domains in order to justify these evaluations.  
4.1.3. Hypotheses 
H1. In the case of evaluating normative targets, we predicted main effects of 
age and ingroup norm from both the individual and group perspectives. Specifically, 
we expected evaluations of normative behaviour to become more favourable with 
age, and for cooperative normative behaviour to be evaluated more favourably than 
competitive behaviour. This fits with evidence that has highlighted the importance of 
cooperation throughout the developmental life span, and normative ingroup 
behaviour. 
H2. When evaluating deviant targets from an individual perspective, we 
expected an interaction between age and ingroup norm. We expected all participants 
to evaluate cooperative deviancy positively due to its coherence with generic moral 
norms. Between childhood, adolescence and young adulthood, we expected 
evaluations of competitive deviancy to become more positive. With age, participants 
come to understand that competitive behaviour that favours the ingroup can advance 
the relative position of the ingroup compared with outgroups. 
H3. When evaluating deviant targets from the group perspective, we again 
expected an interaction between age and ingroup norm. Children were expected to 
believe that their group would favour a cooperative deviant as they personally 
would. With age, participants were expected to understand that their group may in 
fact favour a competitive deviant who benefits their ingroup over a cooperative 
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deviant. This is because with age individuals develop an advanced understanding of 
intergroup processes and the importance of benefitting the ingroup in competitive 
contexts. In contrast, adolescents come to understand that cooperating with an 
outgroup (whilst morally laudable) counter to an ingroup competition norm, will be 
negatively evaluated. 
H4. Reasoning justifications for deviant target evaluations were expected to 
vary depending upon the ingroup norm and participants’ agreement with the deviant 
behaviour. Specifically we expected to see greater reference to group functioning for 
participants who agreed with a competitive deviant. Competition is important to 
advance the position of the group, especially in the context of a competitive 
intergroup art event. Inversely, participants who agreed with a cooperative deviant 
were expected to make reference to fairness and equality. As per Chapters Two and 
Three, we also expected to see more varied and nuanced moral domain reasoning 
amongst adolescents and adults compared with children. 
H5. We expected that the strength of the relation between participants’ own 
evaluations and their perceived group evaluation of the deviant would weaken with 
age. Adolescents have previously been shown to understand that their group’s 
evaluation may differ from their own. Children struggle to make this distinction, 
especially when the behaviour under evaluation falls within the moral domain.   
4.2. Method 
These measures were a part of the same protocol used in Chapter Three and as such 
the participant information (using the same exclusion criteria), design, and ingroup 
norm manipulation were all the same as described in Chapter Three. 
4.2.1. Target Introduction. After being informed that their institution 
council and the rival institution council had collectively raised £100 to distribute to 
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the groups, participants were introduced to the normative and deviant ingroup 
member. These individuals were represented by one of the cartoon figures. 
Participants were informed that the normative target agreed with how the 
group wanted to distribute the resources. In the competitive ingroup norm condition, 
the normative target wanted to allocate £80 to the ingroup and £20 to the outgroup. 
In the cooperative ingroup norm condition, the normative target wanted to allocate 
£50 to the ingroup and £50 to the outgroup.  
 Participants were then introduced to the deviant target, who they were told 
disagreed with how the group wanted to distribute the money, instead arguing for the 
opposite to that of the ingroup majority. This alternative allocation option was 
favoured by the outgroup. In the competitive ingroup norm condition, the deviant 
target wanted to allocate £50 to the ingroup and £50 to the outgroup. In the 
cooperative ingroup norm condition, the deviant target wanted to allocate £80 to the 
ingroup and £20 to the outgroup.  
4.3. Measures  
Participants completed all measures individually on laptops, via Qualtrics. 
Evaluation of the normative target was assessed using three questions. First, 
participants were asked: “how much do you think your group would like (Normative 
name)?” (Group Evaluation). Second, participants were asked “how much do you 
think you would like (Normative name)?” (Individual Evaluation). Both responses 
were recorded on a five-point scale from ‘dislike a lot’ to ‘like a lot’. The individual 
evaluation question was followed by an open-ended “Why?” (Reasoning 
Justification) question.  
Evaluation of the deviant target was assessed using three questions. 
Participants were asked: “how much do you think your group would like (Deviant 
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name)?” (Group Evaluation). Second, participants were asked “how much do you 
think you would like (Deviant name)?” (Individual Evaluation). Both responses were 
recorded on a five-point scale from ‘dislike a lot’ to ‘like a lot’. The individual 
evaluation question was followed by an open-ended “Why?” (Reasoning 
Justification) question. In order to assess reasoning, we also included a Deviant 
Agreement question, which asked participants “how much do you agree with how 
(Deviant name) wants to share the money?” This question followed the explanation 
of how the deviant member wanted to share the money and was recorded 
dichotomously as “agree” or “disagree”.  
4.4. Data Preparation  
Responses to social reasoning justifications were coded using a framework 
adapted from Social Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983). The coding system assigned 
responses to five conceptual categories based on previous research (Killen et al., 
2013) and theoretical formulations: (1) Fairness, references to generic fair sharing 
(e.g. “it’s fair”), (2) Equality, references to allocating resources equally between 
groups (e.g. “So the supplies are equal”), (3) Fair Competition, references to 
ensuring the competition is conducted on a level playing field (e.g. “So every team 
has a chance to win”), (4) Group Functioning, references to group dynamics, norms 
or loyalty (e.g. “because that’s what the rest of the team wanted to do”), and (5) 
Personal Choice, references to personal autonomy (e.g. “because each person can 
make their own mind up”). Responses that did not fit into one of these five 
conceptual categories were coded as “other”. Two coders, one of whom was blind to 
the hypotheses of the study, conducted the coding. Analysis of agreement between 
two coders (one of whom was blind to the hypotheses of the study) across 25% of 
the responses revealed strong inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ = .95).  
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We hypothesised that whether or not a participant agreed with the target 
would direct the domain of reasoning in which they justified their evaluation, and as 
such, this was essential for our analysis. We used the Deviant Agreement question in 
order to assess this. Participants who agreed with the deviant (competitive ingroup 
norm, n = 68; cooperative ingroup norm, n = 38) were expected to differ 
significantly in reasoning style from those who disagreed with the deviant 
(competitive ingroup norm, n = 21; cooperative ingroup norm, n = 44). 
4.5. Data Analytic Plan 
Normative and Deviant Evaluation responses were subjected to 3 (age group: 
child, adolescent, adult) x 2 (ingroup norm: competitive, cooperative) x 2 (generic 
norm: competitive, cooperative) univariate ANOVAs. Interaction effects were 
followed up with pairwise comparison tests with Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons applied. One-sample t-tests were used to assess whether participants’ 
responses differed significantly from the mid-point of the scale (criterion value = 
2.5).  
Our sample size did not allow for us to reliably test for gender effects in 
interaction with age or norm conditions. However, given that gender has not 
previously been shown to exert an effect on adherence to group norms (McGuire et 
al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) we did not expect 
differences in deviant evaluation or reasoning based on gender.  
Individual deviant evaluation reasoning responses were analysed using a 
multinomial logistic regression model. We modelled the effects of Age Group 
(Children, Adolescents, Adults), Deviant Agreement (Agree, Disagree), and Ingroup 
Norm (Competitive, Cooperative) on reasoning style across four conceptual 
categories (fairness, fair competition, group functioning, personal choice). Fewer 
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than 5% of participants (n = 11) used the equality category, and so these responses 
were omitted from the analyses, along with participants who used the “other” 
category (n = 71).  
We were also interested in examining the relation between participants’ 
perceived group favourability towards the deviant, and their own individual 
favourability, along with developmental trends in this relation. The PROCESS 
Macro tool (Hayes, 2012) was used to test for a moderation relation between group 
and individual favourability. Using bootstrapping, we entered the centered 
continuous variables for group favourability and age in months, together with their 
interaction terms hierarchically in order to predict participants’ individual 
favourability. 
4.6. Results 
4.6.1. Individual Favourability of Normative Target 
(H1) Individuals were expected to evaluate normative behaviour more 
favourably with age, and in the cooperative ingroup norm condition. 
When evaluating a normative target, there was a significant main effect of 
age group F(2, 247) = 7.40, p = .001, η2 = .06 (see Figure 4.1.). Both children (M = 
3.64, SD = 1.47; p < .001) and adults (M = 3.57, SD = 1.12; p = .009) evaluated a 
normative target more favourably than adolescents (M = 2.98, SD = 1.27). There was 
no difference between the evaluations of children and adults (p = .44). Both 
children’s (t (95) = 4.25, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .78) and adults’ (t (67) = 4.21, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = .96) individual evaluations of this normative target differed 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale. Adolescents by comparison, did not 
differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t (88) = -.17, p = .87, Cohen’s d = 
38. This age effect suggests that children positively evaluate normative ingroup 
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behaviour, before becoming more neutral in adolescence. In young adulthood, a 
positive evaluation of normative behaviour returns. 
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of ingroup norm, F(1, 
247) = 56.99, p < .001, η2 = .19 (see Figure 4.2.). Participants rated normative 
behaviour more favourably in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (M = 4.00, SD 
= 1.14) than they did in the competitive ingroup norm condition (M = 2.84, SD = 
1.28; p < .001). Evaluations of normative cooperative behaviour differed 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t (118) = 9.61, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
1.32. By comparison, evaluations of normative competitive behaviour did not differ 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t (133) = -1.42, p = .16, Cohen’s d = .27. 
Cooperative behaviour was generally rated more favourably than competitive 
behaviour, even when this competitive behaviour aligned with an ingroup norm. 
There was no main effect of generic norm, nor did it interact with ingroup norm or 
age group. 
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Figure 4.1. Individual favourability of normative ingroup member as a function of 
age group with standard error bars
0
1
2
3
4
5
8 - 11 years 13 - 16 years 18+ years
F
a
v
o
u
ra
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
N
o
rm
a
ti
v
e 
T
a
rg
et
Age Group
Chapter Four: Deviant Evaluation 
 113 
Figure 4.2. Individual favourability of normative ingroup member as a function of 
ingroup norm with standard error bars
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4.6.2. Group Favourability of Normative Target 
When considering participants’ perceived group evaluations of a normative 
target, we observed a significant main effect of age group F(2, 243) = 3.12, p = .05, 
η2 = .03 (see Figure 4.3.). Adult participants (M = 4.00, SD = .77) believed that their 
group would evaluate a normative target more favourably than both adolescents (M 
= 3.57, SD = 1.05; p = .02) and children (M = 3.61, SD = 1.24; p = .04). Children’s (t 
(93) = 8.67, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .90), adolescents’ (t (87) = 9.56, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.02) and adults’ (t (66) = 15.82, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.95) perceived 
group evaluations of normative behaviour all differed significantly from the 
midpoint of the scale. With age, participants come to believe that ingroup members 
increasingly prefer normative behaviour. 
As per the individual level analyses, we observed a main effect of ingroup 
norm, F(1, 243) = 7.09, p = .008, η2 = .03 (see Figure 4.4.). Again, the normative 
target was more favourably evaluated in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (M 
= 3.91, SD = .94) than in the competitive ingroup norm condition (M = 3.51, SD = 
1.15; p = .008). In both the cooperative (t (116) = 16.22, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.50) 
and competitive (t (131) = 10.07, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .88) conditions, participants’ 
perceived group evaluations of normative behaviour differed significantly positively 
from the midpoint of the scale. Again, there was no main effect of generic norm, nor 
did it interact with ingroup norm or age group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Deviant Evaluation 
 115 
 
Figure 4.3. Perceived group favourability of normative ingroup member as a 
function of age group with standard error bars 
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Figure 4.4. Perceived group favourability of normative ingroup member as a 
function of ingroup norm condition with standard error bars 
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4.6.3. Individual Favourability of Deviant Target  
(H2) Age and ingroup norm were expected to influence participants’ 
individual evaluations of a deviant target. 
First, our analyses revealed a significant interaction between age group and 
ingroup norm, F(2, 233) = 3.42, p = .04, η2 = .03 (see Figure 4.5). Participants’ 
evaluations of a deviant ingroup target depended both upon their age, and the 
ingroup norm they were prescribed. As per the normative analyses, we did not 
observe a main effect of generic norm, or any interactive effects. 
In the cooperative ingroup norm condition (i.e. a competitive deviant), 
children (M = 2.55, SD = 1.15) evaluated the deviant significantly less positively 
than both adolescents (M = 3.47, SD = 1.06; p = .002) and adults (M = 3.65, SD = 
.85; p < .001). There was no significant difference between the ratings of adolescents 
and adults (p > .05). Children’s personal evaluations of the competitive deviant did 
not differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale (t (39) = .27, p = .79, Cohen’s 
d = .04). Adolescents (t (37) = 5.67, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .91) and adults (t (33) = 
7.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.35) evaluated this individual significantly above the 
midpoint of the scale. With age, competitive deviancy was evaluated more positively 
relative to evaluations of this behaviour amongst children. 
By comparison, when the ingroup norm was competitive, there were no 
differences between age groups in terms of how they rated cooperative deviancy (p > 
.05). Children (M = 3.83, SD = 1.62), adolescents (M = 3.80, SD = 1.34) and adults 
(M = 4.33, SD = .55) all positively rated deviants who advocated for cooperation 
with the out-group. For children (t (45) = 5.54, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .82), 
adolescents (t (50) = 6.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .97) and adults (t (29) = 18.37, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 3.33), individual evaluations of a cooperative deviant different 
Chapter Four: Deviant Evaluation 
 118 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale. Across the age groups, a cooperative 
deviant was favourably evaluated from the personal perspective.  
Children also evaluated a cooperative deviant significantly more favourably 
than a competitive deviant (p < .001). This was also true for adults (p = .02). 
Adolescents on the other hand did not make a distinction between their favourability 
evaluations for competitive and cooperative deviants (p = .20). Again, these age-
related differences suggest that positive evaluative attitudes towards cooperation 
(even as a form of deviancy) in childhood are reduced amongst adolescents, but 
return in young adulthood. 
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Figure 4.5. Individual favourability of deviant ingroup member as a function of age 
group and ingroup norm with standard error bars 
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4.6.4. Perceived Group Favourability of Deviant  
(H3) Age and ingroup norm were expected to influence participants’ 
perceived group evaluations of a deviant target. 
As per the individual’s deviant evaluations, there was a significant interaction 
between age group and ingroup norm, F(2, 231) = 6.99, p = .001, η2 = .06 (see 
Figure 4.6). Perceived group evaluations of the deviant target were dependent upon 
the prescribed ingroup norm, and the age of the participant. Once again, there was no 
main effect of generic norm, nor did it interact with ingroup norm or age group. 
When the ingroup norm was competitive (i.e. a cooperative deviant), there 
were significant differences between perceived group evaluations based on age 
group. Children (M = 3.02, SD = 1.57) believed their group would rate deviancy in 
this condition significantly more positively than adolescents (M = 2.24, SD = .99; p 
= .004). There was no significant difference between adults (M = 2.49, SD = .92) and 
children’s perceived group evaluations of the deviant in this condition (p > .05). 
Similarly, there was no significant difference between the adolescents’ and adults’ 
perceived group evaluation of the deviant member in the competitive condition (p > 
.05). Children’s perceived group evaluation of a cooperative deviant differed 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t (46) = 2.28, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .33. 
Adolescents’ (t (50) = -1.91, p = .06, Cohen’s d = -.26) and adults’ (t (30) = -09, p = 
.93, Cohen’s d = -.01) perceived group evaluations of the cooperative deviant did not 
differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale. Whilst children expected their 
group to positively evaluate a cooperative deviant, adolescents and adults expected 
this individual to be more neutrally evaluated by the group.  
There were also significant differences between participants of different ages 
in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (i.e. a competitive deviant). Adults (M = 
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3.20, SD = .99) believed their group would rate deviancy (that is, competitive 
behavior) significantly more positively than children (M = 2.46, SD = 1.25; p = .02). 
There was no significant difference between adults and adolescents perceived group 
evaluations of a deviant in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (M = 2.66, SD = 
1.12, p > .05). Similarly, there was no significant difference between children and 
adolescents perceived group evaluations of deviancy in this condition (p > .05). 
Children (t (40) = -.18, p = .85, Cohen’s d = -.03) and adolescents’ (t (37) = .87, p = 
.39, Cohen’s d = .14) perceived group evaluation of a competitive deviant did not 
differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale. Adults (t (34) = 4.16, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .71) perceived group evaluations of this competitive deviant were 
significantly above the midpoint of the scale. These results indicate age effects 
between childhood and adulthood, with individuals moving towards an 
understanding that an ingroup may actually be less negative towards a deviant who is 
favouring the ingroup, even when this runs counter to cooperative peer level 
expectations. 
Again, within the age groups there were differences in evaluations of 
competitive and cooperative targets. Children believed their group would evaluate a 
cooperative deviant more favourably than a competitive deviant (p = .03). Adults by 
comparison believed that their group would evaluate a competitive deviant more 
favourably than a cooperative deviant (p = .02). There was no difference in 
adolescents’ evaluations of deviant targets as a function of ingroup norm condition 
(p = .10). These results complement those from the individual perspective. Children 
perceive that their group will show the same positive evaluation of a cooperative 
deviant relative to a competitive deviant that they personally do. Adults, by 
comparison, have inverted this relation in understanding that their group may in fact 
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evaluate a competitive deviant more positively than a cooperative deviant – even if 
they themselves would personally prefer a cooperative deviant. 
Figure 4.6. Perceived group favourability of deviant ingroup member as a function 
of age group and ingroup norm with standard error bars 
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4.6.5. Individual Deviant Favourability Reasoning  
(H4) Deviant agreement and ingroup norm were expected to influence 
participants’ justifications for their deviant evaluations. 
We next examined how age group, ingroup norm and agreement with the 
deviant influenced participants’ chosen reasoning justification for their evaluation of 
the deviant target, using a multinomial logistic regression approach. Addition of the 
predictors (age group, ingroup norm, target agreement) to the model led to a 
significant improvement in model fit compared with the null model, LR χ2(15, N = 
171) = 79.37, Nagelkerke R2 = .41, p < .001.  
The main effect of Age Group, χ2(6, N = 171) = 33.97, p < .001 was 
significant. Specifically, children were more likely than adults to make reference to 
fairness than group functioning reasoning to justify their evaluation of a deviant, β = 
-1.67, χ2(1) = 9.25, p = .002, Exp(B) = .19, 95% CI [.06, .55]. Children justified their 
evaluations of a deviant with reference to concerns for fairness. For example, one 
child participant positively evaluated a cooperative deviant “because he is fair”. By 
comparison, adults discussed the group functioning consequences of including a 
deviant target. For example, one adolescent participant negatively evaluated a 
cooperative deviant by stating “I would dislike her on my team as she is disagreeing 
with most of our group, which will cause arguments”. 
As well as this main effect, we observed an interaction effect between 
Ingroup Norm and Deviant Agreement, χ2(9, N = 171) = 33.97, p < .001. Given 
some small cell sizes, we used Fisher’s exact tests and follow up z tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to examine differences in individual 
deviant evaluation reasoning as a function of Ingroup Norm and Deviant Agreement. 
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All comparisons reported were significant at the p < .05 level, and reported means 
are proportional percentages of reasoning.  
First, there were differences in reasoning style dependent upon deviant 
agreement within the competitive ingroup norm condition (i.e. a cooperative 
deviant), Fisher’s exact = 22.84, p < .001. Participants who agreed with a 
cooperative deviant in this condition made greater reference to fairness (M = .50) 
than fair competition (M = .13) or group functioning (M = .30) reasoning. 
Participants who agreed with this form of cooperative deviancy did so because they 
believed it was the fair thing to do. Counter to this, participants who disagreed with 
the cooperative deviant made greater reference to group functioning (M = .71) than 
fairness reasoning (M = .14) or personal choice (M = .14). There were no references 
to fair competition amongst these participants. In this condition, less favourable 
evaluations of cooperative deviancy were justified with reference to the counter-
normative nature of the deviant’s behavior, and the problems for advancing the 
relative position of the ingroup this would create. One participant justified a negative 
evaluation of a cooperative deviant by arguing that “she’d give away half our 
precious money!” 
Likewise, in the cooperative ingroup norm condition (i.e. a competitive 
deviant) there were significant differences in reasoning domain use as a function of 
agreement with the deviant, Fisher’s exact = 22.18, p = .001. Participants who 
agreed with the competitive deviant made significantly greater use of group 
functioning reasoning (M = .89) than personal choice reasoning (M = .12). These 
participants justified a positive evaluation of the deviant with reference to the group 
functioning benefits of their behaviour. Amongst participants who disagreed with the 
competitive deviant, there were also references to group functioning (M = .40) above 
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and beyond fairness (M = .33), personal choice (M = .16) or fair competition (M = 
.12). These participants viewed the behaviour of the competitive deviant negatively 
due to the consequences their deviancy would have for group functioning. For 
example, one participant argued “I would dislike her on my team as she is 
disagreeing with most of our group which will cause arguments”.  
 
Table 4.1. 
 
Frequencies and proportions of participants’ reasoning as a function of ingroup 
norm and deviant agreement 
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6 (.12) 
 
20 (.40) 
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4.6.6. Relation Between Perceived Group and Individual Favourability 
(H5) With age, the relation between perceived group and individual 
evaluations was expected to weaken. 
Finally, we used the PROCESS Macro tool (Hayes, 2012) to test whether age 
moderated the relation between group and individual favorability. Using 
bootstrapping, we entered the centred continuous variables for group favorability and 
age in months, together with their interaction terms hierarchically in order to predict 
participants’ individual favorability. 
This analysis revealed a significant relation between age and individual 
favorability of the deviant (β = 0.01, t = 5.33, p = .001), R2 = .27, F(3, 225) = 
22.43, p < .001 (see Figure 4.7). In general, older participants were more favorable 
towards a deviant than younger participants.  
Similarly, group favorability was a significant predictor of individual 
favorability (β = 0.31, t = 4.77, p = .001). Participants who perceived that their 
ingroup would be more favorable towards a deviant showed higher individual 
favorability.  
These predictive effects were qualified by a significant interaction between 
age and perceived group favorability (β = -0.01, t = -5.85, p = .001) on individual 
favorability. Simple slopes analyses revealed that the relation between individual 
favorability and group favorability of the deviant was significantly stronger amongst 
younger participants (t = 7.60, p = .001) than older participants (t = -0.14, p = .89). 
This suggests that with age, the relation between adolescents and adults’ individual 
evaluations of the deviant and their perceived group evaluation becomes 
significantly weaker.  
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Figure 4.7. Individual favorability of deviant target among younger and older 
participants as a function of perceived group favorability. For older and younger 
participants and higher and lower perceived group favorability scores, we substituted 
values 1 standard deviation above and below the means, respectively. 
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4.7. Discussion 
The findings of this chapter extend previous research in the field of 
intragroup dynamics by examining how evaluations of ingroup peers in competitive 
and cooperative intergroup contexts develop between middle-childhood and young 
adulthood. This study shows that children expect their group to prefer a cooperative 
deviant relatively more than older participants, even when this is counter to a 
competitive ingroup norm in the context of a competitive arts competition. In line 
with work that has shown the importance of cooperation throughout the lifespan, 
participants of all ages positively evaluated the cooperative ingroup deviant. In 
contrast, when the ingroup deviant was competitive there were differences in 
favourability judgments as a function of age. Adult participants believed their group 
would evaluate this deviant relatively more favourably. Similarly, evaluations of a 
competitive ingroup deviant from middle childhood, into adolescence and adulthood 
became more positive from the individual perspective. In addition this study showed 
that participants varied the social reasoning they used to justify their evaluations 
according to whether the ingroup norm was competitive or cooperative, and their 
own personal agreement with the deviant.  
These findings address changing conceptions with age regarding cooperative 
and competitive norms. Previous work has shown that deviance from equal 
allocation norms becomes more acceptable between childhood and adolescence 
(Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014). This study extends previous findings by 
examining resource allocation related to competitive and cooperative contexts from 
middle childhood to adulthood. Specifically, we observed important differences 
between adolescents and adults that reflect an on-going developmental process. 
Adults personally positively evaluated a cooperative deviant ingroup member in the 
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same manner as children. However, unlike children they demonstrated more 
advanced intragroup knowledge in understanding that their group would not 
favourably evaluate this individual. This fits with research that has demonstrated the 
ongoing importance of cooperation into adulthood (Kahneman et al., 1986). Adults 
support cooperative norms and positively evaluate those who challenge such norms 
against a group norm for competition. This deviant is not only challenging an 
ingroup norm, but is also acting against a competitive intergroup context (i.e. the arts 
competition). Even with their advanced understanding of group processes and 
contextual knowledge, adults personally favour an individual who is arguing in 
favour of cooperation.  
By comparison, adolescents do not distinguish between competitive and 
cooperative deviants from their personal perspective. This is an interesting example 
of the conflicting influence of group processes and moral domain concerns outlined 
by the SRD approach (Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 2010). In different 
contexts, both cooperation and competition can be considered acceptable behavioral 
motivations. Adolescents do not seem to positively evaluate one over the other when 
it comes to deviancy. It would be interesting to further manipulate the context of the 
resource allocation decision in order to examine adolescents’ understanding of 
contextual factors and the impact this may have upon their evaluative preference for 
cooperation and competition.  
Moderation analyses revealed a relation between perceived group and 
individual evaluations for younger, but not older, participants. For younger 
participants the more favourable they perceived their group to be towards a deviant, 
the more favourable they themselves were. For older participants however, there was 
no link between individual and group evaluations. This supports the idea that a 
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fundamentally different understanding of intragroup dynamics emerges between 
childhood and young adulthood. Younger individuals struggle to comprehend that 
any group they would join could collectively think differently from themselves, 
especially when cooperation and equal distribution of resources are under in 
question. Adolescents and adults, on the other hand, make a distinction between their 
own attitudes and those of the group when making evaluative judgments of ingroup 
members. It is this understanding that both competitive and cooperative behaviors 
can be seen as acceptable from different perspectives, and depending on the 
situational context, which separates adolescents and adults from children. 
This study extends previous work examining the influence of group norms on 
deviant evaluation by making a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive peer 
group norms. In comparable work, peer group norms have been descriptive, where 
normative expectations were outlined via examples of past resource allocation 
behavior (Mulvey et al., 2014). However, peer group norms can also be delivered as 
prescriptions (i.e. a direct instructional statement regarding how group members are 
expected to behave). Here, participants received both a prescribed statement of 
cooperation or competition and observed how their fellow ingroup members were 
going to allocate resources (coherent with the prescription). Despite a unified 
statement of intent and allocation action, children in the competitive ingroup norm 
condition still believed that their group would like a cooperative deviant. Children’s 
commitment to cooperation is strong enough to supersede both a unified prescriptive 
and descriptive norm for competition.  
In line with predictions from the SRD model (Rutland & Killen, 2017), 
participants’ reasoning justifications for their evaluations of the deviant target 
involved the coordination of both moral and group functioning concerns. This was 
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specifically related to participants’ agreement with the deviant act. Those who 
disagreed with competitive deviancy referenced the inherently unfair nature of 
taking more resources for one’s ingroup. Conversely, participants who agreed with 
such behavior almost exclusively focused on the group functioning benefits of access 
to a greater share of the resources, or the consequences caused by including a 
cooperative deviant who wanted to give resources away to the outgroup.  
It is well established that children and adolescents simultaneously consider 
group functioning and moral domain concerns in their reasoning justifications 
(Mulvey et al., 2014; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Rutland & Killen, 
2017). These reasoning results extend this work by emphasising the importance of 
context in determining which of these factors takes precedence in a given situation. 
Group members’ justifications for evaluations of deviancy must not only take into 
account the morality of the deviant’s behavior, but also the contextual bounds in 
which this behaviour takes place. Specifically, in competitive intergroup contexts 
children face complex decisions requiring them to weigh up whether they ought to 
adhere to generic moral expectations or follow competitive cues to advance the 
relative position of their ingroup. Differential reasoning processes guided the 
evaluation of a deviant target, a process which itself differed dependent upon 
participant age. This intertwined relation between reasoning and judgment 
developing across childhood predicted by the SRD model is integral to children’s 
developing moral understanding.  
As predicted, the generic normative context did not influence evaluations of 
normative or deviant members. Instead, ingroup norms were of greater importance in 
predicting evaluations of ingroup targets. This finding fits with the idea that 
evaluating group members is seen as beyond the influence of generic expectations. 
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Who is chosen to join a group and how they are expected to behave falls under the 
jurisdiction of group members (Killen & Stangor, 2001) and is not contingent upon 
the context in which the group finds itself. For example, whilst a group member 
behaving cooperatively in line with a cooperative generic norm could be evaluated 
positively based upon moral principles of fairness and equality, such deviation in the 
context of a competitive ingroup norm is a transgression against group expectations. 
As such, the context in which this transgression happens is of less importance when 
participants are asked how their group would evaluate such behavior. Future work 
should seek to elucidate what behaviours that breach generic normative contexts are 
considered reproachable enough to face negative evaluation from the individual and 
group perspective, even if such behavior is in line with group norms. Similarly, it 
would be interesting to explore children’s understanding of how external individuals 
would evaluate various deviant acts. In particular whether, from the perspective of a 
non-group member, children understand that generic context does begin to play a 
more important role. 
4.8. Overview 
The present work extends knowledge regarding children, adolescents and 
adults’ understanding of intragroup dynamics into a context where competitive and 
cooperative norms were manipulated. Using a novel prescriptive norm method in the 
context of intergroup competition we demonstrated age-related differences between 
children, adolescents and adult’s understanding of group and individual evaluations 
of competitive and cooperative deviancy. Children favourably evaluated cooperative 
deviant targets from both a group and individual perspective, and didn’t separate 
their own perspective from that of the group. By comparison, adolescents and adults 
positively evaluated competitive group members whose behavior supported the 
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advancement of the ingroup’s relative share of resources, and cooperative group 
members who sought to share with the outgroup. At the same time, older participants 
understood that their group may still have positively evaluated a competitive deviant, 
whilst simultaneously negatively evaluating a cooperative deviant. Reasoning data 
supported these findings by demonstrating a shift between reasoning domains 
dependent on the ingroup norm and agreement with the deviant.  
With age individuals develop a sophisticated understanding of the interactive 
importance of both group membership and cooperation. When these issues conflict, 
adolescents and adults understand that there may be a difference between their own 
and the ingroup’s viewpoint. Understanding this difference this is essential in order 
to retain functioning group cohesion in increasingly complex contexts. By 
comparison, children remain focused on cooperation even when this may 
compromise ingroup cohesion. Intergroup situations are often competitive, and 
understanding when it is more or less justifiable to compete is important in order to 
maintain both inter-group and intra-group harmony. Crucially, by adulthood 
individuals revert to a strong personal positive evaluation of morally relevant 
cooperation even when they believe their group will not do so.  
Chapters Three and Four demonstrated the importance not just of peer level 
norms in resource allocation and intragroup evaluation, but also of contextual 
information and generic norms. Specifically, with age, individuals coordinate these 
factors to guide their behaviour and reasoning. Chapter Five returns to examine 
resource allocation, specifically with a focus on extending our investigation of 
generic level norms. In Chapter Two children integrated ingroup and outgroup level 
information when allocating resources. Children also found it difficult to coordinate 
ingroup information with more abstract generic contextual information manipulated 
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in Chapters Three and Four, particularly in a challenging intergroup scenario. 
Chapter Five seeks to examine whether a more concrete form of generic norm, made 
relevant to children’s everyday experience, exerts more of an influence upon their 
resource allocation decisions. Generic norms of cooperation are a powerful 
tempering influence on adolescents’ and adults’ resource allocation under 
competitive ingroup conditions. It is important to understand whether there are 
similar generic norms that, when designed in the context of children’s everyday 
experience, can exert a similar tempering effect on their ingroup biased resource 
allocation decisions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cooperation is not always morally relevant: The influence of performance-focus and 
learning-focus generic norms for cooperation 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapters Three and Four we examined whether children and adolescents 
simultaneously considered ingroup and generic contextual norms of competition and 
cooperation when allocating resources and evaluating their peers in a competitive 
intergroup scenario. These Chapters demonstrated that both ingroup and generic 
norms of competition and cooperation have an important role to play. Generic norms 
become increasingly important for adolescents when allocating resources. In Chapter 
Three, children adhered to a competitive ingroup norm by allocating a greater share 
of resources to their ingroup, even in a cooperative generic context. Older 
participants, by comparison, tempered their ingroup bias when the generic context 
was cooperative, even when prescribed an ingroup norm of competition. These 
findings suggest that between the ages of 7 and 11 years, children place greater 
emphasis upon ingroup norms than they do generic contextual norms. Chapter Five 
was designed to explore whether this is always the case, or alternatively whether 
there are more specific generic norms that are relevant for children’s resource 
allocation decision-making. In Chapter Three, age-related differences in 
understanding of generic contexts emerged between childhood and adolescence. 
Therefore, in Chapter Five we did not include an adult sample. 
In Chapter Three, participants in the cooperative generic normative context 
were asked to imagine they would be taking part in a “United Kingdom charity art 
event”. In this event, the art that groups produced would be sold to raise money for 
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an animal shelter. This generic normative context was designed to suggest to 
participants as there was no “winner” of the event, that cooperating with the 
outgroup to produce the best art possible would be the optimal solution to benefit the 
charity. Children, however, may have interpreted this scenario differently. 
Specifically, younger participants may in fact have assumed that the “winners” of the 
charity art event would be the school group who raised the greatest amount of money 
for the animal shelter. We know that children are highly influenced by competitive 
norms (see Chapter Two) and behave less prosocially under such conditions 
(Abrams et al., 2015). Biased ingroup allocation could be an attempt to prepare for 
the forthcoming charity art event by securing greater access to luxury art resources. 
This could be exaggerated when coupled with the competitive ingroup norm 
condition. Under such conditions a morally ambiguous cooperative event could be 
viewed through a competitive lens. 
This alternative interpretation of the results of Chapter Three draws from 
Killen's (2016) argument that cooperation alone is not always morally relevant. In 
line with evolutionary anthropological formulations of cooperation, Killen agrees 
that cooperation should be seen as a fundamental human process. However, she 
proposes that cooperation is not always a morally relevant or unambiguous action. 
The examples presented by Killen are dramatic (e.g. the cooperation of war criminals 
to commit genocide) but the central argument is relevant to the propositions of 
Chapter Five. Working together does not necessarily imply that the outcome of 
cooperation is going to be morally relevant. The intentions of the cooperating parties 
and the outcomes of the cooperative enterprise are just as important as the decision 
to work together when assessing the morality of an act. In Chapter Three, children 
may have interpreted “winning” the charity event as a more important goal than 
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allocating resources equally with the outgroup (i.e. a more traditional cooperative 
motive).  
A second line of thought relevant to this interpretation comes from the 
attitudes literature. Specifically, it is possible that children allocated a greater share 
of resources to their ingroup based upon assumptions of high ingroup competence. 
Through an extensive line of enquiry, Fiske and colleagues have established that 
outgroup members are stereotyped on two dimensions of warmth and competence 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). The Stereotype Content Model (SCM) argues 
that ingroup status and intergroup competition determine where stereotypes fall on 
the axes of warmth and competence. Given the competitive intergroup context of 
Chapter Three, less positive stereotypes about the outgroup may have been activated. 
The SCM proposes that individuals classify groups based on their warmth and 
competence. High-status or competitive groups are thought to be competent, but low 
in warmth. By comparison low-status or noncompetitive groups are categorised as 
low in competence, but high in warmth. In the case of the cooperative generic 
normative context in Chapter Three, participants may have stereotyped outgroup 
members as less competent artists than themselves.  
Competence scales have variously included measures of capability, 
skillfulness, intelligence, and confidence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). 
Competence in conjunction with warmth has been shown to be of central importance 
in the formation of stereotypes of older people, Asian Americans, immigrants, and 
even in fascist propaganda regarding racial groups (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Durante, 
Volpato, & Fiske, 2010; Kitano & Sue, 1973; Lee & Fiske, 2006). The SCM argues 
that attitudes towards groups are ambivalent in nature. That is, groups are either 
viewed as high in competence and low in warmth (for example, Asian Americans), 
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or low in competence but high in warmth (for example, the elderly). Crucially, 
stereotypes regarding ingroup members are a rare non-ambivalent example, as 
ingroup peers are viewed as both high in competence and warmth. Children in 
Chapter Three likely applied positive non-ambivalent stereotypes of high 
competence and warmth to their ingroup relative to the outgroup.  
In Chapter Five we examine the possibility that rather than ignoring generic 
expectations altogether, children in Chapter Three interpreted the cooperative 
generic norm situation as one in which they should attempt to better the outgroup in 
raising money for the charity, and in turn believed that their highly competent 
ingroup should receive the greater share of resources in order to do so. The SCM 
also emphasises the importance of group status. High status groups are considered to 
be more competent than low status groups, due to the belief that status is a 
consequence of ability rather than luck (Cuddy et al., 2008). In Chapter Two, 
participants were inducted into a high status ingroup in order to replicate the real-
world status quo where high status groups enact biased resource allocation which 
disadvantages low status minority groups. Less is known regarding how first-person 
membership of a low status ingroup influences the resource allocation process. In the 
present study, for the first time in conjunction with resource allocation norms, status 
is manipulated in order to examine its influence upon ingroup biased resource 
allocation.  
In Chapter Three, we manipulated generic contexts by informing participants 
that they would be taking part in one of two activities. These activities implied 
certain behavioural expectations associated with competitive or cooperative 
scenarios. It is possible that generic norms in this form did not guide children’s 
allocation behaviour as they were not outlined at the classroom level in which 
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children develop the majority of their intergroup social understanding. A third line of 
research can help to clarify why this is the case, with particular relevance given the 
age group and setting of Chapter Three. A rich literature regarding learning style has 
outlined two key motivations that guide children’s learning strategies at school: 
namely, learning and performance goals (Ames, 1992; Dweck, 1986; Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Learning goals involve a commitment to the 
process of learning, and individual development as the most important outcome of a 
given learning experience. When learning goals are applied, individuals are 
encouraged to develop new skills and master new tasks (Brophy, 1983; Meece, 
Blumenfeld, & Hoyle, 1988).  
Performance goals, by comparison, focus on comparing one individual’s 
abilities against others’ abilities in the same task. When performance-focus goals are 
applied, measuring success relative to comparison groups and receiving public 
recognition for success are the important goals. Less is known about how these 
motivational processes guide behaviour beyond learning. Performance-focus goals 
are particularly relevant to a setting where an outgroup exists against which 
performance can be measured. Indeed, they can be considered analogous to generic 
norms at the classroom level, where teachers outline goals and the expected means 
by which class members should behave in order to achieve these goals. With generic 
norms prescribed at the classroom level with specific expectations outlined to 
participants, we did not expect to observe age differences in the ability to take these 
more concrete generic norms into consideration. 
Performance-focus and learning-focus goals act as two of the central 
motivations for children’s learning. The generic cooperative charity context of 
Chapter Three has remarkable similarities with Dweck and colleagues’ performance-
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focus goal motivation. The charity context presented a situation in which one 
group’s artistic output could be measured against the other group. In the present 
study we attempted to control for this difference in cooperative motivation by 
creating two different generic cooperative contexts. In the generic performance-focus 
context, participants were again informed that they would be taking part in an event 
to raise money for a charity. The focus here was upon the outcome, i.e. the amount 
of money raised for the charity. We also, for the first time, inducted participants into 
a learning-focus generic context. In this morally relevant cooperation situation, 
participants were told they would be creating art to be displayed as part of an 
exhibition where the exhibitors would work together to learn about art. In this 
condition, there would be no winner on the day, nor a measureable outcome variable. 
We were interested in whether this distinction between performance and learning 
focuses could help explain why children in Chapter Three allocated a greater share 
of resources to their ingroup, even when the generic normative context was 
ostensibly cooperative. 
In the present study, participants were inducted into simulated groups based 
on school membership and asked to imagine they would be taking part in an art 
event with a school from the local area. For the first time, they were informed that 
their group was either of a professional artistic standard (high status) or an average 
artistic standard (low status). They were then prescribed an ingroup norm of 
competition or cooperation. The art event acted as the generic normative context for 
the study. This was either a direct competition (competitive), a charity art event 
(performance-focus cooperation) or an art exhibition (learning-focus cooperation). 
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5.1.1. Aims 
1. We aimed to establish whether children and adolescents make a distinction 
between different cooperative norms at the generic level. We were interested in 
whether children and adolescents would allocate resources differently as a function 
of the focus or outcome of the generic cooperative context (i.e. whether that was 
performance or learning).  
2. For the first time in such a resource allocation task we manipulated the 
status of the ingroup. Our aim was to understand whether members of higher status 
groups would show greater ingroup bias than participants in low status groups, 
particularly in the context of an art event where competence was related to success.  
3. We were again interested in understanding children’s social reasoning 
justifications for their behavior and how this differed as a function of age and chosen 
allocation strategy.  
5.1.2. Hypotheses 
H1. We expected to observe a significant main effect of ingroup norm. 
Participants in the competitive ingroup norm condition were expected to allocate a 
greater share of resources to their ingroup than those in the cooperative ingroup 
norm condition. 
H2. We expected to observe a significant interaction between ingroup norm, 
generic norm and status. In the cooperative ingroup norm condition, high status 
participants were expected to allocate a greater share of resources to the ingroup, but 
only when the generic norm was performance-focus. In the cooperative ingroup 
norm condition, low status participants were expected to allocate a greater share of 
resources to the outgroup in the performance-focus generic norm condition, given 
that the outgroup would have the greater competence required to meet the goals of 
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the charity event. In the learning-focus condition participants were expected to 
allocate resources equally regardless of status or ingroup norm. In the competitive 
generic context, we expected to see allocations in favour of the ingroup, particularly 
when the ingroup norm was competitive. When the ingroup norm was competitive, 
we expected to see greater ingroup biased allocation, independent of the generic 
norm condition. 
H3. Reasoning justifications for allocation were again expected to differ as a 
function of chosen resource allocation strategy, ingroup norm and age. In particular, 
we expected to see greater reference to fair competition and generic context to justify 
an equal allocation against a competitive ingroup norm amongst adolescents, 
compared with references to achieving basic fairness and equality amongst children. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
Participants (n = 344) were recruited from the Greater London metropolitan 
area. Participants included 190 (97 female, 93 male) 9- to 11-year-old children (Mage 
= 9.84, SD = .65), and 154 (87 female, 67 male) 14- to 16-year-old adolescents (Mage 
= 14.92, SD = .74). Power analysis for an ANOVA with 24 groups was conducted in 
G*Power to determine a sufficient sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 
0.95, and a medium effect size (f  = .025) (Faul et al., 2007). Based on these 
assumptions, the desired sample size was 322 participants. The sample consisted of 
approximately 42% White British, 19% Black British, 20% Asian British, and 16% 
other ethnic minority backgrounds (including Dual Heritage British, Chinese British 
and Eastern European participants), with 3% of participants opting to withhold 
ethnic information. The ethnic mix of these schools reflected the population of the 
metropolitan area in which testing took place. Participants attended schools serving 
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lower to middle-class socioeconomic (SES) populations. Parental consent and child 
assent were obtained for all participants.  
5.2.2. Design 
The study used a 2 (age: children, adolescents) x 2 (status: high, low) x 2 
(ingroup norm: competitive, cooperative) x 3 (generic normative context: 
competitive, learning, performance) between-subjects design.  
5.3. Procedure 
All measures were completed individually on laptop or desktop computers 
using Qualtrics. Group membership was initially established using the same method 
as in studies one, two and three. Participants were asked to imagine that they would 
be taking part in an inter-school arts event between their own school and a local rival 
school. They saw cartoon images representing the two groups, and picked a team 
logo, colour and name in order to instill feelings of group membership. 
5.3.1. Status. Status was manipulated by informing participants that an 
“award winning local artist” had been invited to assess the art of both competing 
school teams ahead of the forthcoming art event.  
In the high status condition, participants read: “The artist decided that most 
of the artists in your group were of a professional standard, and better than most 
examples they see from people of your age. The artist decided that most of the artists 
from the other school group were of an average standard, and no better than most 
examples they see from people of your age.” 
In the low status condition, this information was reversed and participants 
read: “The artist decided that most of the artists in your group were of an average 
standard, and no better than most examples they see from people of your age. The 
artist decided that most of the artists from the other school group were of a 
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professional standard, and better than most examples they see from people of your 
age.” 
5.3.2. Ingroup Norm. Ingroup norm was again manipulated by informing 
participants that their teammates had a secret message to be relayed to new team 
members prior to the art event.  
Participants read: “Hello, we’re really happy you’re going to be in our group 
for this drawing event. We just have one rule if you’re going to be in our group, and 
that is…”  
(Competitive ingroup norm) “If you want to be a part of the group, you 
should try and make our school do better than the other school groups, and never 
help the other groups in the event.  
(Cooperative ingroup norm) “If you want to be a part of the group, you 
should try and make our school do better than the other school groups, but also help 
the other groups in the event.  
…We’re really happy you’re going to be a member of the [School Name] 
group, good luck!”  
These norms were again designed to ensure they were believable in the 
context of the local competition, particularly given the strong expectation that 
individuals should support the ingroup in competitive situations (Bauer et al., 2013; 
Bowles, 2006). 
Next participants answered a manipulation check question to ensure that 
they had paid attention to and understood their ingroup norm: “Based on what you 
just read, does your team want to help other teams in the competition?” (Yes/No). 
Participants who failed to accurately understand their ingroup norm were excluded 
from the final analyses (n = 112). For example, a participant was excluded if they 
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said that their team wanted to help other teams in the competition when they had 
been told their team held a competitive ingroup norm. A sample of 344 participants 
(child, n = 190, adolescent, n = 154) was included in the final analyses. 
 5.3.3. Generic Norm. Following the ingroup norm induction, participants 
were told more about the generic normative context, which was one of three art 
events in which their group would be taking part. Participants were asked to read a 
message ostensibly from their class teacher, informing them about the event.  
In the Competitive Generic Norm condition, they read: “You will be taking 
part in the United Kingdom Art Competition, which is the highest level of art 
competition in the country that schools can take part in. The idea here is for you to 
try your hardest to win by making the best art.” 
In the Performance-focus Generic Norm condition, participants read: “You 
will be taking part in a United Kingdom Charity Art Event. The art will be used for a 
charity event for animal shelters across the UK. The idea here is to raise as much 
money as possible” 
In the Learning-focus Generic Norm condition, participants read: “You will 
be taking part in a United Kingdom Art Exhibition. The art will be used as part of an 
exhibition of lots of different schools across the country. The idea here is to work 
together so that everyone can display their art and learn a lot” 
5.3.4. Resources Introduction. Following the ingroup and generic 
normative manipulations, participants were introduced to the resources to be 
distributed in advance of the art event. Participants were told that the school councils 
of their school and the other school in the event had bought materials that could be 
used in the art event. These were graphically represented as ten boxes of art supplies. 
We opted here to ask participants to allocate boxes of art supplies for the event rather 
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than money to be spent on supplies. This was designed to remove a layer of 
ambiguity for child participants and in turn to increase the direct relevance of the 
resources to the event. In the competitive ingroup norm condition, participants were 
told that their group had voted to give “more supplies to your own school group, and 
less supplies to the other group”. In the cooperative ingroup norm condition, 
participants were told that their group had voted to “give the same amount of 
supplies to both groups”. 
5.4. Measures 
Participants were first asked to evaluate the chosen allocation strategy of 
their school group. They were asked either: “How okay or not okay is it for your 
school to give more supplies to your own group?” (competitive ingroup norm) or: 
“How okay or not okay is it for your school to give the same amount of supplies to 
both groups?” (cooperative ingroup norm) (resource allocation agreement 
question). Participants responded on a scale from 1 (really not okay) to 5 (really 
okay). Following this, participants were asked to indicate how they would distribute 
10 boxes of art supplies between the two groups (resource allocation). They could 
drag and drop pictures of each box to a column marked “Your School Group” or 
“Other School Group”. All 10 boxes had to be allocated in order to complete the 
task. For the analyses presented below, ingroup bias was measured in terms of the 
number of resources allocated to the participants ingroup (from 0 to 10 boxes of art 
supplies). After completing the allocation task, we assessed social reasoning by 
asking participants to justify their proposed allocation using an open ended “Why did 
you split the supplies the way you did?” question (resource allocation reasoning). 
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5.5. Data Preparation 
Responses to social reasoning justifications for both the resource allocation 
agreement measure and the resource allocation measure were coded using categories 
adapted from Social Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983). The coding system assigned 
responses to seven conceptual categories based on previous research (Killen et al., 
2013) and theoretical formulations: (1) Fairness, references generic fairness (e.g. 
“It’s the fair thing to do”), (2) Equality, references to allocating resources equally 
between groups (e.g. “So the supplies are equal”), (3) Fair Competition, references 
to ensuring the competition is conducted on a level playing field (e.g. “So every team 
has a chance to win”), (4) Group Functioning, references to group dynamics, norms 
or loyalty (e.g. “because that’s what the rest of the team wanted to do”), (5) Status, 
references to the status difference between the two groups (e.g. “because we are the 
better artists”), (6) Generic Context, references to the generic context of the event 
(e.g. “because I wanted the charity event to have lots of money and other groups can 
help by making amazing art”), (7) Personal Choice, references to autonomy (e.g. “it 
was my decision how to split the boxes”). Responses that did not fit into one of these 
seven conceptual categories were coded as “other”. Two coders, one of whom was 
blind to the hypotheses of the study, conducted the coding. Analysis of agreement 
between two coders (one of whom was blind to the hypotheses of the study) across 
25% of the responses revealed good inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ = .67).  
Participants’ chosen allocation strategy was included as a variable in 
reasoning analyses for those who provided a justification for their allocation. 
Participants who assigned five boxes to each team were coded as Equality Strategists 
(n = 274). Participants who assigned more boxes to their ingroup were coded as 
Ingroup Servers (n = 70).  
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Participants were considered to have not fully understood the normative 
manipulation if they answered the ingroup norm manipulation check question 
counter to the group norm manipulation. For example, a participant would be 
excluded if they said that their team wanted to help other teams in the competition 
when they had been told their team held a competitive ingroup norm.  This excluded 
group comprised 97 children and 20 adolescents (see appendix A for a complete 
breakdown of exclusion by condition). Initial analyses were conducted with the full 
sample, revealing no significant results. Following this, participants who answered 
the norm manipulation check question incorrectly were omitted from the final 
analyses. The analyses reported here included a total sample of 344 participants 
(children, n = 190; adolescents, n = 154).  
5.6. Data Analytic Plan 
Participants’ Resource Allocation (boxes allocated to the ingroup) and 
Resource Allocation Agreement responses were both subjected to 2 (Age Group: 
Children, Adolescents) x 2 (Ingroup Norm: Competitive, Cooperative) x 3 (Generic 
Norm: Competitive, Learning-Focus, Performance-Focus) univariate ANOVAs.  
Our sample size did not allow for us to reliably test for gender effects in 
interaction with age or norm conditions. However, given that gender has not 
previously been shown to exert an effect on adherence to group norms (McGuire et 
al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) we did not expect 
differences in resource allocation or reasoning based on gender.  
Follow up pairwise comparisons tests were conducted with Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons applied. One sample t-tests were used to assess 
ingroup bias in resource allocation by comparing participants’ allocations to the 
midpoint of the scale (criterion value = 5 boxes). 
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Reasoning responses were analysed using a multinomial logistic regression 
model. We modeled the effects of Age Group (Adolescents, Children) and 
Allocation Strategy (Equality, Ingroup Servers) on reasoning style across five 
conceptual categories (fairness, equality, fair competition, group functioning, generic 
context). Fewer than 5% of participants used the status (n = 5) and personal choice 
categories (n = 5), and so these responses were omitted from the analyses, along with 
participants who used the “other” category (n = 17).  
5.7. Results 
5.7.1. Resource Allocation Agreement 
Analyses revealed a main effect of ingroup norm in participants’ evaluations 
of the resource allocation strategies advocated by the competitive and cooperative 
ingroups, F(1, 319) = 249.51, p < .001, η2 = .44. Giving more resources to one’s own 
group (competitive ingroup norm condition) was rated as significantly less 
acceptable (M = 2.17, SD = 1.27) than distributing the resources equally between the 
two groups (cooperative ingroup norm condition) (M = 4.13, SD = 1.04). Participants 
evaluated cooperative equal allocation more favourably than competitively favouring 
one’s ingroup, independent of their status, age or generic norm. 
5.7.2. Resource Allocation  
(H1) Participants will allocate more resources to their ingroup when the 
ingroup norm is competitive. 
Having established that participants judged cooperative equal allocation to be 
more acceptable than competitive ingroup bias we next analysed ingroup allocation 
as a function of status, age, ingroup norm and generic norm. There were no 
significant or interactive effects for the status manipulation. We observed a 
significant main effect of age group, F(1, 337) = 10.29, p = .001, η2 = .03. 
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Adolescents (M = 5.66, SD = 1.41) allocated a greater share of the art resources to 
their ingroup than did Children (M = 5.26, SD = .78). There was also a significant 
main effect of ingroup norm, F(1, 337) = 4.65, p = .03, η2 = .01. Participants in the 
competitive ingroup norm condition (M = 5.55, SD = 1.28) allocated significantly 
more resources to their ingroup than those in the cooperative ingroup norm condition 
(M = 5.32, SD = .93).  
(H2) Participants’ allocations would differ as a function of ingroup norm, 
generic norm and status. 
These significant main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between ingroup norm and generic norm F(2, 320) = 5.41, p = .005, η2 = .03 (see 
Figure 5.1). Participants’ resource allocation decisions were dependent not only upon 
their prescribed ingroup norm, but also the generic context in which the art event 
would take place. When the ingroup norm was cooperative, there were significant 
differences in resource allocation as a function of the generic norm condition. 
Participants in the Performance-Focus (i.e. a charity art event) generic norm 
condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.33) allocated a significantly greater share of the 
resources to their ingroup than participants in either the Competition (i.e. inter-
institution competition) generic norm condition (M = 5.19, SD = .59; p = .02) or 
Learning-Focus (i.e. cooperative art exhibition) generic norm condition (M = 5.12, 
SD = 50; p = .01). There was no significant difference between the Competition and 
Learning-Focus conditions (p = .99). Participants’ allocations in the performance (t 
(56) = 4.07, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .54) and competition (t (53) = 2.33, p = .02, 
Cohen’s d = .32) conditions differed significantly from the criterion value of 5 
boxes. Allocations in the Learning-Focus condition did not differ significantly from 
this value, t (57) = 1.84, p = .07, Cohen’s d = .24. In the Performance-Focus 
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condition, when the ingroup norm was cooperative, participants demonstrated 
significantly greater ingroup biased allocation than in the Learning-Focus or 
Competition generic contexts.  
There were no significant differences between the Competition (M = 5.40, 
SD = 1.00), Performance-Focus (M = 5.52, SD = 1.30) or Learning-Focus (M = 5.82, 
SD = 1.50) generic conditions when the ingroup norm was competitive. Participants’ 
allocations differed significantly from the criterion value of 5 boxes in the 
Competition (t(64) = 3.24, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .40), Performance-Focus (t(53) = 
2.93, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .40) and Learning-Focus (t(55) = 4.09, p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = .55) conditions. In the competitive ingroup norm condition, the generic context 
was less influential upon participants’ decisions to allocate resources. 
Chapter Five: Performance & Learning 
 152 
 
Figure 5.1. Boxes allocated to ingroup as a function of ingroup norm and generic 
norm with standard error bars 
 
5.7.3. Resource Allocation Reasoning 
(H3) Participants’ reasoning justifications were expected to differ as a 
function of age and allocation strategy. 
Addition of the predictors (age group, ingroup norm, strategy) to the model 
led to a significant improvement in model fit compared with the null model, LR 
χ2(24, n = 317) = 212.26, Nagelkerke R2 = .51, p < .001. The main effects of 
Strategy, χ2(4, n = 317) = 163.12, p < .001 and Age Group, χ2(4, n = 317) = 17.27, p 
= .002 were both significant, as well as the interaction effect of Strategy and Age 
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Group, χ2(12, N = 317) = 197.63, p < .001. There were no differences in reasoning 
style as a function of ingroup norm. Given some small cell sizes (n < 5), we used 
Fisher’s exact tests and follow up z tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons to examine differences in Resource Allocation reasoning as a function 
of Age and Strategy (see Table 5.1).  
Amongst adolescents, there were significant differences in reasoning style as 
a function of allocation strategy, Fisher’s exact = 84.67, p < .001. Adolescent 
participants who used equality as an allocation strategy made greater reference to fair 
competition (M = .38) than fairness (M = .20), equality (M = .21), group functioning 
(M = .06) or generic context (M = .15). These participants argued that it was 
important to allocate resources equally between the two groups in order to ensure 
that both groups would have equal access and a fair chance in the competition. For 
example one participant allocated resources equally between the groups “because I 
think even though it’s a competition we should all be given the same chance and 
opportunity to make it fair to win.” 
By comparison, participants who allocated a greater share of the resources to 
their ingroup made significantly greater use of group functioning justifications (M = 
.82) than equality (M = .03), or generic context (M = .15). There were no references 
to fairness or fair competition amongst this group. Participants who justified ingroup 
serving behavior within this group functioning category referenced the importance of 
advancing the relative position of their ingroup. For example, one participant 
justified allocating six of the ten boxes to their ingroup by arguing: “we want more 
than an even chance to win, so the other team will need less supplies – but not too 
little.” It is interesting that despite the prominent importance of ingroup success, this 
participant was still concerned with some form of equity. 
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Similarly amongst children, there were significant differences in reasoning 
style as a function of allocation strategy, Fisher’s exact = 71.81, p < .001. Children 
who allocated the resources equally between the two groups made equal reference to 
fairness (M = .33) and fair competition (M = .33). They referenced these two styles 
significantly more than they did equality (M = .28), group functioning (M = .03) or 
generic context (M = .04). Participants who referenced fairness justified their equal 
allocation with reference to the importance of basic principles of fairness. For 
example one participant gave equal numbers of art supplies to both groups “because 
if I gave more supplies to one team it would be unfair.” Concerns for fair 
competition were also present amongst children, who argued that equal allocation 
was important: “so it is fair; if we had more than them they could run out of 
materials.”  
In contrast, children who allocated a greater share of the resources to their 
ingroup justified this with greater reference to group functioning (M = .80) than 
fairness (M = .10) or generic context (M = .10). There was no reference to equality or 
fair competition amongst this group. Similarly to the adolescent sample, these 
participants made reference to the group functioning benefits of ingroup biased 
resource allocation for the forthcoming art event. There were also references to the 
importance of group loyalty, for example one participant justified allocating six of 
the ten boxes to their own school “because I don’t want to help another school win, 
other than mine.” 
Crucially, there were differences in proportion of reasoning style as a 
function of age within the equality strategists, Fisher’s exact = 15.48, p = .003. 
Children justified an equal allocation of resources with significantly greater 
reference to simple fairness than adolescents. In contrast, we observed significantly 
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greater reference to the generic context amongst adolescents than children. For 
example, there were references to the Learning-Focus generic normative context. 
One adolescent participant argued that it was important to give both groups the same 
amount of supplies “as it’s stated that the idea is to have fun and learn a lot about 
displaying art. The other team won’t have fun if it’s not really fair.” There were also 
references to the charity art event amongst adolescents. For example, one adolescent 
participant split the boxes equally between the two groups “so we can have an equal 
amount and raise as much money as we could for the charity.”  
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Table 5.1.  
 
Frequencies and proportions of participants’ reasoning as a function of age and allocation strategy
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
Age Group 
 
 
 
Fairness 
 
Equality 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
Generic 
Context 
 
 
Equality 
 
 
  
 
13 – 16 years 
 
 
 
22 (0.20) 
 
 
23 (0.21) 
 
 
41 (0.38) 
 
 
6 (0.06) 
 
 
16 (0.15) 
 
 
8 – 11 years 
 
 
51 (0.33) 
 
 
43 (0.28) 
 
 
51 (0.33) 
 
 
4 (0.03) 
 
 
6 (0.04) 
 
 
Ingroup 
Servers 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
13 – 16 years 
 
 
 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 (0.03) 
 
 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
 
 
28 (0.82) 
 
 
 
5 (0.08) 
 
 
 
8 – 11 years 
 
 
2 (0.10) 
 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
 
16 (0.80) 
 
 
2 (0.10) 
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5.8. Discussion 
The present study demonstrated that the process of cooperation in the context 
of resource allocation is more complex than a case of “you help me and I’ll help 
you” reciprocity (Killen, 2016). Instead, participants simultaneously coordinated 
normative information regarding the outcomes of their cooperative resource 
allocation action with moral and group functioning factors. Here, we observed a 
significant interaction between ingroup norm and generic norm when participants 
were asked to allocate resources for use in a forthcoming arts event. Specifically, 
within the cooperative ingroup norm condition, ingroup biased resource allocation 
was dependent upon a generic normative context that implied participants’ 
performance would be measured or compared with the outgroup.  
Whilst participants took ingroup and generic norms into account independent 
of age, reasoning data revealed age-related differences in the style of justification 
used amongst equality strategists. Adolescents made greater reference to the need to 
establish a fair competition, and in turn to the two cooperative generic contexts. 
Children by comparison relied on more straightforward references to the necessity 
for strict equality and fairness. It is this reasoning process that differentiates 
children’s and adolescents’ resource allocation decision-making, even when they 
allocate resources using the same strategy. Whilst 9-year-olds are capable of using 
generic contextual information to guide their allocation, their reasoning to justify 
these decisions relies upon more straightforward fairness concerns. Adolescents on 
the other hand, emphasise more advanced notions of fair competition, as well as 
situating the decision within the generic context. 
In Chapter Three, children allocated a greater share of communal resources 
to their ingroup than an outgroup in a cooperative generic normative context when 
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prescribed a competitive ingroup norm. One possible explanation for this allocation 
behavior was that they ignored the generic context altogether, and displayed ingroup 
bias in line with a competitive ingroup norm. Chapter Five tested an alternative 
explanation drawn from the work of learning motivation theorists (Ames, 1992) and 
the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002). Guided by this work, we argued 
that it was possible children had construed the cooperative generic context in 
Chapter Three to involve comparison with the outgroup and assessment based on 
performance in terms of money raised for the charity event. In turn, it is known that 
individuals believe their ingroup to be composed of high competence members 
(Cuddy et al., 2008). As such, children in Chapter Three may have allocated more 
resources to their perceived high competence ingroup in an attempt to succeed in the 
charity art event. We tested this possibility by adding a third condition, based on a 
learning-focus motivation, where no tangible outcome could be measured against the 
outgroup. 
Under these conditions we observed an interaction between ingroup norm 
and generic norm, independent of age. When prescribed an ingroup competition 
norm, participants allocated a greater share of resources to their ingroup than an 
outgroup regardless of generic condition. This ingroup preference under competitive 
conditions has been established in Chapters Two and Three. However, when 
prescribed an ingroup norm of cooperation, resource allocation differed as a function 
of generic normative context. Participants allocated a significantly greater share of 
the resources to their own group in the performance-focus condition relative to both 
the learning-focus and competitive conditions. Children and adolescents alike 
believed that in the performance-focus condition, their group require a greater share 
of the resources in order to successfully sell more art to benefit the charity. It is 
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important to stress that this does not mean children and adolescents ignore 
cooperative motivations, rather that they pay attention to the outcomes related to a 
generic context alongside moral norms of cooperation.  
When the ingroup norm was cooperative, participants demonstrated more 
ingroup bias when allocating in a performance-focus generic normative context than 
when the generic norm was competitive. In the case of the performance-focus 
condition, demonstrating ingroup bias can arguably be justified as an attempt to 
benefit not one’s ingroup, but instead to assist the charity target via the means of 
selling high quality art. In the competitive generic condition however, displays of 
ingroup bias cannot be justified as either an attempt to display group loyalty (as the 
ingroup norm is cooperative), or as a biased means to a moral end. This difference 
emphasises children’s and adolescents’ developing understanding of the conditions 
in which it is acceptable to demonstrate ingroup bias, as well as their continued 
commitment to cooperation at the intergroup level. 
Interestingly, we did not observe the predicted effects of our status 
manipulation. Manipulating the status of the ingroup based on perceived artistic 
capability did not result in greater ingroup bias when in a high status group, or in low 
status group members favouring the outgroup. There are two possible explanations 
for this. First, children and adolescents may simply have found it hard to believe that 
their ingroup could be low in competence. This would fit with studies from the SCM 
perspective that have reliably shown ingroup members to be characterised as warm 
and high in competence across cultures (Cuddy et al., 2009).  
Alternatively, it may be the case that as members of a low status ingroup, 
participants sought to rectify the inequality in ability by assigning a greater share of 
resources to their ingroup for use in the competition. This could explain why low 
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status groups did not allocate in favour of a “professional” high status outgroup. 
Participants in the high status ingroup did not allocate a greater share of resources to 
a less competent low status outgroup in this study. Children and adolescents are 
aware of the consequences of ingroup disloyalty (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 
2014; Rutland et al., 2015) and are unlikely to show outgroup bias in their allocation, 
even when they are in a position of power. Future research is essential in order to 
tease apart these two explanations. A burgeoning line of research has begun to 
explore whether children challenge preexisting resource inequalities by rectifying in 
favour of disadvantaged groups (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016a, 2016b; Elenbaas, Rizzo, 
Cooley, & Killen, 2016). An interesting next step following this work could involve 
manipulating the status of these groups in terms of competence and task-ability.  
We also asked participants to justify their resource allocation strategy. 
Analysis of this data revealed an interactive influence of participants’ chosen 
strategy, and their age. Amongst participants who allocated resources equally 
between the two groups, we observed significant age trends. Older participants 
predominantly referenced fair competition when justifying such behavior; “Because 
I think even though it’s a competition we should all be given the same chance and 
opportunity to make it fair to win”. Children also made reference to fair competition, 
but did so in tangent with more generic references to fairness; “because if I gave 
more supplies to one team it would be unfair”. By 9 years, children are beginning to 
move beyond reasoning about more general principles of fairness, and applying 
specific contextual knowledge to their reasoning justifications.  
Adolescents also made reference to the generic context of the art event. Some 
adolescents justified an equal allocation by referencing the learning-focus; “as it’s 
stated that the idea is to have fun and learn a lot about displaying art. The other 
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team won’t have fun if it’s not really fair.” Others referred to the importance of 
working together to benefit the charity organization; “so we can have an equal 
amount and raise as much money as we could for the charity”. This is particularly 
interesting given that it was in the performance-focus condition that we observed 
greater ingroup bias than the competition or learning-focus generic conditions. 
Whilst some participants justify an equal allocation in reference to the charity, we do 
not observe such explicit reference to the charity event to justify an ingroup biased 
allocation. Instead, these participants talk about how their group needs a greater 
share of resources in order to “win” the event. With age, the same generic contextual 
information can be differentially used to justify both equal and ingroup biased 
allocation. The more advanced moral domain reasoning seen amongst adolescents 
reflects a higher order interactive coordination of issues of fairness, intergroup 
functioning, ingroup norms and contextual information. Cooperation is important 
throughout the lifespan, but what it means to cooperate changes and becomes more 
contextual with age. 
Future research could serve to pick apart differences in how children and 
adolescents think about cooperative scenarios like this one. Clearly, some 
participants do believe that the charity event is a situation that requires cooperation, 
whilst others believe their group is fundamentally better equipped to benefit the 
charity. It would be interesting to explore how perceptions of ingroup ability feed 
into this. Further it is important to establish whether ingroup identification play a 
role. It is possible that participants who identify highly with their ingroup whilst 
simultaneously believing that said group is high in competence are most likely to 
demonstrate ingroup biased resource allocation in a performance-focus task. 
Ultimately, whilst children are beginning to show evidence that they can think 
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beyond simple “fair or unfair” reasoning, it is adolescents who reach beyond ideas of 
fair competition to incorporate generic contextual information in their moral 
reasoning justifications in order to guide their allocation decisions. 
5.9. Overview 
In this study we set out to extend understanding of the influence of generic 
norms in childhood and adolescence. The findings of this study support the idea that 
from middle childhood, generic normative information can be incorporated into 
resource allocation decisions when it is made salient and specific to children’s 
classroom experiences. Participants favoured their ingroup in a situation where their 
performance could be compared to an outgroup, but did not do so in an unambiguous 
cooperative context. Children are capable of coordinating generic norms with 
ingroup norms when they are relevant to their experiences of school life. The key 
distinction between childhood and adolescence falls in the reasoning that is used to 
justify this decision. It is only by adolescence that references to fair competition and 
generic context become prominent.  
Chapters Two to Five have demonstrated that under the appropriate 
conditions, children and adolescents coordinate group normative information with 
cues from the generic context and their intrinsic desire to share resources equally 
between groups. In the final empirical chapter we extend our examination of the 
coordination of multiple informational sources by introducing a scenario where one 
group is disadvantaged by a preexisting resource inequality. Less is known regarding 
how children and adolescents allocate resources in such situations where they not 
only have to take into account norms and expectations for equal allocation, but also 
information regarding existing access to resources. This final chapter provides an 
important extension to the preceding studies. When both groups begin on an even 
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standing, adhering to a group norm of equality is a morally unambiguous behaviour 
that is unlikely to disadvantage others. However, when one group has less to begin 
with, allocating in line with an equal allocation norm may actually serve to 
disadvantage another group and perpetuate systematic inequalities. The study 
described in Chapter Six aimed to clarify whether children and adolescents are 
capable of coordinating such situational information with concerns for group loyalty 
and norms. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Ingroup bias in rectifying resource inequalities: The role of ingroup norms 
 
A version of this chapter is under review as: McGuire, L., Rutland, A., Elenbaas, L., 
& Killen, M. (Under Review). The development of ingroup bias in rectifying 
resource inequalities: The role of ingroup norms. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Resources are often unequally distributed between societal groups based on 
characteristics including, for example, race and gender. Recent work has 
demonstrated that, under certain conditions, children between 5 and 10 years of age 
will rectify resource inequalities between groups (Elenbaas et al., 2016; Li, Spitzer, 
& Olson, 2014; Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & Banaji, 2011). Less is known, however, 
regarding age-related differences of this ability between childhood and adolescence, 
or the role that salient peer group norms play in the decision to rectify inequalities. 
Chapter Six sought to extend our knowledge of peer group norms into a situation 
where one group has been disadvantaged by a preexisting resource inequality. 
 Further, recent research on resource allocation and inequality has 
predominantly taken a third-party perspective. It is important to extend this work to 
the first-person perspective, and examine how children and adolescents distribute 
resources in contexts of inequality when they themselves are potential resource 
recipients. It is not yet fully understood how the first-person experience of 
advantaged or disadvantaged access to resources influence challenges to inequality. 
Similarly, we do not yet fully understand how intergroup processes (i.e., group 
membership, group status, and group norms) interact to guide the development of 
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challenges to inequality. This is an essential topic to investigate given that many 
inequalities are based upon social group categorisations. In the final chapter of this 
thesis, for the first time, we examined children and adolescents’ decisions about 
whether to rectify a resource inequality in a competitive intergroup context where 
both peer group norms and the advantaged or disadvantaged status of participants’ 
own group were made salient. 
Prior research in this area has primarily examined whether children reject 
resource inequalities in dyadic contexts where intergroup factors are not salient 
(Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Williams & Moore, 2014). In 
these contexts children’s ability to distribute resources in order to correct a pre-
existing inequality emerges in early childhood. For example 5-year-olds share more 
resources with a recipient who has few, than a recipient who has many resources (Li 
et al., 2014; Paulus, 2014). By 7-8 years of age, children judge that correcting a pre-
existing inequality is more acceptable than allocating resources strictly equally 
(Rizzo & Killen, 2016) and recognise need as a legitimate reason for distributing 
more resources to one individual than to another (Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, & 
Tomasello, 2016). When reasoning about their decisions, children reference the 
importance of fair access to resources, and the need to rectify past inequalities 
(Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009).  
However, resource inequalities often occur in intergroup contexts (e.g., 
inequalities between racial, gender, or school-affiliated groups). Several lines of 
research demonstrate that children often allocate preferentially to their ingroup, 
whether this is based upon race, gender, or a minimal group manipulation (Benozio 
& Diesendruck, 2015; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015). In 
some cases when an existing inequality between such groups is made salient, 
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children allocate resources in favour of those who have less (Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016b). However, other research has shown this is not always the case, as children 
can also perpetuate an inequality between novel groups (Olson et al., 2011). Thus, 
children have the capacity to challenge resource inequalities between groups they 
perceive to be unfair, even if that means giving fewer resources to members of their 
own social group. However, they do not always choose to rectify such an inequality, 
especially when intergroup characteristics are salient. The present work seeks to 
provide an examination of one group process that may influence the decision to 
rectify in such contexts, namely, group norms. 
While children develop the ability to rectify inequalities in middle childhood, 
little is known regarding how group norms influence children and adolescents’ 
resource allocation in situations of intergroup inequality. Developmental research 
has shown how group norms regarding social exclusion and inclusion at the broad or 
local individual level of groups influence children's intergroup attitudes (McGuire et 
al., 2015) and resource allocation (Chapters Two to Five), yet the role of group 
norms in guiding resource allocation in a context of inequality is unknown. For 
example, a group might expect its members to share resources equally between 
recipients. Children understand and support such equality norms, preferentially 
evaluating those who adhere to them (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 
2013). However, children and adolescents also adhere to equity norms (Almås et al., 
2010), expecting resources to be distributed according to recipient need. In this study 
we examine the influence of both an equality (all groups should receive the same 
amount) and an equity (those who have less to begin with should receive more now) 
group norm on the development of intergroup resource allocation in the context of 
inequalities between groups.  
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Further, most developmental research examining intergroup resource 
allocation has asked children about third-party situations where the participant does 
not personally stand to gain any resources. In situations of intergroup inequality 
however, an individual’s personal “stake” in the outcome of any given allocation 
often plays an important role in their decision-making. In this study, we inducted 
participants into simulated groups within a competitive intergroup context. Then we 
informed participants that their peer group either had a greater initial amount of 
resources than the outgroup, or vice versa. When resources are at stake, the intended 
use of these resources is an important factor to consider. Often, groups are 
competing for resources, which in turn can lead to resource inequalities. Given this, 
we chose to examine allocation within a competitive context where status and 
normative information must be considered simultaneously. Children and adolescents 
were therefore required to balance ingroup/outgroup considerations, personal 
advantage/disadvantage, and peer group norms all within a competitive intergroup 
context, when making decisions about resource allocation.  
In the current study, participants learned that their group either had a lot of 
resources (advantaged) or few resources (disadvantaged) relative to another group at 
a local rival school. Then, for the between-subjects peer group norm manipulation, 
participants received a prescriptive peer group norm informing them that their group 
either wanted to allocate new resources between the two groups equally (same 
number to both groups) or equitably (more to the disadvantaged group). In a control 
condition, participants were not given any information regarding their peer groups’ 
allocation norm. This control condition allowed us to examine whether participants 
would allocate equally or equitably in a situation where they are not given any 
normative information.  
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The SRD perspective (Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 2010) predicts 
developmental trends between childhood and adolescence regarding the ability to 
coordinate normative and moral information when making decisions in intergroup 
contexts. Adolescents (13-year-olds) are more likely than children (9-year-olds) to 
consider both the issue of morality (e.g., to be fair to each group) and group 
functioning (e.g., to be loyal to my group and make it function effectively). This has 
been shown in research in which adolescents are more likely than children to 
consider the group goals of their ingroup and to recognise that groups would like 
someone who wanted to help the ingroup by distributing more resources to 
themselves (Killen et al., 2013). This age-related difference can in part be explained 
by adolescents’ increased understanding of group processes through their 
experiences of group membership, developing group nous and social acumen skills 
(Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & Cameron, 2015; Nesdale, 2013; Nesdale, 
Zimmer-Gembeck, & Roxburgh, 2014).  
Given this shift in the ability to balance peer group normative information 
with moral concerns from childhood into adolescence (Rutland & Killen, 2017), we 
tested for differences between children (7 - 11-years old) and adolescents (13 – 16-
years-old). Extending the SRD perspective, this chapter examined children and 
adolescents’ decisions about how to distribute resources in a context of intergroup 
inequality involving their school and a local rival school, when their peer group was 
either advantaged or disadvantaged by a pre-existing resource inequality and 
endorsed equal or equitable allocation norms. In order to examine in detail why 
participants allocated resources in a given manner, we again assessed social 
reasoning justifications with the expectation that children and adolescents would use 
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different social reasoning depending on their decision to rectify or perpetuate the 
inequality. 
6.1.2. Aims 
1. To examine whether children and adolescents’ challenges to a 
resource inequality were dependent upon their ingroup norm.  
2. To examine whether children and adolescents’ challenges to a 
resource inequality were dependent upon their relative advantage 
status.  
3. To examine children and adolescents’ social reasoning justifications 
for their chosen resource allocation strategy. 
6.1.3. Hypotheses 
H1a. Given previous findings and the predictions of the SRD model we 
expected that children and adolescents would view perpetuating inequality as wrong. 
H1b. Previous research has demonstrated that adolescents who are more 
aware of existing status inequalities are more likely to challenge inequality via social 
action (Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). Adolescents were expected 
to be better able than children to consider information regarding peer group norms 
and group advantaged/disadvantaged status, and to employ this information when 
allocating resources. Therefore, when prescribed an ingroup norm of equity and 
personally disadvantaged by an inequality, we expected adolescents to allocate a 
greater share of resources to their ingroup than children in the same condition. When 
personally advantaged by a resource inequality, we expected adolescents and 
children to use equality as a resource allocation strategy. Equality both meets with 
expectations for fairness and expectations for group loyalty (i.e., not explicitly 
favouring the outgroup, particularly in a context of intergroup competition). 
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H2. We also expected to observe differences within the age groups when 
comparing the influence of the equity norm with the equality norm, for 
disadvantaged participants. Specifically, when disadvantaged by a resource 
inequality, we expected adolescents to allocate a greater share of resources to their 
ingroup when prescribed an equity norm than an equality norm. For children, we did 
not expect to observe a difference in resource allocation between these two norms. 
Children are less capable of coordinating intergroup and moral concerns, particularly 
in the complex intergroup competitive scenario used in this study. Given this, we 
expected the greatest difference between the equity and equality conditions amongst 
adolescent participants who were disadvantaged by the inequality. Again, we did not 
expect to observe differences between the norm conditions among participants 
whose group was advantaged by the inequality. Instead, we predicted that 
advantaged participants would use equality as a resource allocation strategy to meet 
fairness norms and group expectations. 
H3. Further, we did not expect to observe differences between allocations in 
the equality and control conditions as a function of age or advantage. In the control 
condition we expected participants to use an equality strategy, given children’s and 
adolescents’ strong desire to allocate resources fairly. When the ingroup supported 
an equality norm, we expected participants to allocate resources equally between the 
groups regardless of their advantage. Again, this strategy meets both with the desire 
to be fair, and coheres with group normative expectations. 
H4. Finally, we expected to observe differences in participants’ reasoning 
dependent upon how they allocated resources. Amongst participants who rectified an 
inequality, we expected to see greater references to the unfair nature of perpetuating 
inequality and the need to use resources to rectify this disparity. By comparison, 
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participants who allocated resources equally between groups were expected to focus 
predominantly upon equality as a general fair resource allocation strategy. Finally, 
participants who gave a greater share of the resources to the advantaged group were 
expected to justify this with reference to the group functioning benefits of doing so 
(i.e., to argue that their own group required a greater share of the resources in order 
to succeed in the competition). 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Participants  
Participants (n = 360) were recruited from the London metropolitan area. 
Participants comprised 249 (129 female, 120 male) 7- to 11-year-old children (Mage 
= 10.16, SD = .68), and 111 (67 female, 44 male) 13- to 16-year-old adolescents 
(Mage = 14.31, SD = .86). Power analysis for an ANOVA with 12 groups was 
conducted in G*Power to determine a sufficient sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a 
power of 0.95, and a medium effect size (f  = .025) (Faul et al., 2007). Based on 
these assumptions, the desired sample size was 322 participants. The sample 
consisted of approximately 42% White British, 27% Black British, 17% Asian 
British, and 14% other ethnic backgrounds (including Dual Heritage British, Chinese 
British and Eastern European participants). The ethnic mix of these schools reflected 
the population of the metropolitan area in which testing took place. Participants 
attended schools serving lower to middle-class socioeconomic (SES) populations. 
Parental consent and child assent were obtained for all participants.  
6.2.2. Design 
The study used a 2 (age; children, adolescents) x 3 (ingroup norm; equity, 
equality, control) x 2 (advantage status; advantaged, disadvantaged) between-
subjects design.  
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6.3 Procedure 
All measures were completed individually on laptop or desktop computers 
using Qualtrics. Group membership was established using the same basic arts event 
procedure as in the preceding studies. 
6.3.1. Advantage Status. In the Advantaged condition participants were next 
told that their school already had “lots of materials (for example, paint and brushes) 
to use in the competition. These materials will help make better art, which is more 
likely to win the competition. [Local Rival School] do not have many of these art 
materials”.  
In the Disadvantaged condition participants were told that their local rival 
school already had “lots of materials (for example, paint and brushes) to use in the 
competition. These materials will help make better art, which is more likely to win 
the competition. [Participants’ school name] do not have many of these art 
materials”.  
6.3.2. Resources. Next, the resources were introduced by informing 
participants that the student council of their school and the rival school had 
purchased materials (pictorially represented by 10 boxes of crayons, paints and 
paper) that could be shared between the two groups. Participants were informed that 
their team would discuss how to distribute the resources together.  
6.3.3. Ingroup Norm. Ingroup norm was manipulated using the secret 
message procedure. Participants read the following: “Hello, we’re really happy 
you’re going to be on our team for this drawing competition. We want everybody in 
the competition to have a good time…”  
[Equality Norm] “We want to give the same amount to both teams” 
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[Equity Norm] “We want to give more to the team that has less to begin 
with” 
Participants in the Control condition read no further information about group 
norms. At the end of the message participants read: “We’re really happy you’re 
going to be a member of the team, good luck!”  
 After the secret message norm introduction, participants were shown how 
their team had voted to allocate the art supplies for this competition, in line with their 
norm. Thus, in the Equality Norm condition, the team voted to give 5 boxes of art 
supplies to the ingroup, and 5 boxes of art supplies to the outgroup. In the Equity 
Norm condition, the team voted to give 8 boxes to whichever team was 
disadvantaged (ingroup or outgroup) and 2 to the advantaged team. In the control 
condition participants did not receive any further information. 
6.4. Measures 
To establish attitudes towards perpetuating inequality, we assessed whether 
participants thought it was acceptable to favour an advantaged group when allocating 
resources. A hypothetical scenario was presented where a new group member 
decided how to allocate the resources. In this case, the individual wanted to give 
more to the advantaged team, because they had always had more in the past. 
Participants were asked, “How okay or not okay would it be for this person to give 
more to (the advantaged school) because they had always had more in the past?” 
(resource inequality evaluation). Answers to this question were recorded on a scale 
from 1 (‘really not okay’) to 5 (‘really okay’). Social reasoning was assessed in an 
open-ended format by asking participants why they thought this was okay or not 
okay (resource inequality reasoning).  
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Participants then indicated how they would distribute 10 boxes of art supplies 
between the two groups (resource allocation) using the same procedure as in 
Chapter Five. They were asked to drag and drop pictures of each box to a column 
marked “Your School Group” or “Other School Group”. All 10 boxes had to be 
allocated in order to complete the task. For the analyses presented below, responses 
to this measure were coded in terms of the number of resources (from 0 to 10 boxes 
of art supplies) allocated to the disadvantaged group (varied as a function of 
advantage condition). After completing the allocation task, we assessed social 
reasoning in an open-ended format by asking participants to justify their proposed 
allocation (resource allocation reasoning). 
6.5. Data Preparation 
Responses to social reasoning justifications for both the resource allocation 
measure and the judgment of perpetuating measure were coded using categories 
adapted from Social Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983). The coding system assigned 
responses to five conceptual categories based on previous research (Killen et al., 
2013) and theoretical formulations: (1) Equity, references to the need to correct 
inequality between the two groups (e.g. “I’m giving them more because they had less 
to start with”), (2) Equality, references to allocating resources equally between 
groups (e.g. “So the supplies are equal”), (3) Fair Competition, references to 
ensuring the competition is conducted on a level playing field (e.g. “So every team 
has a chance to win”), (4) Fairness, references to generic fair sharing (e.g. “it’s 
fair”), and (5) Group Functioning, references to group dynamics, norms or loyalty 
(e.g. “because that’s what the rest of the team wanted to do”). Responses that did 
not fit into one of these five conceptual categories were coded as “other”. Two 
coders, one of whom was blind to the hypotheses of the study, conducted the coding.  
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Analysis of agreement between two coders (one of whom was blind to the 
hypotheses of the study) across 25% of the responses revealed strong inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen’s κ = .81).  
In order to test our hypotheses regarding Perpetuating Inequality Reasoning, 
an “Inequality Agreement” variable was created. Participants who rated the 
perpetuation of inequality as “Okay” or “Really Okay” were classified as evaluating 
inequality as “Okay” (advantaged n = 38, disadvantaged n = 19), those who rated 
inequality as “Not Okay” or “Really Not Okay” were classified as evaluating 
inequality as “Not Okay” (advantaged n = 119, disadvantaged n = 116). Participants 
who evaluated inequality as “neither okay or not okay” were omitted from the 
analysis of perpetuating inequality reasoning (n = 43). 
Similarly, participants’ chosen allocation strategy was included as a variable 
in reasoning analyses for those who provided a reasoning justification. Participants 
who assigned five boxes to each team were coded as Equality Strategists (n = 247). 
Participants who assigned more boxes to the disadvantaged team were coded as 
Rectifiers (n = 47); and those who assigned more to the advantaged team were coded 
as Perpetuators (n = 32). Participants who did not complete the resource allocation 
measure were not included in the final analysis (n = 34). The final analyses reported 
here included a total sample of 326 participants (children, n = 225; adolescents, n = 
101).  
6.6. Data Analytic Plan 
Participants’ Resource Allocation (boxes allocated to the disadvantaged 
group) and Perpetuating Inequality responses were subjected to 2 (Age group: 
children, adolescents) x 3 (Ingroup norm: equity, equality, control) x 2 (Advantage 
status: advantaged, disadvantaged) univariate ANOVAs.  
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Our sample size did not allow for us to reliably test for gender effects in 
interaction with age or norm conditions. However, given that gender has not 
previously been shown to exert an effect on adherence to group norms (McGuire et 
al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) we did not expect 
differences in resource allocation or reasoning based on gender.  
Follow up pairwise comparisons tests were conducted with Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons applied. One sample t-tests were used to assess 
ingroup bias in resource allocation by comparing participants’ allocations to the 
midpoint of the scale (criterion value = 5 boxes). 
We predicted differences in reasoning as a function of participants’ chosen 
allocation strategy. Given the categorical nature of the reasoning data and the focus 
on participants’ allocation strategy, these reasoning responses were analysed using 
chi-square tests of independence. The effect of Allocation Strategy (Equality, 
Ingroup Servers) on reasoning style was examined across five conceptual categories 
(equity, fairness, equality, fair competition, group functioning). Fewer than 5% of 
participants used the personal choice categories (n = 5), and so these responses were 
omitted from the analyses, along with participants who used the “other” category (n 
= 51). 
6.7. Results 
6.7.1. Perpetuating Inequality 
(H1a) Participants will view perpetuating inequality as wrong. On average, 
participants judged perpetuating inequality as unacceptable (M = 2.19, SD = 1.28; 
differed significantly from midpoint of the scale, t(332) = -4.39, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= -.24). Yet, this decision varied as a function of the status condition. Analysis of 
participants’ evaluations of the perpetuation of inequality between groups revealed a 
Chapter Six: Challenging Inequality 
 177 
main effect of Advantage Status, F(1, 309) = 7.72, p = .006, η2 = .02 (see Figure 
6.1.). Participants in the Disadvantaged condition (M = 1.99, SD = 1.14; differed 
significantly from midpoint of the scale, t(152) = -5.48, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -.45) 
rated the perpetuation of inequality as significantly more unacceptable than those in 
the Advantaged condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.37; did not differ significantly from 
midpoint of the scale, t(179) = -1.37, p = .17, Cohen’s d = -.10). That is, even though 
all participants viewed perpetuating inequality as wrong on average, participants 
whose ingroup was disadvantaged by an inequality evaluated giving more to an 
advantaged group more negatively than participants whose ingroup was advantaged. 
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Figure 6.1. Evaluation of the perpetuation of inequality as a function of 
advantage status with standard error bars 
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6.7.2. Reasoning 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine relations 
between reasoning and participants’ judgments about the perpetuation of inequality. 
Given that some of the reasoning categories included fewer than 5 responses, we 
report here the Fisher’s exact test statistic. The relation between these variables was 
significant, Fisher’s exact (4, N = 247) = 55.01, p <.001. Follow up z tests with 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons were used to examine differences in 
reasoning as a function of inequality agreement (see Table 6.1). All differences 
reported were significant at the p < .05 level. 
Participants who rated the perpetuation of inequality as not okay were more 
likely to make reference to Equity (Mdisagree = .29, Magree
 = .03). These participants 
argued, for example, that perpetuating an inequality was unacceptable “as we had 
more supplies in the first place, and if they gave more to us we would still have more 
– this is not fair”. References to Fair Competition (Mdisagree = .29, Magree = .06) were 
also used more by participants who disagreed with the perpetuation of inequality. 
For example, one participant argued against the inequality “because a competition 
isn’t fair if one team runs out of materials and can’t finish”.  
 By comparison, participants who rated the perpetuation of inequality as okay 
were more likely to justify this with reference to Group Functioning (Magree = .67, 
Mdisagree
 = .10). These participants were in favour of perpetuating the inequality to 
advance the relative position of the ingroup. For example, “so we can have good 
equipment to win”.  
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Table 6.1. 
 
Frequencies and proportions of reasoning used by participants to justify 
perpetuation of inequality as a function of agreement with inequality 
 
 
 
Inequality 
Agreement 
 
Equity 
 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Equality 
 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Agree 1 (0.03) 4 (0.12) 2 (0.06) 4 (0.12) 22 (0.67) 
 
Disagree 
 
63 (0.29) 
 
 
50 (0.23) 
 
63 (0.29) 
 
17 (0.08) 
 
21 (0.10) 
 
 
 
6.7.3. Resource Allocation  
(H1b) Adolescents will allocate more to their disadvantaged ingroup than 
children when prescribed an equity norm.  
Having established that participants rated the perpetuation of inequality as 
more unacceptable when their ingroup was disadvantaged, and referenced the unfair 
nature of giving more to those who had more to begin with, we next assessed how 
participants allocated resources in this context of a resource inequality. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Age Group on boxes allocated to a 
disadvantaged group, F(1, 314) = 8.52, p = .004, η2 = .03. Adolescents (M = 5.38, 
SD = 1.67) gave significantly more boxes to a disadvantaged outgroup than children 
(M = 4.95, SD = 1.27). Likewise, there was a significant main effect of Advantage 
Status, F(1, 314) = 19.56, p < .001, η2 = .06. Disadvantaged participants gave 
significantly more boxes to their disadvantaged ingroup (M = 5.41, SD = 1.42) than 
advantaged participants gave to a disadvantaged outgroup (M = 4.79, SD = 1.35).  
These main effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between Age Group, Advantaged Status and Ingroup Norm, F(2, 314) = 3.60, p = 
Chapter Six: Challenging Inequality 
 181 
.03, η2 = .02 (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). As predicted by H1, there were key 
differences in how the two age groups utilised advantage status and group norm 
information in their resource allocation decisions. Specifically, disadvantaged 
adolescents who were prescribed an ingroup equity norm (M = 6.60, SD = 2.03; 
differed significantly from midpoint of scale, t(14) = 3.06, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .79) 
allocated significantly more to a disadvantaged ingroup than children in the same 
condition (M = 5.49, SD = 1.45; p = .007; differed significantly from midpoint of 
scale, t(36) = 2.05, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .34). When prescribed an ingroup norm of 
equity and personally disadvantaged by a resource inequality, adolescents seek to 
rectify an inequality more than children do. 
Inversely, when personally advantaged and prescribed an equity norm, 
adolescents’ did not use an equality strategy, instead opting to allocate significantly 
fewer resources to the disadvantaged outgroup compared with a criterion level of 5 
boxes (M = 4.38, SD = 1.20, t(20) = -2.36, p = .03, Cohen’s d = -.52). Children, by 
comparison, did use an equality strategy when personally advantaged and prescribed 
an equity norm. Their allocations did not differ from the criterion level of 5 boxes (M 
= 4.73, SD = 1.46, t(54) = -1.39, p = .17, Cohen’s d = -.18). Adolescents and 
children’s allocations did not significantly differ in the advantaged equity norm 
condition (p = .31). When prescribed an equity norm but personally advantaged by 
an inequality, adolescents favoured their ingroup and perpetuated an inequality, 
whereas children opted for equality. 
(H2) When disadvantaged, an equity norm promotes greater rectifying than 
equality in adolescents, but not children. 
To test H2, we looked for differences within the age groups regarding the 
influence of an equity norm compared with an equality norm when participants were 
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disadvantaged by a resource inequality. For disadvantaged adolescents, an equity 
norm (M = 6.60, SD = 2.03) led to significantly greater allocations to the ingroup 
than an equality norm (M = 5.22, SD = 1.40, p = .004, did not differ significantly 
from midpoint of scale, t(26) = .83, p = .42, Cohen’s d = .16). When their ingroup 
was disadvantaged by a resource inequality, adolescents prescribed an equity norm 
rectified this inequality more so than adolescents who were informed their group 
held an equality norm. Counter to our predictions regarding advantaged participants 
in H1, adolescents favoured their ingroup even when personally advantaged by a 
resource inequality and prescribed an ingroup equity norm. Interestingly, advantaged 
participants prescribed an equality norm allocated more resources to a disadvantaged 
outgroup than participants who were prescribed an ingroup equity norm (p = .008). 
The most effective norm in encouraging rectifying allocation for adolescents differs 
depending upon their relative ingroup advantage. 
Amongst children, however, there was no significant difference between 
participants who were prescribed an equity norm (M = 5.49, SD = 1.45, although this 
did differ significantly from midpoint of scale, t(36) = 2.05, p = .05, Cohen’s d = 
.34) and those who were prescribed an equality norm (M = 5.21, SD = 1.18; p = .99, 
did not differ significantly from midpoint of scale, t(28) = .95, p = .35, Cohen’s d = 
.18). For disadvantaged children, there was no difference in allocation as a function 
of the type of ingroup norm prescribed. Even when disadvantaged by a resource 
inequality, they opted to use an equality strategy to allocate resources. Similarly, 
when advantaged by a resource inequality there was no difference in allocation 
between children who were prescribed an equity norm (M = 4.73, SD = 1.46, did not 
differ significantly from midpoint of scale, t(54) = -1.39, p = .17, Cohen’s d = -.18) 
and those prescribed an equality norm (M = 5.09, SD = .83; p = .65, did not differ 
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significantly from midpoint of scale, t(33) = .62, p = .54, Cohen’s d = .11). Again, 
when advantaged, children opted for an equality strategy regardless of normative 
information. 
(H3) Participants will use an equality strategy in the equality norm and 
control conditions. 
Counter to our predictions, and following on from the significant three-way 
interaction between age, advantage and ingroup norm reported above, we did 
observe differences in resource allocation between the equality and control 
conditions for adolescents and children. For adolescent participants, allocations in 
the equality condition did not differ significantly from the criterion value of 5 boxes 
to each group amongst either advantaged (M = 5.62, SD = 1.86; t(20) = 1.53, p = .14, 
Cohen’s d = .33) or disadvantaged participants (M = 5.22, SD = 1.40; t(26) = .83, p = 
.42, Cohen’s d = .16). Similarly, allocations in the control condition did not differ 
significantly from a criterion value of 5 boxes among either advantaged (M = 4.89, 
SD = .33, t(8) = -1.00, p = .35, Cohen’s d = -.33) or disadvantaged (M = 6.13, SD = 
1.64, t(7) = 1.94, p = .09, Cohen’s d = .69) participants.  
However, advantaged children in the control condition allocated significantly 
fewer resources to the disadvantaged outgroup compared with a criterion level of 5 
boxes (M = 4.34, SD = 1.26; t(34) = -3.09, p = .004, Cohen’s d = -.52). Without 
normative information, children in the control condition sought to maintain the status 
quo against a disadvantaged outgroup by allocating a greater share of the resources 
to their ingroup. When disadvantaged, their allocations did not differ significantly 
from a criterion level of 5 boxes in the control condition (M = 4.97, SD = .86; t(34) = 
-.20, p = .84, Cohen’s d = -.03). In the equality norm condition, children’s 
allocations did not differ from a criterion level of 5 boxes in either the advantaged 
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(M = 5.09, SD = .83; t(33) = .62, p = .54, Cohen’s d = .11) or disadvantaged (M = 
5.21, SD = 1.18; t(28) = .95, p = .35, Cohen’s d = .18) conditions. 
 
Figure 6.2. Boxes allocated to disadvantaged group as a function of advantage and 
ingroup norm condition with standard error bars (adolescents; 13 – 16 years) 
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Figure 6.3. Boxes allocated to disadvantaged group as a function of advantage and 
ingroup norm condition with standard error bars (children; 8 – 11 years) 
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6.7.4. Reasoning 
(H4) Reasoning style will differ as a function of participants’ chosen 
resource allocation strategy. 
Finally, a chi-square test of independence was used to examine differences in 
reasoning as a function of resource allocation strategy. Again, given that some of the 
reasoning categories included fewer than 5 responses, we report here the Fisher’s 
exact test statistic. The relation between these variables was significant, Fisher’s 
exact (8, N = 302) = 196.73, p < .001. Follow up z tests with Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons were used to examine differences in perpetuating 
inequality reasoning as a function of inequality agreement (see Table 6.2). All 
differences reported were significant at the p < .05 level. 
Significantly more references were made to Equity amongst participants who 
rectified an inequality (M = .57) than those who used an equality strategy (M = .01). 
Participants who perpetuated the inequality did not make reference to equity. Those 
participants who rectified an inequality and made reference to equity emphasised the 
unfair nature of inequality and the importance of challenging it through resource 
allocation. For example, one participant allocated more resources to the outgroup 
“because they didn't have many from the start, but we already did so it would be fair 
to give them more, so we have equal amounts now”. 
Similarly, significantly greater reference was made to Fair Competition 
amongst participants who used an equality strategy (M = .33) than those who 
rectified (M = .02) or perpetuated an inequality (M = .04). Participants who allocated 
resources equally between the two groups justified their decision in the context of 
the intergroup art competition. They made reference to the importance of 
establishing a level playing field between the two groups, independent of pre-
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existing inequality. For example, one participant gave both groups the same number 
of boxes “because it would make the competition fair, the winner will win due to 
their skills – not the amount of supplies they have”. 
Finally, there was significantly greater reference to Group Functioning 
amongst participants who perpetuated an inequality (M = .78) than those who used 
equality (M = .03) or rectified an inequality (M = .29). These participants justified 
their bias towards the advantaged ingroup with reference to the group functioning 
benefits of perpetuating the inequality. As one participant stated:  “We need the 
resources to win. If the other team don't have enough and want ours, then that's too 
bad”. 
 
Table 6.2. 
 
Frequencies and proportions of reasoning used by participants to justify resource 
allocation decisions as a function of resource allocation strategy 
 
 
Allocation 
Strategy 
 
Equity 
 
 
Fairness 
 
 
Fair 
Competition 
 
Equality 
 
 
Group 
Functioning 
 
 
Equality 
 
2 (0.01) 
 
 
54 
(0.23) 
 
79 (0.33) 
 
94 
(0.40) 
 
8 (0.03) 
 
Rectify 
 
 
24 (0.57) 
 
4 (0.10) 
 
1 (0.02) 
 
1 (0.02) 
 
12 (0.29) 
 
 
Perpetuate 
 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
 
2 (0.09) 
 
 
1 (0.04) 
 
 
2 (0.09) 
 
 
18 (0.78) 
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6.8. Discussion 
This final chapter was the first to explore the intertwined influence of peer 
group norms and advantaged status on children and adolescents’ resource allocation 
from a first person perspective, in a context of intergroup inequality. Coherent with 
the evidence from Chapters Two to Five, norms were important in decisions to 
rectify an inequality in a competitive intergroup context. Adolescents allocated a 
greater share of resources to their disadvantaged ingroup when prescribed a peer 
group norm of equity than children did in the same condition. Understanding of peer 
group norms in conjunction with intergroup competition and relative advantage was 
apparent in adolescents’ responses but not in children’s responses. Similarly, we 
found support for the relative influence of different types of norm, as disadvantaged 
adolescents demonstrated greater rectifying allocations when prescribed an equity 
norm than an equality norm. Children’s resource allocations did not differ as a 
function of the norm, even when they were members of a disadvantaged ingroup. 
Finally, we found support for the important link between allocation decisions and 
reasoning, as participants’ justifications for their decisions differed as a function of 
their chosen allocation strategy. Specifically, references to the unfair nature of 
inequality were greatest amongst participants whose allocations challenged the 
inequality.  
Taken together, these results suggest an age-related trend between middle 
childhood and adolescence. In situations of intergroup competition with non-
essential resources, adolescents rectify an inequality under equity normative 
conditions, but only when their ingroup is personally disadvantaged. However, when 
their group was personally advantaged and the group held an equity norm, 
adolescents perpetuated the status quo of inequality by allocating more resources to 
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their ingroup. By comparison, children predominantly rely upon an equality strategy 
across normative conditions, but also show evidence of sustaining a status quo of 
inequality when their ingroup is advantaged and no norm is made salient.  
The normative expectations of an ingroup can directly influence adolescents’ 
decisions to rectify an inequality in a competitive intergroup context. Adolescents in 
this chapter coordinated multiple competing concerns, considering intergroup 
dynamics and the relative advantage of their ingroup. When their peers argued for 
equity, adolescents sought to rectify an inequality. Crucially, adolescents 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the importance of group loyalty by only 
allocating a greater share of the resources to a disadvantaged ingroup than to a 
disadvantaged outgroup when their peer group held an equity norm. Children did not 
coordinate these factors in the same way, as their allocations across conditions did 
not differ from the midpoint of the scale. Children were predominantly concerned 
about maintaining equality (of supplies) between the two groups rather than 
rectifying a pre-existing inequality.  
Adolescents in the equity norm condition who were advantaged by a resource 
inequality chose to perpetuate this inequality by allocating a relatively greater share 
of resources to their ingroup compared to the other conditions. Importantly, the 
present study is the first to examine participants’ responses to resource inequalities in 
a competitive intergroup context. Children and adolescents become less prosocial 
towards outgroup members in competitive compared to non-competitive or 
interpersonal contexts (Abrams et al., 2015) and generally demonstrate concerns for 
group loyalty. Under such conditions, ingroup members may feel pressure not to 
display explicit outgroup favouritism by allocating them more resources, even if this 
means disadvantaging the outgroup in relative terms.  
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Previous research examining challenges to resource inequalities has asked 
participants to make judgments from a third-party perspective (Elenbaas et al., 
2016). It is possible that here, allocating resources from a position of first-person 
advantage exerted an effect on participants’ challenges to inequality. Individuals that 
wield the power to allocate resources and effectively challenge resource inequalities 
in societies are often themselves in advantaged positions of power. Instead of 
seeking to rectify, those in positions to do so often preserve the status quo. So too 
advantaged adolescents cemented their relative advantage by allocating a greater 
share of resources to their ingroup. Likewise we did not observe challenges to 
inequality from disadvantaged participants when an equality norm was prescribed.  
Ideas from system justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) may offer a potential explanation for the ingroup serving 
behaviour of advantaged adolescent participants. In order to reduce feelings of 
cognitive dissonance as a result of observing unjust systematic processes, SJT argues 
that individuals are motivated to see the status quo as justifiable and legitimate, 
particularly when they are members of lower status groups. Children too show 
evidence of system justifying behaviours from as young as 5 years old (Baron & 
Banaji, 2009; Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006, 2007). One way in which the status 
quo is sustained is through unequal access to resources. In the present study, 
adolescents as members of an advantaged ingroup may have been motivated to 
sustain the resource inequality to maintain their position of power.  
The relative advantage of an individual’s ingroup matters, especially when 
considering inequality from a first-person perspective in a competitive intergroup 
context. Participants whose ingroup was disadvantaged by the inequality rated 
perpetuating the inequality (by allocating more resources to the advantaged group) as 
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less acceptable than participants whose ingroup was advantaged. There were no 
differences as a function of participant age, indicating that both children and 
adolescents were more accepting of inequality when it benefitted their group. 
Likewise, advantaged participants who judged that perpetuating was “okay”, were 
more likely to use reasoning related to group functioning when justifying their 
evaluation (e.g., “so we can have good equipment to win”). That is, they focused 
more on the benefits of this strategy for their own group, rather than focusing on the 
unfair nature of the ongoing inequality. However, it is also possible that the 
allocation strategy adopted by advantaged adolescents who were prescribed an 
ingroup equity norm is a demonstration of ingroup bias, rather than an attempt to 
support an existing inequality at the systematic level. Future work is required to 
examine these two explanations in more depth. 
While children relied upon equality even in a situation of pre-existing 
disparity between groups, adolescents recognised that equity was a more proactive 
approach under conditions that did not violate ingroup norms or expectations of 
group loyalty. Participants who rectified the resource inequality made explicit 
reference to the unfair nature of the inequality and the fact that the fair thing to do 
would be to give more to the group who had less. Thus, moral reasoning about 
equality, inequality, need, and relative disadvantage were central to the participants’ 
reasoning about their allocation decisions. As an illustration, when their peers 
supported an equality norm, adolescents allocated resources equally between the 
groups independent of relative advantage. Adolescents in the equality norm 
condition may have adhered to their peer groups’ norm because equality as a general 
strategy met basic standards for fairness and adhered to the conventions of the group. 
Crucially, this equality norm also lead to more proactive allocation in favour of the 
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disadvantaged outgroup compared to an equity norm when the participants’ ingroup 
was advantaged.  
This finding is particularly important to consider when introducing 
educational interventions that promote equality. For advantaged adolescents, a more 
general reminder of generic moral expectations for fairness may in fact be a 
powerful influence when issues of group loyalty, competition and status quo are 
coordinated in influencing advantaged groups. For disadvantaged children and 
adolescents, early educational policies about the importance of relative allocations 
depending upon structural inequality will be important. These messages are 
particularly important for young children, who when no norm is made salient, will 
perpetuate a resource inequality as a consequence of displaying ingroup bias. 
Educators and policy makers must take into account the varying relative advantage 
of groups in developing targeted interventions, rather than adopting a one-size-fits-
all approach to reducing inequality and promoting fairness through the use of norms. 
6.9. Overview 
While most research examining inequality has asked children to make 
decisions about how to distribute resources between individuals from a third-party 
perspective, this study manipulated group membership on a first-person basis and 
prescribed ingroup norms in a competitive intergroup context where participants 
allocated resources between groups. Having established that the ability to coordinate 
group normative influences and understanding of advantage are important in the 
development of proactive challenges to resource inequalities, an essential next step is 
to attempt to delineate the social-developmental processes underlying this ability. 
Adolescents have a more advanced understanding of the consequences of inequality 
when they are members of social groups who have faced societal and historic 
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marginalisation (Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). They are also able 
to balance multiple normative and moral concerns simultaneously. It would be 
interesting to explore how experience or pre-existing knowledge of inequality are 
important factors in this process. Perhaps children who have personally experienced 
inequality will have internalised norms of resource allocation equity in the same way 
adolescents appear to. Assessing how social understanding drives this process is a 
rich avenue for future research. 
Further, the resources used in this study were art supplies needed for a city-wide art 
competition. Related work in this area has used diverse types of resources, from 
stickers and candy to educational or healthcare resources (Elenbaas et al., 2016; 
Rizzo et al., 2016). Whilst the art boxes were appropriate for the art competition 
scenario used in the current study, future work should explore whether ingroup 
favouritism, norms, and the relative worth or necessity of the resource in question 
interact to influence resource allocation decisions. It would also be interesting to 
explore further the conditions under which adolescents will challenge outgroup 
inequalities; crucially, to establish whether there is a point at which the disadvantage 
of an outgroup becomes more influential than the desire to adhere to an ingroup 
norm.  
The present work extends previous research in two main directions. First, 
burgeoning work examining the influence of peer group norms upon intergroup 
resource allocation has not, until now, examined a situation where the participant 
allocated resources from a first-person perspective as a member of a disadvantaged 
or advantaged group. Peer group norms are important from middle childhood, but 
only by adolescence do individuals in complex intergroup settings make the 
distinction between expectations regarding equity and equality and take their relative 
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ingroup advantage into consideration. Second, this study extended related work 
examining children’s understanding of inequalities by including a sample of 
adolescents. Adolescents were more adept at balancing multiple factors such as 
group norms, status, and intergroup considerations when making allocation decisions 
in a competitive context. This is a crucial finding for targeting intergroup 
inequalities, emphasising that pre-existing normative expectations between and 
within groups, as well as the intergroup context, will continue to prove a powerful 
influence in childhood and adolescence.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The central aim of this thesis was to provide a systematic examination of the 
influence of peer group and societal level norms on the development of fair resource 
allocation decision-making, as well as the ability to coordinate these multiple sources 
of normative information. Across five empirical chapters we have provided evidence 
demonstrating age-related differences between children and adolescents in this 
coordination of normative information. In children, an early understanding of the 
importance of group normative processes is countered in adolescents by a more 
nuanced coordination of both peer norms and contextual information. Children are 
highly influenced by ingroup norms when allocating resources, evaluating ingroup 
members and reasoning about these decisions. Adolescents simultaneously consider 
generic norms and contextual information (e.g., pre-existing inequalities between 
groups) when making these same decisions. This final chapter provides an overview 
of the findings of each empirical chapter. This is followed by discussion of the 
central aims of the thesis with a specific focus on the allocation and reasoning 
measures. This in turn is followed by an examination of the potential mechanisms 
that may be driving the observed behaviours. Finally, potential limitations and future 
directions for this work are discussed, before a general conclusion is drawn. 
7.2. Summary of Empirical Chapters 
7.2.1 Chapter Two: Ingroup and Outgroup Norms. In Chapter Two, 
participants were prescribed ingroup and outgroup norms of competition and 
cooperation and asked to allocate tokens in exchange for art supplies. We assessed 
participants’ resource allocation decisions and reasoning justifications for their 
decisions. As expected, we did not observe age differences in the ability to 
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coordinate peer-level ingroup and outgroup norms. Participants took both ingroup 
and outgroup normative information into consideration when deciding how to 
allocate resources between groups. Specifically, when both the ingroup and outgroup 
advocated competing with the other group, participants displayed significantly more 
ingroup bias than in a situation where one of the groups advocated cooperation. The 
influence of a cooperative ingroup norm was particularly powerful in terms of 
tempering ingroup bias.  
The participants’ age and their chosen allocation strategy were significantly 
related to the type of reasoning used to justify the allocation. Allocation strategy 
interacted with age, with adolescents varying the form of their moral domain 
reasoning to justify an equal allocation strategy (i.e. references to fair competition), 
compared with children who focused primarily on the importance of fairness. 
7.2.2 Chapter Three: Ingroup and Generic Norms. In Chapter Two, 
children and adolescents attended to multiple norms at the intergroup level when 
allocating resources from a first person perspective in a competitive intergroup 
context. Chapter Three extended this first study by manipulating the generic 
normative context in which the allocation decision took place. Understanding the 
contextual normative demands of a resource allocation decision is an important 
factor that must be considered in tandem with group normative demands. We also 
extended our age range in an attempt to explore potential further age-related 
differences in these abilities between adolescence and young adulthood. The 
resource allocation decision took place in either a competitive or cooperative generic 
normative context. Again, participants were prescribed either a cooperative or 
competitive ingroup norm and asked to allocate £100 between groups for the 
purchase of art supplies.  
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Resource allocation differed as a function of age, ingroup norm and generic 
norm. When the generic context was cooperative (i.e. a charity art event), children 
allocated significantly more resources to their ingroup when the ingroup held a 
competitive norm, than when the group supported a cooperative ingroup norm. 
Whilst older participants displayed ingroup bias under competitive generic 
normative conditions, they did not adhere to a competitive ingroup norm when the 
generic normative context was cooperative. When both levels of norm were 
cooperative, all participants tempered their ingroup bias.  
Significant effects of age group and allocation strategy were observed upon 
allocation justification reasoning. These main effects were qualified by an interaction 
with ingroup norm. When the ingroup norm was competitive and they allocated 
equally, older participants made greater reference to fairness as a direct challenge to 
the competitive ingroup norm. In contrast when the ingroup norm was cooperative, 
older participants also referenced the importance of a fair competition. In this case, 
there was less need to reinforce generic issues of fairness and participants referenced 
principles of fair competition. This again demonstrates that, with age, reasoning 
becomes a reflective process dependent upon the context of the allocation. 
7.2.3 Chapter Four: Evaluating Deviant and Normative Ingroup 
Members. Resource allocation decisions are related to ingroup norms, outgroup 
norms, and generic normative contextual information. However, decisions regarding 
allocation can also serve as a guide for evaluative decisions of fellow group 
members. In Chapter Four we aimed to extend knowledge of intra-group evaluation 
on the basis of resource allocation by exploring these processes in competitive and 
cooperative contexts. Following the group induction in Chapter Three, participants 
were introduced to two of their fellow group members. They were informed that one 
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of these group members wanted to allocate resources in the same manner as the rest 
of the group (i.e. a normative member). A second group member wanted to allocate 
resources in a manner counter to the rest of the group (i.e. a deviant member). We 
then asked participants to evaluate this individual from their personal perspective, 
the perspective of the group, and to justify their evaluation.  
Adults and children evaluated normative targets more favourably than 
adolescents, who did not differ from the midpoint of the scale in their personal 
evaluations of normative targets. However, all participants, independent of age, 
perceived that their group would favourably evaluate normative behaviour. There 
were also differences as a function of ingroup norm condition. Normative 
cooperative behaviour was more favourably evaluated than normative competitive 
behaviour from both individual and perceived group perspectives.  
When evaluating deviant targets, we observed an interaction between ingroup 
norm and age group for both individual and perceived group perspectives. From the 
individual perspective, children’s evaluations of a competitive deviant were 
significantly less positive than both adolescents’ and adults’ evaluations. All 
participants personally favourably evaluated a cooperative deviant. From the 
perceived group perspective, children believed that their group would evaluate a 
cooperative deviant significantly more favourably than adolescents and adults, who 
believed their group would rate this individual significantly below the midpoint of 
the scale. In contrast, children believed their group would evaluate a competitive 
deviant significantly below the midpoint of the scale, whereas adults and adolescents 
believed their group would not negatively evaluate this individual.  
Reasoning to justify participants’ individual evaluations of a deviant member 
was dependent upon both the normative condition, and whether or not the individual 
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agreed with the deviant target. For example, participants who disagreed with 
cooperative deviancy justified this with relation to the group functioning 
consequences of relinquishing resources to the outgroup. Similarly to when 
challenging a competitive ingroup norm with equal allocation, participants who 
disagreed with a competitive deviant emphasised that this behaviour represented a 
breach of moral domain principles of fairness. 
7.2.4 Chapter Five: Performance and Learning Focused Norms. In 
Chapter Three, children adhered to a competitive ingroup norm by allocating 
resources in favour of their ingroup, counter to a cooperative generic normative 
context. Chapter Five explored a possible alternative explanation for this finding. 
Specifically, to understand whether children and adolescents differentiate between 
cooperative generic contexts based on the outcome of the situation. We tested the 
possibility that children in Chapter Three interpreted the cooperative generic context 
as a situation where their group’s performance would be assessed based on the 
amount of money raised for the charity. Chapter Five tested this by manipulating a 
generic norm at three levels. Participants were asked to distribute resources between 
groups in either a competition, performance-focus (charity art event where 
achievement was measured based on money raised) or learning-focus (art exhibit 
where learning and fun were the outcomes) context, as well as being prescribed 
ingroup norms of competition and cooperation. 
We observed a significant interaction between ingroup norm and generic 
norm, independent of age. Specifically, when the ingroup norm was cooperative, 
participants allocated significantly more resources to their ingroup in the 
performance-focus condition than either the competition or learning-focus generic 
conditions. When they believed their performance would be assessed, even in an 
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ostensibly cooperative context, participants allocated resources in a competitive 
ingroup biased manner. However, when the ingroup norm was competitive, the 
generic context was less influential. In this case, participants demonstrated 
significantly ingroup biased allocation across the three generic contexts.  
Reasoning was dependent upon age group, and how participants chose to 
allocate resources. Specifically, with age there were greater references to the 
importance of establishing a fair competition. Interestingly, we also saw greater 
reference to the generic context amongst adolescents than children. Whilst we did 
not observe age effects in the allocation measure, participants’ justifications for their 
allocation differed with age, and came to include consideration of the generic context 
in adolescence.  
7.2.3 Chapter Six: Equity and Equality Norms. In this final empirical 
chapter we extended our examination of norms and context from the preceding 
chapters to a situation of pre-existing inequality between the two groups. It is 
important to examine group normative processes under these conditions as inequality 
is often based upon intergroup characteristics. In this final study, participants were 
inducted into simulated groups that were either advantaged (i.e. had access to lots of 
resources) or disadvantaged (i.e. had access to few resources). Participants were 
prescribed an ingroup norm of equity (i.e. giving more to those who had less to begin 
with) or equality (i.e. giving the same to all groups) before allocating art supplies 
between the two groups. 
Results revealed a significant interaction between age group, ingroup norm 
and advantage status. Adolescents rectified an inequality by allocating more 
resources to a disadvantaged group in line with an ingroup equity norm, but only 
when their own group was disadvantaged. Advantaged adolescent participants 
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perpetuated an inequality by demonstrating ingroup biased allocation in this 
condition. Children showed a similar pattern by rectifying a resource inequality in 
the equity condition when their group was disadvantaged. However, they allocated 
significantly fewer boxes in this condition than adolescents in the same condition. 
All participants allocated resources equally between groups when prescribed an 
ingroup equality norm.  
Participants’ reasoning differed as a function of their chosen allocation 
strategy. Participants who allocated resources equally referenced fairness and fair 
competition. Participants who perpetuated an inequality, by comparison, justified 
this behaviour in reference to the group functioning benefits of increased access to 
resources. Finally, participants who allocated more resources to the disadvantaged 
group focused predominantly on the importance of challenging a pre-existing 
inequality. 
Taken together these five empirical chapters demonstrate the development of 
an advanced understanding of group processes and their relation to moral 
expectations when allocating resources. In middle childhood, individuals are 
strongly influenced by group expectations, but also adhere to basic principles of 
fairness. Ideas of fairness and equality are repeatedly referenced in children’s 
reasoning justifications for their allocations. In contrast, in adolescence a coordinated 
understanding of group norms, principles of fair competition, and contextual 
information emerges. Taking these elements together, adolescents adjusted their 
allocation across situations and varied their reasoning justifications accordingly. In 
the next section, we discuss these findings with reference to the broad aims of the 
thesis, and in relation to the existing literature and theory. 
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7.3. Central Aims 
7.3.1 To examine how norms directly influence resource allocation. This 
thesis aimed to provide a systematic examination of how social norms at the peer and 
generic level guide resource allocation in childhood and adolescence. In Chapters 
Two, Three and Four we demonstrated how individuals take cooperative and 
competitive norms into consideration. Competitive ingroup norms were shown to 
lead to increased ingroup bias, but only in the context of a competitive outgroup 
norm. In Chapter Three, this methodology was extended to demonstrate that ingroup 
norms interact with generic level norms for cooperation and competition to exert an 
influence over this process. Specifically, in cooperative contexts, ingroup bias can be 
tempered when coupled with a cooperative ingroup norm. However, children’s bias 
can also be exaggerated when the ingroup holds a competitive ingroup norm, even 
when the context is cooperative. In Chapter Four these norms were shown to also be 
integral to the process of evaluating peer group members from both an individual 
and group perspective. Chapter Five provides evidence that in a more concrete and 
specified form, children can take generic contexts into account when allocating 
resources. Finally, Chapter Six provided evidence that norms may be integral to 
challenging pre-existing resource inequalities – but that these norms cannot be 
considered in a vacuum, and instead must be examined in context.  
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that peer and societal level norms 
are integral components of the resource allocation process. Research concerned with 
distributive justice and drawing from the behavioural economics literature has 
predominantly examined resource allocation in dyadic contexts. If nothing else, this 
thesis sets forth an argument that to fully understand how children, adolescents and 
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adults allocate resources, we must consider the group normative expectations of the 
individual, their sharing partners, and the context in which allocation takes place. 
7.3.2 To examine age-related differences in the coordination of group and 
moral factors in complex first-person resource allocation scenarios. Specifically, 
we aimed to examine how the coordination of group norms, moral principles and 
contextual information differed as a function of age. In Chapter Two, we 
demonstrated that by middle childhood, participants coordinated ingroup and 
outgroup norms of competition by only displaying ingroup bias in a situation where 
both groups advocate competition. When norms are prescribed at the same level in 
an intergroup competition scenario, children from 8 years take this information into 
account. In Chapter Three however, there were age differences when participants 
were informed about the generic normative context in which their allocation would 
take place. In line with previous research demonstrating more advanced abilities in 
coordinating multiple norms with age (Abrams et al., 2009; Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010; 
Rutland & Killen, 2017), adolescents and adults tempered their ingroup bias when 
allocating resources in a cooperative generic context, even when the group held a 
competitive norm. Children, however, were significantly influenced by a competitive 
ingroup norm, displaying ingroup bias in line with this norm when this was counter 
to a generic cooperative context. With age, resource allocation is guided by an 
advanced coordination of normative prescriptions, contextual information, and a 
genuine desire for fairness in adulthood (Güth et al., 1982; Kahneman et al., 1986).  
These developmental effects were not limited to resource allocation 
measures. When evaluating ingroup members we observed age-related differences 
between children, adolescents, and young adults. The most prominent difference 
between the age groups was an understanding of the distinction between the 
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individual’s own perspective, and that of the group. This has previously been 
observed in relation to equal and unequal allocation norms (Mulvey et al., 2014). 
Unlike in previous research, children did not make the distinction between their 
individual evaluation of a deviant target, and their group’s evaluation of a deviant 
target. Instead they assumed that their group would, like themselves, favourably 
evaluate a deviant ingroup member who wanted to cooperate with the outgroup. 
Adolescents and adults by comparison believed that their group would negatively 
evaluate any act of deviancy, but particularly a deviant who sought to cooperate with 
the outgroup. Interestingly, adults positively evaluated cooperative deviancy 
relatively more so than adolescents did from their personal perspective. Crucially, 
however, adults applied their understanding of group processes to distinguish 
between their personal desire for cooperative equal allocation and the competitive 
normative stance of the ingroup. This chapter provides a novel extension of previous 
examinations of intragroup understanding in relation to resource allocation by 
extending this to more complex intergroup scenarios where descriptive norms are 
directly manipulated. Whilst norms have a clear impact upon intergroup resource 
allocation by middle childhood, the understanding of the influence of such norms on 
intragroup evaluative processes appears to still be developing into adolescence and 
beyond. 
Chapter Five provided an extension of Chapter Three by examining resource 
allocation in two cooperative generic contexts that varied in their moral relevance. 
These contexts were Learning-Focused (a fun art exhibition with no measurable 
outcome) and Performance -Focused (a charity event where performance could be 
assessed based on funds raised). Interestingly, participants of all ages were capable 
of taking both ingroup and generic level norms into consideration when allocating 
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resources. That is, when their ingroup prescribed a cooperative norm, children and 
adolescents used generic normative contextual information to guide their allocation 
decisions. Specifically, in a situation where their performance could be assessed in a 
charity event, they demonstrated ingroup bias. This seems to suggest that in specific 
cases where the norms and context are relevant to their experience and more 
concrete, children are capable of balancing ingroup and generic normative 
information. It is only by adolescence that consideration of more abstract 
competitive or cooperative generic normative contexts becomes a central part of 
individual’s decision-making. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, we presented children and adolescents with a 
situation where an inequality in access to resources existed between two groups. 
Rather than a generic contextual norm, participants had to take into account their 
own relative advantage in the situation and coordinate this with the norm of the 
ingroup. All participants were capable of rectifying a resource inequality when their 
ingroup was disadvantaged and they were prescribed an ingroup norm of equity. 
Adolescents allocated a significantly greater proportion of resources to their 
disadvantaged ingroup, and did so without the prompt of an ingroup norm. This 
study again demonstrated the advanced abilities in coordinating ingroup normative 
information with moral principles and context cues, as predicted by the SRD 
approach (Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 2010). By middle childhood 
individuals are taking tentative steps towards understanding that it is sometimes 
appropriate to give more to one group when they may have had less before. 
Adolescents reliably do so, but demonstrate significant ingroup bias in this ability, as 
would be expected by Social Identity approaches (Nesdale, 2007; Nesdale, 2004).  
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Together, these empirical chapters provide a picture of a developmental trend 
in the coordination of group processes and moral principles from middle childhood 
into adolescence. Children predominantly use ingroup norms to guide their 
allocation, but also look to outgroup norm information (Chapter Two) and specific, 
relevant generic normative context cues (Chapter Five) when deciding how to 
allocate resources. Adolescents, by comparison, reliably use more abstract generic 
norms (Chapters Three and Five), take the perspective of their ingroup into account 
(Chapter Four) and use contextual information regarding structural hierarchical 
inequalities (Chapter Six) to guide their allocation. The examination of these 
processes in adulthood is more limited in the present thesis, but evidence suggests an 
emphasis upon issues of fairness and equality in young adults when allocating 
resources and evaluating their peers, despite their understanding that group loyalty is 
a requisite of group membership (Chapters Three and Four). These five empirical 
studies provide a promising avenue for future research. Whilst competitive ingroup 
norms and contexts are valuable cues for resource allocation, in general, moral 
principles of fairness and cooperation still provide a powerful pull on resource 
allocation from an early age into adulthood. 
7.3.3. To analyse social reasoning data to complement behavioral resource 
allocation data. In the present thesis reasoning data emphasises the importance of 
age, normative information, and allocation behaviour in determining how children 
think about and justify their own behaviour. Predominantly, when allocating 
resources the age of the participant and their chosen allocation strategy dictated how 
they justified their resource allocation. The most important distinctions in age were 
observed amongst participants who allocated resources equally between groups. 
Young participants predominantly justified an equal allocation by stating that it was 
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the fair thing to do. Equal allocation met with their understanding of fairness, which 
they took on face value as the appropriate way to behave. Adolescent participants 
began to take broader conceptual ideas of fair competition into consideration. These 
participants were not necessarily concerned about fairness as a general principle, but 
instead applied their understanding of fairness to the context of the competition in 
which they were being asked to allocate resources.  
This shift from broad ideas of fairness to specific applied conceptions of what 
makes a fair competition is likely driven from two directions. We know that when 
faced with a complex intergroup resource allocation scenario in the context of 
competition, children predominantly use ingroup norms as a decision-making 
heuristic. Likewise when justifying this decision, referencing fairness is a shortcut 
that meets with generic expectations of fairness and alleviates self-presentational 
concerns. By comparison, adolescents take peer level and generic contextual norms 
into consideration when deciding how to allocate resources. Similarly, when 
justifying these decisions they include contextual information, such as the fact that 
they were allocating resources for use in a competition. References to the more 
abstract idea of a fair competition demonstrate a nuanced view of fair resource 
allocation as a contextual process where the reasons one might allocate resources 
equally are not always generalisable.  
Interestingly, when evaluating a deviant ingroup member (Chapter Four) 
participants’ reasoning was significantly influenced by ingroup norm and target 
agreement as opposed to the age effects seen in other chapters. For example, 
participants who disagreed with the behaviour of a cooperative deviant justified their 
negative evaluation of this target with reference to the group functioning 
consequences of their behaviour. It makes sense that different factors would be of 
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importance when reasoning about ingroup member evaluations than when thinking 
about resource allocation decisions.  
In the case of resource allocation, the most important factor is the allocation 
strategy. Ingroup norm influences the direction of the initial allocation decision (i.e., 
the behavioural decision), but is less important in the case of post-hoc justification. 
Participants reference the ingroup norm condition in the group functioning category, 
but in a general sense related to adhering to group expectations rather than the 
specific descriptive instructions of the norm. In contrast, when reasoning about 
evaluations of an ingroup member who deviates from the norm, the direction of the 
norm is important, in conjunction with the participant’s own agreement with it. The 
domain of the participant’s reasoning is necessarily dependent upon whether or not 
they agree with the target, which in turn is driven by whether the target has turned 
away from a cooperative (arguably more moral) or a competitive norm (favouring 
the ingroup).  
7.4. Towards a Coordinated Perspective 
When asked to allocate resources between groups, children take normative 
information at the level of the peer group into consideration from approximately 8 
years of age. By adolescence, they coordinate this information with generic norms, 
context-specific information, and historical inequalities. It is worth examining the 
social-developmental changes during this age range that may be useful in explaining 
why children move from a singular focus on the peer group towards a coordinated 
perspective that takes multiple sources of information into consideration. 
One key skill that emerges in middle childhood and into adolescence is a 
more advanced social perspective taking ability. In classic first order theory of mind 
(ToM) tasks young children come to understand that the mental states of others 
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differ from their own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Beyond first-order ToM, more advanced perspective taking develops involving 
understanding of social and group processes. For example, Fitzroy and Rutland 
(2010) used a Theory of Social Mind (ToSM) measure to explore explicit intergroup 
bias in middle childhood. Participants who demonstrated more advanced ToSM 
abilities were tempered their explicit intergroup bias without having to be made 
accountable to classmates or teachers. By the age of 11 years most participants are 
capable of passing a ToSM measure. However, that is not to say that social 
perspective taking abilities stop developing in this pre-adolescent age group. Instead, 
it is likely that these abilities advance further to incorporate group understanding. 
For example, Selman's (1980) model of the growth of interpersonal understanding 
includes four central areas of understanding that develop into adolescence. 
Understanding of peer groups is one of the four main components of Selman’s 
model. Longitudinal examinations of adolescents have demonstrated changes in 
conceptual understanding of these domains generally (Gurucharri, Phelps, & Selman, 
1984; Gurucharri & Selman, 1982) as well as in the context of resource allocation 
(Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009).  
In the present work it is likely that the ability to take the perspective of 
ingroup, outgroup and external individuals is important in the onset of coordinated 
allocation decisions. Understanding the desires of the ingroup is essential to 
maintaining a cohesive ingroup dynamic. However, it is also important to take into 
consideration how those outside of the situation might view your chosen allocation 
decision. In particular, when distributing resources between groups, the outgroup 
may be in a position to reward or punish decisions in the future. Children understand 
that reciprocity is often contingent on past decision-making (House, Henrich, 
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Sarnecka, & Silk, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). The more advanced 
perspective taking abilities proposed by Selman and others are likely required to 
appreciate how behaviour at the intergroup level will be evaluated at the generic 
level by individuals not directly involved in the decision. Future work is essential in 
order to examine how these individual differences in perspective taking may actually 
serve to moderate our age effects.  
Beyond the ability to take the perspective of others both within the peer 
group and beyond, with age individuals become increasingly aware of their 
membership of a greater number of groups at the peer level and the societal level. 
This experience is essential in informing understanding of group dynamics and 
group processes (Killen & Rutland, 2011). The number of groups children belong to 
has been shown to predict measures of group nous, an understanding of intragroup 
inclusion and exclusion decisions (Abrams et al., 2009). It is highly likely that this 
factor also plays a role when allocating resources between groups. Specifically, 
greater experience of group membership is likely related to understanding of the 
consequences associated with allocating in favour of an outgroup, or including a 
deviant member who wants to do the same. Future work should seek to examine 
whether the effects of age examined in this thesis can in part be explained by 
membership and increasing knowledge of groups. 
Finally, age is also related to an advanced understanding of the way in which 
resources have historically been allocated in broader society. This is of particular 
importance to the results of Chapter Six. Understanding how resources may have 
been distributed based on group characteristics in the past can help inform how they 
ought to be distributed going forward in order to challenge or sustain the status quo. 
Research has demonstrated that an understanding of structural inequality and the 
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holding of beliefs that society ought to be more equal are predictive of social action 
(Diemer & Rapa, 2016). This understanding of historical and structural inequality is 
likely to be important in determining how to allocate resources when the identities of 
sharing partners are made salient. Examining how an understanding of structural 
inequality feeds into behavioural decisions when in an advantaged position will be a 
rich avenue for future work on resource allocation. 
Between childhood and adolescence individuals develop more advanced 
social perspective taking abilities that are tied in with their on-going experience of 
group dynamics and historical knowledge related to the actual distribution of 
communal societal resources. In tandem these factors are likely important in creating 
a foundation upon which adolescents come to coordinate their resource allocation 
decision-making. Children understand that it is important to consider how other 
people think and to avoid actively disadvantaging others in mutually cooperative 
situations, but lack the broader lens through which adolescents come to view these 
decisions. Future research is essential in order to explore these individual difference 
variables and model the possible explanatory factors. 
7.5. Implications for Policy Makers and Educators 
Beyond their theoretical relevance, the findings of this thesis should also be 
considered in the context of potential future educational interventions. Taken 
together, these studies demonstrate that ingroup norms remain a consistently 
important influence across the developmental lifespan, and hold particular 
significance in middle childhood. This can be problematic in situations where there 
exists an inequality between groups. Those seeking to challenge ingroup biased 
resource allocation in schools should look to manipulating generic contextual norms 
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as one way in which children and adolescents can be guided towards more 
egalitarian resource allocation strategies. 
Work examining the efficacy of a school norms approach has shown positive 
outcomes in targeting demonstrations of negative outgroup attitudes (Nesdale & 
Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). McGuire et al.(2015) showed that when an 
ingroup held an exclusionary norm, an inclusive school norm served to temper 
displays of ingroup bias. Similarly, a normative statement on behalf of the school to 
remind participants that they expect resources to be distributed using egalitarian 
principles could be a strong statement to counter competitive ingroup norms. 
Likewise, recent work by Brauer and Murrar (2017) tested a simple descriptive norm 
intervention where anti-prejudice posters outlining the attitudes held by fellow 
college students were shown to improve implicit attitudes on a campus university. A 
similar intervention would be straightforward to implement in a school setting, and 
hold potentially powerful results. 
In tandem with this, it is essential that educators include information 
regarding inequality (historical and contemporary) into the curriculum, and also 
recognise that interventions to encourage challenges to inequality cannot adopt a 
“one size fits all” approach. In Chapter Six, a norm of equity was effective in 
encouraging challenges to inequality, but only when the participant was 
disadvantaged. When the participant was in a position of advantage, a broader 
equality norm led to participants allocating a fairer share to a disadvantaged 
outgroup. Educators should recognise that when discussing issues related to 
inequality, the group identity of the target audience of this message is important.  For 
children and adolescents who are members of groups that have historically faced 
resource inequalities, a normative statement relating to the acceptability of 
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challenging such inequalities will provide a crucial framework for tackling such 
systematic inequality later in life. 
7.6. Limitations & Future Directions 
Before drawing general conclusions from the present thesis, it is worth 
considering the potential limitations and caveats of the general methodology and 
protocol used across the five empirical chapters, as well as the further questions 
these limitations raise. 
7.6.1. Mechanisms. In this discussion chapter we have examined the 
possible mechanisms that may help explain age-related differences between children 
and adolescents in resource allocation behaviour. However, the studies presented in 
this thesis did not measure three key factors that likely play an important role in the 
emergence of fair resource allocation; namely, perspective taking ability, experience 
of group membership and understanding of historical inequality.  
Advanced social perspective taking ability has been shown to be essential in 
moderating explicit prejudice without external accountability (Fitzroy & Rutland, 
2010). The ToSM measure developed by Abrams and colleagues (Abrams et al., 
2009) may be of use to help understand differences in group normative 
understanding in middle childhood, but is likely to be of less use in adolescence and 
beyond. By young adolescence, most individuals will reliably pass this ToSM 
measure. Future work should attempt to develop a measure in the same vein that 
distinguishes between children’s and adolescents’ varying advanced social 
perspective taking abilities. This is likely to be tied in with their understanding of 
groups, as well as the number of groups they belong to. Nesdale and colleagues have 
begun to develop a measure of Social Acumen that may be a useful starting point for 
such work (Nesdale, 2013; Nesdale, Zimmer-Gembeck, & Roxburgh, 2014). Again 
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however, this measure has been developed for use with children younger than those 
in our sample. An essential next step is to extend this work to explore how 
adolescents’ and adults’ understanding of other group members’ perspectives 
influences their ability to coordinate normative information with moral domain 
concerns. 
Likewise, adolescents by comparison with children have a more advanced 
understanding of historical resource allocation and the structural inequalities of the 
society they belong to (Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). This is of 
particular importance when allocating resources between groups where there may 
exist a historical inequality. Understanding when this might be relevant to the 
present resource allocation scenario, and therefore when an ingroup desire to 
compete may be less important, is likely to be involved in coordinating group 
normative information with moral domain concerns. Future work should seek to 
replicate the findings of Chapter Six in combination with a measure of inequality 
knowledge. It is likely that this will serve as an important moderator of the relation 
between group norms of equity and resource allocation. 
7.6.2. Chosen Resources. When deciding how to allocate communal 
resources, what is being allocated is as important as who is receiving the resources. 
In Chapter Two, participants allocated tokens that could be exchanged for art 
materials. In Chapter Three the token exchange was removed and substituted for 
money that could be spent on materials as the group decided. In Chapters Five and 
Six, the idea of exchange was removed altogether and participants were directly 
provided with the art materials to allocate between the groups. In Chapters Two, 
Three and Five the resource that was to be allocated was not essential for the group 
to participate in the art event. Participants were informed that all participating groups 
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had access to the basic materials required to compete. However, with the money (or 
art supplies in the case of Chapter Five) they could gain access to luxury art supplies 
that would allow the group to produce art of a higher level. Children understand the 
important distinction between luxury and necessary resources from as young as 3-
years old (Killen, Rutland, Rizzo, & McGuire, 2017). It is likely that the luxury 
nature of the resources used in the present thesis affords greater leeway in terms of 
benefitting one’s ingroup. Children certainly understand that it is less morally 
permissible to restrict access to necessary resources. 
Chapter Six provided a different examination of the luxury/necessary 
distinction. Whilst the resource was the same as in Chapter Five (art supply boxes), 
the existing distribution of these resources was skewed in favour of one of the two 
groups. The fact that children allocated a greater share of these resources to their 
own group when personally disadvantaged, but not to the disadvantaged outgroup, 
suggests that they do not consider art materials to be a necessary resource, even in 
the art competition context. Given our focus on multiple-level normative 
information, we did not manipulate the necessity of the art supplies in the present 
work. It is possible that children and adolescents alike would be less susceptible to a 
competitive ingroup norm (or competitive generic context) if the resource in 
question was necessary for the survival of the outgroup (e.g. food, education, 
healthcare). Future work should seek to explore whether the effects of a competitive 
peer group or context are diminished when the resource to be allocated is necessary, 
rather than luxury. 
7.6.3. “Simulated” Groups & Existing Norms. Across the five empirical 
chapters, participants were inducted into simulated groups using an extensively 
replicated method that has been reliably shown to induce strong feelings of ingroup 
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identification and preference in children (McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, 2015; 
Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, Kiesner, & Griffiths, 2008; 
Nesdale, Griffith, Durkin, & Maass, 2005; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, 
Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005). These studies inducted participants into 
simulated groups ostensibly based on artistic ability. We extended this by informing 
participants that these groups were based on school membership. For children and 
adolescents, their school group forms an important part of their identity and is 
essential for motivating behaviour in school (Goodenow, 1993). Children are also 
often involved in competitive situations in school (Butler & Kedar, 1990; Williams 
& Sheridan, 2010). Given this, we opted to use school membership as the boundary 
between ingroup and outgroup members. This protocol provides a midway point 
between minimal groups and the use of existing real world groups (where controlling 
other group-level variables is likely to be problematic). However, it remains possible 
that pre-existing peer and generic level school norms could have influenced 
participants’ behaviour when allocating resources. 
School norms are highly influential in tempering negative attitudes towards 
an outgroup when the ingroup holds an exclusionary peer level norm (McGuire et 
al., 2015; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Similarly, schools are 
more likely to endorse generic cooperation than competition. This may feed into the 
peer level normative climate of the school. Future work should seek to examine the 
influence of the school norm in two ways. First, following on from existing work in 
the attitudes literature, school norm could be manipulated. As discussed above, it is 
possible that an explicitly cooperative school level norm could serve to extinguish 
the effects of a competitive peer level norm, by comparison to a situation where no 
school norm is made salient. Second, it would be interesting to examine whether 
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existing norms exert the same influence as those descriptively manipulated in the 
present thesis. Specifically, individuals could be asked to specify how their group 
would generally allocate communal resources, and how they think their school 
would expect them to do so. It would be interesting to see whether individuals who 
perceive their group to be naturally more competitive may behave competitively, or 
whether their perceptions of the school’s cooperative ethos would temper this. 
7.7. Conclusion 
The central aim of this thesis was to examine the influence of social norms on 
fair resource allocation between childhood and young adulthood. We examined the 
development of the ability to coordinate social norms related to resource allocation at 
multiple levels within a complex intergroup setting. Much research on resource 
allocation has examined how children, adolescents and adults alike allocate 
communal resources fairly in instances of dyadic exchange. Whilst important, this 
work does not examine the contexts in which resource allocation often takes place. 
Rarely are we asked to allocate resources without having access to information about 
the recipients of the resources. Bringing together ideas from social and 
developmental psychology, this thesis provides evidence for a developmental 
trajectory between childhood and adolescence where the coordination of multiple 
norms and contextual information becomes an imperative component of resource 
allocation decision-making. 
It is important in closing to stress that despite the competitive context of the 
intergroup art event methodology used in the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
individuals showed a remarkable commitment to equality and fair sharing. Children 
from a young age are passionate about fairness. This thesis presents evidence 
regarding a number of select situations in which children and adolescents can be lead 
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to less egalitarian decisions. Specifically, a competitive ingroup norm is a powerful 
influence upon children’s decision-making. Reassuringly, with age adolescents 
develop the competence to balance their desire to adhere to this norm with both 
generic level norms, and historical resource allocation information.  
This work also emphasises the importance of not only cooperation, but also 
competition. A long line of research has focused upon children’s desire to cooperate 
with one another and to allocate resources based on jointly cooperative activity. The 
present work is amongst the first to explore how competitive motivations are equally 
important throughout the developmental lifespan. Educators in particular should 
consider the importance of these motivations in the classroom when seeking to 
promote justice and equality. Finally, social reasoning data collected here extends 
behavioural findings to draw attention to the increasingly sophisticated reasoning 
used by children and adolescents. Counter to traditional perspectives on children’s 
morality, the Social Reasoning Development and Social Domain approaches give 
weight to children’s perspectives on moral decisions. When thinking about how to 
allocate resources, adolescents in particular come to reason about their decisions 
based on the context of the allocation (e.g. whether a historical inequality is relevant) 
and broader ideals of justice (i.e. a fair competition).  
Those who seek to promote justice and equality via the medium of equitable 
resource allocation should consider these findings promising. We now know that 
from early adolescence, individuals are capable of coordinating peer group norms 
with generic contextual and historical information to temper their allocation against 
prescriptions of explicit competition. Targeted descriptive norm interventions in 
schools promoting equality between groups and explorations of existing norms at the 
peer group level will prove important next steps. Similarly, educating young children 
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with regard to historical inequalities and the importance of rectifying these is 
absolutely essential. Social norms play a crucial role in resource allocation decision-
making from a young age; the next step is to use these norms to challenge injustice 
in resource allocation where it exists. 
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Appendix A: Included and Excluded Participants 
Chapter Two: Outgroup Norms  
Table 7.1.  
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Children 
 
 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Outgroup 
Norm 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
  
N 
 
37 
 
29 
 
33 
 
32 
 
14 
 
14 
 
9 
 
21 
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Table 7.2. 
 
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Adolescents 
 
 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Outgroup 
Norm 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
  
N 
 
20 
 
27 
 
32 
 
19 
 
13 
 
4 
 
1 
 
11 
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Chapters Three & Four: Generic Norm  
Table 7.3.  
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Children 
 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
  
N 
 
27 
 
28 
 
24 
 
24 
 
7 
 
8 
 
12 
 
12 
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Table 7.4. 
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Adolescents 
 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
  
N 
 
29 
 
22 
 
18 
 
21 
 
3 
 
3 
 
10 
 
10 
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Table 7.5.  
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Adults 
 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
  
N 
 
21 
 
13 
 
20 
 
16 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
4 
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Chapter Five: Performance & Learning 
Table 7.6. 
 Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Children 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
Competitive  
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
 
Competitive 
 
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
  
  
N 
 
38 
 
29 
 
28 
 
30 
 
34 
 
31 
 
Status 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
Competitive  
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
 
Competitive 
 
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
  
  
N 
 
11 
 
21 
 
20 
 
13 
 
14 
 
18 
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Table 7.7. 
Inclusion & Exclusion Cell Counts: Adolescents 
Status 
 
 
Included 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
Competitive  
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
 
Competitive 
 
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
  
  
N 
 
27 
 
26 
 
27 
 
24 
 
24 
 
26 
 
Status 
 
 
Excluded 
 
Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
 
Generic 
Norm 
 
Competitive  
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
 
Competitive 
 
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
  
  
N 
 
3 
 
0 
 
4 
 
7 
 
3 
 
3 
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Appendix B: Example Protocol 
Chapter Two: Outgroup Norms 
 
This is a survey designed by the Developmental Intergroup Processes Lab at the 
Goldsmiths, University London Psychology Department. This survey helps us to 
find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or 
wrong answers and this not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you 
do not want to finish the survey please let us know. 
    
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask! 
Today’s date:  _______________________________   
Your initials (e.g., Mark Smith is MS): ___________________ 
Birthday:  Please write the day, month, and year you were born  
(e.g., July 12, 1999): __________________________________ 
Your age in years (e.g., 10): ____________________________ 
Gender: ____________________________  
Your race or heritage (e.g. White British): _______________________ 
 
© 2015, Luke McGuire & Adam Rutland, Protocol Assessment 
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Chapter Three & Four: Generic Norms 
This is a survey designed by the Developmental Intergroup Processes Lab at the 
Goldsmiths, University London Psychology Department. This survey helps us to 
find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or 
wrong answers and this not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you 
do not want to finish the survey please let us know. 
    
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask! 
Today’s date:  _______________________________   
Your initials (e.g., Mark Smith is MS): ___________________ 
Birthday:  Please write the day, month, and year you were born  
(e.g., July 12, 1999): __________________________________ 
Your age in years (e.g., 10): ____________________________ 
Gender: ____________________________  
Ethnicity (e.g. White British): ____________________________  
SCHOOL NAME: _____________________________________ 
SCHOOL TEACHER: _________________________________ 
 
© 2015, Luke McGuire & Adam Rutland, Protocol Assessment 
© 2010, Joan Tycko, Illustrator 
 
 
Thank you!  Please turn the page! 
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INTRODUCTION: 
You are going to see pictures of some kids and read a little bit about them.  Then you 
will answer some questions about these kids.  We are interested in finding out what 
children your age think about things kids do. There are no right or wrong answers. 
This is not a test. No one will see your answers, and we do not put anyone’s name on 
any reports.  We only record your age and whether you are a girl or boy.   
 
When you see this type of line on the form: 
 
…this means that you will be asked to tick the circle that matches your answer to the 
question. 
 
For example, if you really liked pizza, you would tick or cross the “like a lot” box 
like this –  
How much do you like or not like pizza? 
 
 
So just tell us what you think about the stories by filling out this survey!  
 
THANK YOU! 
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First we would like you to imagine that you’re going to take part in an ART AND 
DRAWING COMPETITION. This competition is going to be held between your 
school, and some other schools in the local area. You are going to be on a team with 
some other kids from your school.  
 
This is your team: 
 
 
© 2010, Joan Tycko, Illustrator 
 
All these kids are members of your school.  
 
Please now: 
1 - Select a name for your group (ex. Superstars): 
________________________________ 
 
2 – Pick a team colour: 
________________________________ 
 
3 – Circle the symbol that you would like for your group: 
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The kids on YOUR TEAM have a secret message for the members of the team 
taking part in the art competition. This is the message from YOUR TEAM: 
 
"Hello, we’re really happy you’re going to be on our team for this drawing 
competition. We just have one rule if you’re going to be on our team, and that is; 
 
If you want to be part of the team, you should try and make our team win and 
never help the other teams in the competition. 
 
We’re really happy you’re going to be a member of the SCHOOL NAME HERE 
team, good luck!” 
  
 
1a. Does your team want to help other teams in the competition? 
 
YES              NO 
 
In this round of the art competition, you are going to be competing against another 
school in your area, SCHOOL NAME HERE. 
 
These are the kids on the team for X SCHOOL: 
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Whoever wins this competition between your school and X school will go on to take 
part in a UNITED KINGDOM CHARITY ART EVENT, where paintings and 
drawings will be sold to raise money so homeless animals are given somewhere to 
live and get enough food. This will be a big day where schools from all over the 
United Kingdom work together and help raise money for animals in need. 
 
 
 
 
1b. What event will the winners of the event go on to take part in? (Please circle 
ONE answer) 
 
a. United Kingdom National Art Competition 
b. United Kingdom Charity Art Event 
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The Student Councils of your school and X school have raised £100 to give out to 
the teams for purchasing extra materials they might want to use for the competition . 
. .  
 
 
 
 
  
Both teams have already raised the money they need to buy enough basic 
materials (for example, pencils and paper) to take part in the competition. 
 
 
 
The money that the student councils have raised is to buy extra, more special 
materials (for example, high quality paint and brushes). These extra materials will 
help make better art, which is more likely to win the competition. 
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Your team has talked about it, and they have voted to give £80 to your own 
team and £20 to the other team.  
 
YOUR TEAM:                                                   THE OTHER TEAM: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the past, when the other school team has talked about it they have voted to 
give £50 to their own team and £50 to your team.  
 
 
YOUR TEAM:                                               THE OTHER TEAM: 
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REMEMBER, your team has £100 to share between the two teams. Both teams 
already have enough money to buy basic materials – this money is to be used to 
buy more special materials, like expensive paints.  
 
Your team wants to split the money in favour of your team (£80 for your team and 
£20 to the other team). 
 
 
 
REMEMBER, the winners of the art competition will go on to take part in the 
UNITED KINGDOM CHARITY ART EVENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have been asked to make the final decision.  
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2a. How much money would you like to give to... (Remember, you only have £100, 
and whatever you don’t give to your team will go to the other team) 
 
Your school team _____£_________________ 
 
2b. Why did you split the money the way you did? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
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Everyone in the team has a vote on what to do... 
  
 
 
 
 
This is Danny and Erick; they are also on your 
school team. They have both voted to give £80 to 
your school team, and £20 to the other school 
team. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This is George; he is also on your school team. George wants to be 
different from the other members of the team. He has voted that your 
team should get £50, and the other team should get £50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Example Protocols 
 262 
 
These questions are about DANNY. Remember, Danny voted to give £80 to your 
team and £20 to the other team, which is what the rest of your team also said. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3a. How much do you think the group would like having Danny in your team?  
 
 
3b. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)   
 _____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
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3c. How much do you think YOU would like having Danny in your team?  
 
 
 
 
3d. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)   
 _____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
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These questions are about GEORGE. Remember, George voted to give £50 to your 
team and £50 to the other team, which is the opposite of what the rest of your team 
wanted to do. 
 
 
 
 
4a. How much do you think the group would like having George in your team?  
 
 
 
4b. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)   
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
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4c. How much do you think YOU would like having George in your team?  
 
 
 
4d. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)   
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5a: Do you think Danny was okay or not okay to vote to split the money £80 to £20?  
 
   OKAY  NOT OKAY  
 
 
5b: How okay or not okay was Danny to vote to split the money £80 to £20? 
 
1  2  3  4  5            6 
       Really               Really Okay 
  Not Okay 
 
 
 
6a: Do you think George was okay or not okay to vote to split the money £50 to 
£50?  
 
   OKAY  NOT OKAY  
 
 
6b: How okay or not okay was George to vote to split the money £50 to £50? 
 
1  2  3  4  5            6 
       Really               Really Okay 
  Not Okay 
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Chapter Five: Performance & Learning 
Before the art event takes place, we asked an award winning local artist to look at 
examples of the art from your school group and the other school group. 
 
The artist decided that most of the artists in your group were OF A 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARD, and better than most examples they see from 
people your age. 
 
The artist decided that most of the artists from the other school group were OF AN 
AVERAGE STANDARD, and no better than most examples they see from people 
your age. 
 
 
 
2a. Based on what you just read, and according to the local artist, your group are of 
an: 
 
a. AVERAGE standard 
b. PROFESSIONAL standard 
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The kids in your group have a secret message for the members of the group taking 
part in the art event. This is the message from your group: 
  
"Hello, we’re really happy you’re going to be in our group for this drawing event. 
We just have one rule if you’re going to be in our group, and that is; 
 
If you want to be part of the group, you should try and make our school do better 
than the other school groups, and never help the other groups in the event. 
 
We're really happy you're going to be a member of the XXXX group, good luck!” 
  
 
2a. Based on what you just read; does your team want to help other teams in the art 
event? 
a. YES 
b. NO 
 
As you read above, we want you to imagine you’re going to be taking part in an art 
event between your school and some other schools in the area. 
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This is a message from your class teacher, telling you a bit more about the art event: 
“You will be taking part in the United Kingdom Art Competition, which is the highest 
level of art competition in the country that schools can take part in. The idea here is 
for you to try your hardest to win by making the best art.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2b. My group will be taking part in: 
 
a. UNITED KINGDOM ART COMPETITION 
 
b. UNITED KINGDOM CHARITY ART EVENT 
 
c. UNITED KINGDOM ART EXHIBITION 
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The student councils of your school and OAKLANDS SCHOOL have bought some 
materials that can be shared between your school group and the other school group. 
These art supplies can be used in the event, and will help you to make better art. 
 
Your group are going to talk about how to share the supplies between your group 
and the other school group. 
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Remember, the Student Councils of your school and Oaklands School have bought 
materials that can be used in the competition. 
 
 
 
 
Your group has talked about it, and they have voted to give 8 BOXES TO YOUR 
GROUP and 2 BOXES TO THE OTHER SCHOOL GROUP. 
 
3a. How okay or not okay is it for your school group to split the supplies this way? 
(Tick One) 
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3b. Why? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
REMEMBER, your group has art materials to share between the two groups. 
These materials will help the groups do better art for the competition. 
 
Remember, you’re going to be taking part in the UNITED KINGDOM ART 
COMPETITION. The idea of the competition is for you to try your best to win 
and do the school proud. 
 
How would YOU share the supplies for the competition? 
 
4a. How many of the boxes of supplies would you give to… 
 
Your school group ___________________ 
 
The other school group ___________________ 
 
4b. Why did you split the supplies the way you did? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Example Protocols 
 272 
Chapter Six: Rectifying Inequality 
 
Your school already has LOTS of art materials (for example, paint and brushes) to 
use in the competition. These materials will help make better art, which is more 
likely to win the competition. 
 
Oaklands School does not have many of these art materials.  
 
 
 
 
2a. Based on what you just read, does your team have many art materials (e.g. paint 
and brushes) for the competition? (Circle one answer) 
 
YES         NO 
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The student councils of your school and OAKLANDS SCHOOL have bought some 
materials that can be shared between your school team and the other school team. 
These art supplies can be used in the competition, and will help you to make better 
art. 
 
Your team are going to talk about how to share the supplies between your team and 
the other school team. 
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The kids on your team have a secret message for the members of the team taking 
part in the art competition. This is the message from your team: 
  
"Hello, we’re really happy you’re going to be on our team for this drawing 
competition.  
  
We want to give more to the team that has less to begin with.  
  
We're really happy you're going to be a member of the SCHOOL DRAWING team, 
good luck!” 
 
 
 
 
2b. Based on what you just read; team wants to… 
 
a. Give the same amount to both teams 
 
b. Give more to the team that has less 
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Remember, the Student Councils of your school and Oaklands School have bought 
materials that can be used in the competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Your team has talked about it, and they have voted to give MORE SUPPLIES to 
THE OTHER SCHOOL TEAM and LESS SUPPLIES to YOUR SCHOOL 
TEAM. 
 
  
3a. How okay or not okay is it for your school team to give more supplies to the 
other team? (Tick One) 
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3b. Why? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
REMEMBER, your team has art materials to share between the two teams. These 
materials will help the teams do better art for the competition. 
 
Your team wants to give more supplies to the other school team. 
 
Your school wants to give more supplies to the team that has less. 
 
How would you do it? You have TEN boxes in total. 
 
 
4a. How many of the boxes of supplies would you give to… 
 
Your school team ___________________ 
 
The other school team ___________________ 
 
4b. Why did you split the supplies the way you did? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
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Let's think about the supplies for the competition again. Imagine 
that someone else on your school team got to decide how to give 
out the money.  
 
What if Peter decided to give more supplies to your 
school, because you'd always had more before? 
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5a. How okay or not okay would it be for Peter to give more to your school because 
you had always had more materials in the past? 
 
 
 
5b. Why? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C: Ethical Materials 
Example Letter to Parents 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I write to you from Goldsmiths College Psychology Department, with a request for 
the time and help of your son/daughter.  
As a part of my Doctoral studies I am hoping to conduct a study in your 
son/daughter’s school. We are interested in their feelings and attitudes towards 
people from different social groups, and fairness. Your child will only take part if 
they want to, and will be given the opportunity to ask questions at any time. The 
children who participate will be made aware that they can stop at any time, and that 
their participation is completely voluntary. All researchers who are involved in the 
data collection will have full DBS (criminal record) checks and work under the 
supervision of teachers and myself. 
 
The data that we gather from this study may at some point be presented at 
conferences or published in an academic journal as part of a broader research project 
– no child’s data will be singled out, the sample will only ever be considered as a 
whole. Confidentiality will remain of the utmost importance, and only the 
researchers involved will ever have access to names of participants. If you have any 
questions about the reasons we are conducting this research, or you’d like to know 
more/raise any issues, please do not hesitate to contact us.  
Given the school’s consent, we are operating an opt-out procedure, such that, if you 
are happy for your child to participate, there’s nothing further for you to do. 
However, if you do not wish for your child to take part in the study, please fill 
out the form overleaf and return it to the school. 
 
Kind Regards, 
Luke McGuire 
PhD Student 
(07540) 097204 
l.mcguire@gold.ac.uk 
 
 
 
I do NOT want my son/daughter .................................................  from year ......... to 
take part in the research project conducted by Luke McGuire/Goldsmiths College. 
 
Parent/Guardian Signature ................................................................. 
Date ................................................... 
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Example Verbal Participant Brief 
‘Hi, my name is Luke and I am from Goldsmiths which is part of the University of 
London. A University is a type of school you can go to when you get older. What I 
do at the University is called research, which means I come into schools like yours 
and talk to children like you about what you think about the world.  
The questions I ask aren’t like the questions you get in class because there aren’t any 
right or wrong answers. This isn’t like the tests you might get in class sometimes, 
I’m just interested in what you think.  
Today I’m going to ask you to fill out this questionnaire on a computer for me. The 
first page has some instructions and asks you for some details about yourself. We 
never ask for your name, so no one will be able to tell which answers are yours. No 
one will ever look at your answers individually, we only look at them as part of a big 
group. 
If you don’t want to take part in the questionnaire, you don’t have to. You are also 
free to stop at any time, without having to say why.  
If you have any questions as we’re going through the questionnaire then please just 
put your hand up and someone will come and help you. 
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
If you’re happy to take part, then please read the first page of the questionnaire, and 
when you get to the bottom, click on the blue arrow in the bottom right hand corner 
of the screen where the questions will begin. 
Thankyou!” 
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Verbal Debrief  
Debrief for Child Participants: 
 
This will be delivered verbally at the end of the study to the entire class, and will 
include: 
 
 Confidentiality reminder:  
“Remember, I’m the only person who will know your name, and no one else 
will be able to tell who gave your answers. Instead of your name we’re going 
to use the number on the booklet here. I’m going to keep a list of everyone’s 
names and numbers, but no one else will see it, and when we’re done I’ll 
make sure we get rid of the sheet.” 
 Reminder of study aim: 
““This is an experiment where we want to find out about how children like 
you get on with their friends, and how they feel about children in other 
groups. Your answers will be put together with the answers of all the other 
children who take part, so there’s no way someone can pick your answers 
out.” 
 
 Deception: 
“Earlier on, we asked you to imagine that these kids were in your group, and 
you were in a drawing competition against these other kids. Remember, this 
was all just a fun game, so don’t worry about the competition or the pictures 
of the kids here. They won’t read your answers, and neither will your 
teachers, we’re the only people who will look them over – remember what I 
said about how no one will be able to know the name of the kid who wrote 
the answers.” 
 
 “Do you have any questions you’d like to ask me?” 
 
 “You all did really well, thank you for taking part, you’ve been a great help!” 
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Example Parental Debrief Letter – Chapter Two 
Parental Debrief Form 
Firstly, I’d like to thank you for allowing your child to take part in this piece of 
postgraduate research conducted by Professor Rutland and myself here at the 
Goldsmiths Department of Psychology. It is incredibly gracious of you to allow your 
child to give us part of their time, and we hope they enjoyed the experience; it really 
is invaluable to us. 
This study was an exploration into the development of decision-making and resource 
distribution in children aged between 7 and 15 years old. Research has previously 
shown increases in selfish sharing from age 7 onwards, and it is the group factors 
that cause this age-related difference that we find ourselves interested in.  
 
Your child was initially put into a group based on their ‘drawing ability’ – in fact, 
this grouping was arbitrary, all children were told that they were “excellent” drawers. 
We then introduced them to their ‘team members’ – pictures of other children on a 
laptop computer, who were again, not really a part of the study. Throughout the 
experiment, participants were reminded that it was completely their choice as to 
whether they continued, and that they could leave at any time without being asked 
why. I would like to reassure you that their answer booklets will not be shown to 
anyone who is not directly involved in the research project – and that no names are 
included on these booklets; in fact, each child is only identifiable by a participant 
number. Given this information, should you now decide that you do not wish for 
your child’s data to be included in the study, please do not hesitate to contact me at 
the email/phone number given below – only I have access to the participant 
number/name details, and can remove individuals from the study. Finally, each child 
was asked to play a ‘sharing game’, where they chose how to split tokens with a 
member of the ‘other’ team they were introduced to at the start of the study. 
The data collected here may be presented at conferences, in academic papers, and 
reports that we send back to schools. Your child’s answers will be put together with 
a large sample of other children, and presented only in terms of broad findings – no 
individual’s answers will ever be called into question.  However, let me again stress 
that you may contact me if you are not happy for your child’s data to proceed. 
 
Finally, I’d like to thank you again for your co-operation, and provide you with 
contact details below for myself and my supervising professor, should you have any 
issues you’d like to raise. 
Kind Regards, 
 
Luke McGuire                                           Professor Adam Rutland 
l.mcguire@gold.ac.uk                                 a.rutland@gold.ac.uk 
07540097204                                               020 7078 5442 
 
 
 
 
